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Summary
This thesis investigates socio-economic drivers and impacts of internal migration in
two countries, Brazil and Ghana.
The first empirical chapter analyses the choice of Brazilian workers to move out
of metropolitan cities. This direction of movement is substantial in the Brazilian
context and leading against standard models of rural-to-urban migration. I estimate
the role of living costs and local amenities in the determination of the destination
choice of metropolitan out-migrants. Furthermore, I quantify the returns to mi-
grating out of a metropolis by computing counterfactual wages applying matching
techniques. The metropolitan out-migrants prefer to move to smaller towns where
their real wage gain is positive. They minimize the physical and social costs of
migration by moving to closer towns within their state of birth. Living costs in big
cities appear to be a main driver for workers to leave these, especially if they are
low-skilled.
In the second empirical chapter, I investigate the effect of internal migration on
homicide rates in Brazil in the period from 2005 to 2010. I construct a retrospective
panel of migration rates between municipalities and use local labour demand shocks
in the manufacturing sector at the origins of migrants as instrument for immigration
rates. An increase in immigration rates of 1% translates in an increase of 1.2% in
crime rates at the local level. The effect is predominant in municipalities with histor-
ically higher homicide rates and there is no effect in locations with a large informal
sector. While internal migration puts pressure on destination labour markets, these
results suggest that it is the presence of a criminal or lack of a flexible sector that
channel this pressure into negative outcomes.
The third empirical chapter explores dynamic patterns of internal migration from
rural areas in Ghana. With a new household panel survey collected in 2013 and
again in 2015, I document that many households have multiple migrants moving at
different points in time and for various reasons. Conditional on having had a migrant
in the past, I estimate the effect of having a new migrant on the asset welfare of
origin households. The findings suggest that due to prior migration experience and
consequently lower migration costs for new migrants, there is no decline in welfare
from having a new migrant.
4Acknowledgements
This thesis is a milestone on my journey to become an applied economist. I am
indebted to my supervisors, Prof Andy McKay and Dr Chari Amalavoyal. Their
patience, insights, and encouragement was essential to complete this thesis.
My special thanks go to Dr Julie Litchfield for her constant support. She gave
me the opportunity to learn from and with her. I am grateful to have gained a
co-author and friend in her.
Faculty in the Department of Economics at the University of Sussex has always
been very supportive, especially Prof L. Alan Winters who encouraged my work.
This thesis benefited from the financial support of the Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC) as well as the Migrating out of Poverty (MooP) Research
Programme Consortium funded by the Department for International Development
(DFID). I thank the team of MooP for giving me the opportunity to learn together
from our multi-disciplinary work. My trip to the project partners at the Center for
Migration Studies (University of Ghana, Legon) was a truly enriching experience.
This journey was filled with wonderful as well as difficult moments. Neither
would I have enjoyed nor gotten through them without my yoga teacher Gratia, my
bicycle, and most importantly the beautiful collegiality and friendship I share with
my fellow Ph.D. colleagues:
Cecilia Poggi, Elsa Valli, Samantha DeMartino, Antonia Schwarz, Rashaad Chow-
dhury, Hector Rufrancos, Francisco Cabrera, Ani Silwal, Mattia DiUbaldo, Amrita
Saha, Mimi Xiao, Egidio Farina, Jorge Hombrados, Edgar Salgado, Tsegay Tekle-
selassi, Pedro Orraca, Nihar Shembavnekar, Andreas Eberhard-Ruiz, Rafael Parra-
Pen˜a, Nick Jacob, Eugenia Go, Marta Schoch, Sweta Gupta, Wiktoria Tafesse,
Maika Schmidt and Daniele Guariso.
All of them shared their knowledge of economics and Stata with me as well as a
great curiosity for each other’s research - peer-education at its best.
There are many friends whose support and distraction I greatly appreciated
during my time in Brighton: Javi, Samantha with my ‘PhD-nephews’ Shayon and
Niraad, Marco, Mar, Jonas, Lorenz, Fatema, Stace, Toma´s, Filippo, Sarah, Michela
with Attilio, and Henry.
I would also like to thank my friends who were constantly and patiently support-
ing this process from a distance, especially Judith and Myriam, and Alexandra, my
extended ‘family’ Nina, Brigitte and Matthias as well as Manfred and Brigitte.
Marcos receives a Muito obrigada! for inviting me to Rio de Janeiro and easing
my access to Brazil, its people, data and language.
There is nothing comparable to the unconditional love and support of my family.
I would have never chosen to pursue the Ph.D. if it had not been for my parents’
encouragement. They made me believe in my strengths and curiosity. Danke, Mama
und Papa. My brothers, Robert and Richard, I thank for sibling-silliness to gain
perspective. I thank Oma Inge, who is not with us anymore, but always present in
my heart.
To Michael goes my love and gratefulness for proof-reading, ensuring that I am
always well fed and for his endless patience.
5Contents
List of Tables 12
List of Figures 14
Introduction 15
1 Out-Migration from Metropolitan Cities in Brazil 19
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.1 Data source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.2 Definition of migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.3 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.4 Definition of origins and destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.5 Other variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.1 Patterns of internal migration in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.3.2 Comparing origins and destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3.3 Comparing migrants and residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4 Destination choice of migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4.1 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.4.3 Robustness: Hedonic housing prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.4.4 Relative effect size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.5 Counterfactual earnings of metropolitan out-migrants . . . . . . . . . 50
61.5.1 Empirical methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.5.3 Robustness: Price measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2 Internal migration and crime: Municipal homicide rates in Brazil
2005-2010 60
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Homicides in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Data, variables and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.1 Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.4.2 Origins and destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.4.3 Homicides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4.4 Migration and crime in Brazil from 2005 to 2010 . . . . . . . . 72
2.4.5 Additional variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.1 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.2 Instrument for immigration rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.6.1 First stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.6.2 Second stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.7 Robustness and sensitivity of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.7.1 Challenges to the exogeneity of the instrument . . . . . . . . . 84
2.7.2 National employment growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.7.3 Alternative weighting of origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7.4 Recall bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7.5 Misreported homicide data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.7.6 Dynamic effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.8 Discussion of possible channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
72.8.1 Channels at the individual level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.8.2 Labour market structure: Informal and criminal sector . . . . 92
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3 The nature and impact of repeated migration within households in
rural Ghana 99
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2.1 Evidence on the impact of migration on origin households . . 103
3.2.2 Migration in Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.3 Analytical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5.1 Baseline and new migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.6 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6.1 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6.2 Dependent variable: Asset index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.6.3 Identification strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.7.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.7.2 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.7.3 Community shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Conclusions 156
Bibliography 159
8A Appendix to Chapter 1 172
A.1 Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.1.1 Coarsened exact matching (CEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A.1.2 Application of CEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
A.2 Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B Appendix to Chapter 2 184
B.1 Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
B.2 Additional figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.3 Misreported homicide data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
C Appendix to Chapter 3 193
C.1 Multiple Correspondence Analysis to construct asset index . . . . . . 193
C.2 Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C.3 Additional tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
9List of Tables
1.1 Migrants between metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es
between 2009 and 2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2 Cross-tabulation of origin and destination regions of migrants moving
out of metropolitan microregio˜es between 2009 and 2010. . . . . . . 27
1.3 Characteristics of metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es in
2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 Characteristics of migrants and non-migrants 2010 . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Labour market characteristics of migrants and non-migrants 2010 . . 35
1.6 Difference between non-metropolitan destination and metropolitan
origin comparing chosen destination to alternative destinations . . . 41
1.7 Destination choice conditional on migration, alternative specific logit 44
1.8 Destination choice of metropolitan out-migrants. Changes in wage
and price measures; Inclusion of unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 48
1.9 Elasticities of independent variables for example location . . . . . . . 49
1.10 Differences in actual and predicted wages for metropolitan out-migrants,
after matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.11 Differences in actual and predicted wages for metropolitan out-migrants,
by education level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.12 Differences in actual and predicted real wages for metropolitan out-
migrants using hedonic prices as denominator, after matching . . . . 57
2.1 Descriptive statistics of main variables, destination municipality-year
observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
10
2.2 First stage of the 2SLS regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.3 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on immigration rates 2005-2010,
Second stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.4 IV-2SLS regression: Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.5 Descriptive statistics of origin and destination characteristics 2010 . 91
2.6 Migrants’ characteristic in response to local labour demand shocks at
origin in t-1, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.7 IV-2SLS regressions, Sub-samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.1 Sample of treatment and control households across regions in 2013 . . 112
3.2 Demographic information of migrants, by migrant status and gender . 114
3.3 Migration decision and facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4 Migration costs and means of financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.5 Migration experience: repetition, seasonality, destination and occu-
pation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.6 Remittances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.7 Contact and support from origin household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.8 Household characteristics at baseline, by group . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.9 Asset ownership by group and year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.10 First and second moments of covariates after applying entropy bal-
ancing weights, by group in 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.11 Effect of having a new migrant on asset index, weighted least squares 145
3.12 Number of new migrants, weighted least squares . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.13 Interaction of treatment with the characteristics of new migrants . . . 147
3.14 Having a new migrant by reason for migration, weighted least squares 149
3.15 Sensitivity of results of asset index using different ways to construct
the asset index, weighted least squares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.16 Effect of new migrant on household welfare controlling for major
shocks in community, weighted least squares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
11
A.1 Coefficients and t-statistics of prediction of wages for migrants based
on residents at destination, OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
A.2 Observed and predicted wage differences based on unmatched sample 178
A.3 Observed and predicted real wage differences using different measures
of living costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
A.4 Regression of housing prices on housing characteristics to predict he-
donic price index, OLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
A.5 Variables and data sources used in chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
B.1 OLS regression of the local economy on the instrument in net-sending
municipalities, 2005-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
B.2 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on immigration rates 2005-2010,
Second stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.3 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on net-migration rates 2005-2010,
Second stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
B.4 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on immigration rates with lagged
immigration rates 2005-2010, Second stage results . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.5 Migrants’ characteristic in response to local labour demand shocks at
origin, by year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
B.6 Characteristics of destination municipalities with and without missing
homicide values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
B.7 Robustness of results to changes in homicide values . . . . . . . . . . 192
C.1 Likelihood for household to attrite, Logit and Multinomial Logit results200
C.2 Migration costs by number of times migrant moved before . . . . . . 204
C.3 Results of Chow test; H0 = Coefficients are stable across sub-samples 204
C.4 Effect of having a new migrant on asset index dropping local employ-
ment rate from control variables, weighted least squares . . . . . . . . 204
12
C.5 Effect of having a new migrant on asset index, weighted least squares.
Entropy balancing weights constructed including the asset index and
its squared term at baseline instead of individual asset indicators. . . 205
C.6 Effect of having a new migrant on asset index, weighted least squares.
Asset index constructed from data pooling both survey waves. . . . . 206
C.7 Effect of new migrant on household welfare controlling for sample
that did not respond to shock question, weighted least squares . . . . 206
13
List of Figures
1.1 Map of greater regions and metropolitan cities of Brazil. . . . . . . . 25
1.2 Out-migration rate from metropolitan cities in Brazil from 2004 to
2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 Map of destination microregio˜es of migrants leaving metropolitan cit-
ies in 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Average annual GDP per capita in microregio˜es 2000-2010 by popu-
lation size of microregia˜o. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Average annual formal sector wages in microregio˜es 2002-2010 by
population size of microregia˜o. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Kernel density plots of actual and predicted nominal wages of metro-
politan out-migrants with matching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.7 Kernel density plots of actual and predicted real wages of metropol-
itan out-migrants with matching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.1 Map of origin and destination municipalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2 Map of homicide rate in destination municipalities. . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3 Map of immigration rate in destination municipalities. . . . . . . . . 73
2.4 Map of instrument in sending municipalities, employment share in
the manufacturing sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.5 Annual national wage growth in the manufacturing sector. . . . . . . 79
2.6 Results for different distance cut-offs in the migration definition. . . . 86
3.1 Asset index of treated and control households in 2013 . . . . . . . . . 134
14
3.2 Asset index of treated and control households in 2015 . . . . . . . . . 135
3.3 Kernel density of household size in 2013, by treatment groups . . . . 141
A.1 Balancing statistics for unmatched sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
A.2 Matching summary of Coarsend Exact Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B.1 Homicide rates in Sa˜o Paulo State 2004 to 2015. . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
B.2 Manufacturing employment share in destinations and origins 2005-2010.187
C.1 Explanatory power of each dimension of MCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
C.2 Summary of first dimension of MCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C.3 Summary of first dimension of MCA, continued . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
C.4 Distribution of asset index for attrited, treated and control households
in 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
15
Introduction
Internal migration is a common phenomenon in most countries. An estimated 740
million people live outside their region of birth (Bell and Muhidin, 2009). Individu-
als move to locate where they can achieve a higher return to their skills or where
they hope to find better opportunities than in their origin (Sjaastad, 1962). House-
holds move in response to unfavourable environments or they might send members
to diversify their income sources (Stark and Bloom, 1985). On the aggregate, migra-
tion out of the rural into the more productive urban sector eventually transforms a
country’s economy to a more advanced one (Harris and Todaro, 1970). The contri-
bution to poverty reduction and economic development motivates research to better
understand the socio-economic drivers and impacts of internal migration.
To broaden our understanding of internal migration it is important to study
people’s mobility with the latest data available. Using such data from Brazil and
Ghana, this thesis documents recent migration patterns and applies econometric
methods to analyse their causes and consequences at the individual, household and
local level. Studying internal migration is inherently prone to endogeneity issues.
The empirical chapters of this thesis address these with methods from the evaluation
and the local labour market literature.
Models of internal migration in developing countries focus on rural to urban
movements, because it is in line with the structural two-sector model of development
(Harris and Todaro, 1970). However, data suggests that rural to rural migration is
more common and even urban to rural migration exists. Recent studies started
to move away from the rural-urban dichotomy and included smaller towns in their
16
analysis (Christiaensen and Todo, 2014). In the first empirical chapter, I document
that a substantial share of migrants in Brazil move out of the biggest cities to
smaller towns. Why do workers move out of metropolitan cities? There are several
possible explanations. On the side of pull-factors, smaller towns in Brazil have been
catching up economically partially due to targeted public investment in lagging
areas. The smaller cities might attract migrants with increasing job opportunities
and fast growing wages. Furthermore, they often have lower crime rates than big
cities in Brazil so that they offer a safer environment to live in. On the other
hand, public service provision in smaller towns is often worse than in big cities in
Brazil. It is hence possible that migrants might also be pushed out of big cities
and not just pulled into the smaller destinations. Urbanization can be associated
with overcrowding and scarcity of affordable housing so that workers might decide
to leave the expensive city for a cheaper smaller town.
I use the detailed information of the Brazilian Population Census survey of 2010
to analyse the out-migration of workers from metropolitan cities. First, I estimate
the role of wages, living costs and local amenities for the destination choice of
metropolitan out-migrants. Secondly, I quantify the wage return to moving out
of big cities in nominal and real terms by computing counterfactual wages with
matching techniques. The metropolitan out-migrants prefer to move to towns where
their real wage gain is positive and they minimize the physical and social costs of
migration. Wage differences are not significant for the destination choice, whereas
price differences are. The results suggest that high living costs in metropolises drive
workers out into smaller towns whose economies are growing fast and thus offer an
attractive alternative.
The second empirical chapter investigates the relationship of labour mobility and
local crime. Crime rates in Brazil are among the highest in the world which is asso-
ciated with high economic cost. The economic literature on crime finds that labour
market factors, such as low income and unemployment, are important determinants
for higher crime (Becker, 1968). One important aspect of labour market dynamics is
17
internal migration because it can affect the employment rate and wages in migrants’
destinations (Kleemans and Magruder, 2017). These effects can in consequence lead
to higher crime. The existing evidence of the impacts of international immigration
on crime in destination countries suggests, however, that there is no effect or, if one
is found, it is associated with a specific group of immigrants (e.g. Bell et al. (2013)).
Impacts of international immigration on labour markets differ to those found for
internal migration. It is therefore not clear whether and how internal migration
affects crime. The second empirical chapter provides evidence for a positive effect
of internal migration on crime and explores possible channels that could explain the
result.
Specifically, I estimate the effect of internal migration on homicide rates in
Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to 2010. The Census survey data of 2010 is
used to construct a retrospective panel of migration rates between municipalities.
Local labour demand shocks in the manufacturing sector at the origins of migrants
provide exogenous variation in immigration rates to overcome endogeneity issues.
An increase in the immigration rate by 1% is related to an increase of 1.2% in
the homicide rate. The effect persists in destinations where the informal sector is
small and the criminal sector large. This suggests that labour market structures can
channel the impact of internal migration on local labour markets in different ways.
Migration is also common in rural households in Ghana. Often more than one
household member migrates at different points in time. Studies looking at the impact
of migration on left-behind households most times do not differentiate whether the
migrant was the first member to move or whether she or another household member
moved in the past. This could imply different reasons for migration as well as
different impacts on the household. For example, some migrants might be sent to
support the household by earning an income and to diversify the income sources.
Another migrant leaves to pursue higher education or to find better opportunities
than those in his origin community without any obligations to send money back
home. The third empirical chapter documents such repeated patterns of migration
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with a new household panel survey from five regions in Ghana.
This survey provides detailed information on the demographics of migrants and
their households, reasons for migration and its support, the financing and costs of
movement, as well as contacts, jobs and occupations at destination. This information
is used in the third empirical chapter to document the nature of repeated migration
within households. The econometric analysis then further estimates how having
a new migrant is related to the asset welfare of households left behind. There is
no impact of new migrants leaving a household on the asset index. This chapter
focuses on households with prior engagement in migration. The data documents
that such migration experience is related to lower moving costs for new migrants
and a different relationship of the new migrants to the origin household compared
to that of previous migrants. These observations help to explain the findings of no
effect on the asset index.
In summary, this thesis offers new empirical evidence concerning drivers of in-
ternal migration and its consequences for receiving and sending communities. It
is structured as follows: Chapter 1 describes the out-migration from metropolitan
cities in Brazil and analyses the destination choice and wage return of out-migrants.
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of internal migration on crime in Brazilian mu-
nicipalities. In chapter 3, dynamic migration patterns of Ghanaian households are
documented and their effect on household welfare is estimated. The conclusion then
summarises the findings and discusses the limitations of this thesis providing an
outlook for future research.
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Chapter 1
Out-Migration from Metropolitan
Cities in Brazil
1.1 Introduction
Urban areas attract workers with job opportunities, high wages and better services.
Yet, with the urbanisation waves in developing countries, large cities face many
problems associated with over-crowding, such as informal housing, congested in-
frastructure and unemployment. Furthermore, many metropolitan cities in these
countries have been growing in population but not economically (Fay and Opal,
2000). City growth increases demand for housing and amenities, whose supply has
a relatively inelastic. Higher living costs put pressure on workers whose budget share
for these goods is relatively high (Giannetti, 2003).
With rising congestion externalities, one might expect significant out-migration
from big cities as was observed in the 70s and 80s in the US and Europe as the so-
called ‘population turnaround’ (Cochrane and Vining, 1988). This phenomenon was
accompanied by the fact that previously lagging regions regained attractiveness as
they were catching up economically. In the second half of the 2000’s, the Brazilian
government heavily invested in the development of lagging areas. Income has been
converging between poorer and richer Brazilian cities (Mata et al., 2005). Previously
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small and remote towns can now offer an alternative to the congested metropolitan
cities (Christiaensen et al., 2017; Ministe´rio do Planejamento, 2010; Lall et al., 2009;
de Oliveira and de Oliveira, 2011).
Retrospective migration data from Brazil shows that around 20 percent of in-
ternal migrants1 moved out of metropolitan cities between 2009 and 2010, which
equals the share of migrants moving into the metropolises in the same period. The
majority of out-migrants (around 78 percent) move to live and work in medium-
sized destinations,2 not small and rural locations. It appears that both high and
low educated out-migrants are equally likely to move which gives rise to the question
what drives these workers out of the cities.
There is a vast literature on the spatial sorting of migrants by skills with a fo-
cus on agglomeration effects (Henderson, 1986; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009; Matano
and Naticchioni, 2012; Cheng et al., 2012; Fu and Gabriel, 2012; Eeckhout et al.,
2014). These studies document that high-skilled workers benefit from human capital
concentration in big cities. For low-skilled workers, skill-complementarity determ-
ines whether they benefit from agglomeration. Other papers investigate the sorting
decision from an individual choice perspective. These studies found that workers
sort themselves to destinations by balancing the highest return to their skills and
the chance to find employment against local living costs and the presence of local
amenities according to their individual preferences (Borjas, 1987; Borjas et al., 1992;
Dahl, 2002; Aroca Gonzalez and Maloney, 2005; Lokshin et al., 2007; Moretti, 2011;
Aguayo-Te´llez et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2011; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Fafchamps
and Shilpi, 2013).
Despite that metropolitan out-migration appears to be substantial in the Brazilian
case, there is little known about the reasons motivating individuals to this move in
the context of developing countries.3 This chapter hence investigates which local
1These migrants leave their place of birth and are not return migrants.
2The median population size of the administrative unit, a microregia˜o, is 173,453 inhabitants.
I classify a medium-sized microregia˜o as one that has between 170,000 and 1 million inhabitants
and above 1 million as metropolitan city.
3One exception is McCormick and Wahba (2005) who analyse migration in and out of big cities
in Egypt. However, their sample of migrants moving out of the big cities is only 82 observations and
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characteristics are preferred by the metropolitan out-migrants and whether their
destination choice is associated with an actual gain in nominal as well as real wages.
The analysis of the migrants’ destination choice is motivated by the fact that
not every destination yields the same returns for migrants, because economic de-
velopment varies across a country. I estimate how various factors at the local level
affect the individual destination choice conditional on migration with a conditional
logit model. The focus lies on the established determinants of migration: wages,
costs, and local amenities. I assume a cost-benefit model of migration in which
benefits are proxied with the expected wage in the destination as a function of skills
(Sjaastad, 1962; Dahl, 2002). Costs are modelled with the distance between origin
and destination and the difference in living costs (Giannetti, 2003; Moretti, 2011;
Kennan and Walker, 2011). Coarsened exact matching (CEM) is applied to control
for selection bias in the prediction of expected wages. Following this analysis, I
further investigate how the actual wages instead of expected wages reflect a gain or
loss resulting from moving out of metropolitan cities. I use counterfactual wages of
migrants to estimate the return to out-migration in nominal and real wages. A few
studies analyse the counterfactual situation of households had their member not mi-
grated, but not of the migrants themselves (Barham and Boucher, 1998; Rodriguez,
1998; Tunalı, 2000; Adams, 2006; Lokshin et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2008; Brown
and Jimenez, 2008; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013).
The results in this chapter demonstrate that the metropolitan out-migrants
prefer smaller cities where cost of living are lower. The counterfactual analysis
confirms that the return to metropolitan out-migration is positive in real wages.
The difference in living costs between metropolitan origins and non-metropolitan
destinations appears to exceed migration costs. This result is strongest for low-
skilled workers, who would normally experience a decline in nominal wages from
leaving metropolitan cities. Furthermore, the out-migrants prefer towns closer to
their origin and within their own state of birth which reduces the economic and
their hypothesis focuses on the movement into compared to out of large cities and the concentration
of specific skill and age groups in large cities.
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social costs of moving. They seem to be willing to accept lower quality in health
service provision, but prefer destinations where education quality is relatively bet-
ter. These results suggest that high prices are pushing workers out of metropolitan
cities.
With this chapter I contribute to the related literature in several ways: To the
best of my knowledge, it is the first work to empirically document the economic
determinants of out-migration from metropolitan cities at the individual level in a
developing country. I exploit the detailed information on migration from a unique
census survey. I account for migration between local labour markets which allows me
to capture a large share of labour mobility within states that accounts for more than
50 percent of migration in Brazil. Even though migration is high within Brazilian
states due to large inequality in economic performance (De Vreyer and Spielvogel,
2009), most studies of migration in Brazil look only at movements at a more ag-
gregated level such as state or region (Yap, 1976; Santos and Ferreira, 2007; dos
Santos Ju´nior et al., 2005; Lall et al., 2009; Aguayo-Te´llez et al., 2010; Fally et al.,
2010). The variation of wages, prices, service provision and other amenities across
a country plays an important role in the location choice of workers (Moretti, 2011)
and regional planning can influence these factors. Policy makers intending to relieve
cities from congestion should thus understand patterns of migration into and out of
metropolitan cities.
The paper is structured as follows. The data used for the empirical analysis is
described in section 1.2. Descriptive maps, graphs and tables explore the nature
of migration from metropolitan to non-metropolitan cities in detail in section 1.3.
Thereafter, the conceptual framework of the destination choice model is discussed
in section 1.4 and results are presented in the same section. The results of the
counterfactual estimation are presented in section 1.5. Section 1.6 then concludes.
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1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data source
Every ten years the Brazilian National Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
conducts a 10 percent nationally representative household survey, the Census survey
(Censo Demogrfico 2010, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE)
(2012)). The survey of 2010 comprises around 20 million individual observations
in all municipalities of Brazil. It contains information on household composition,
living conditions, labour market, education, geographic location, and on migration.
1.2.2 Definition of migration
The Census survey from 2010 allows to identify migrants in the sample using the
questions “Were you born in this municipality?” to know whether people are living
in their birthplace, “When did you move to this municipality?” provides the year
of migration, and the question “In which municipality (in which state) did you live
before you moved to this municipality that you are currently living in?” provides
the exact origin of migrants. It further asks for the municipality of the current job
as well as of the previous job. Migrants are individuals who used to live and work
in a different location than the on they are living in at the time of the survey.
1.2.3 Sample
The sample comprises working-age migrants and non-migrant residents. The legal
working age in Brazil is 16 years, and the retirement age for men 65 years. The age
group for the sample has been restricted from 25 up to 65 years. This way it can
be assumed that students are excluded. All individuals in the sample are currently
not in school and are participating in the labour market which means that they
are either employed or unemployed but looking for work. I restrict the sample of
migrants to those who moved within the past year, between 2009 and 2010, in order
to minimize recall bias.
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1.2.4 Definition of origins and destinations
Migration is measured as change in living and working location at the level of a mi-
croregia˜o. Microregio˜es are geographic and administrative agglomerations of muni-
cipalities sharing a labour market and economic activities, a bit larger than counties
in the US. I define 22 of these microregio˜es as metropolitan based on their popula-
tion size of 1 million and above.4 There are 551 microregio˜es, 22 metropolitan and
529 non-metropolitan microregio˜es. Information on the local characteristics is ag-
gregated to the microregia˜o level using individual level data from the Census survey.
I use survey weights to obtain local estimates of wages and housing prices measured
with the amount of rent per room.
1.2.5 Other variables
Other information on local characteristics is obtained from Ipeadata. This is an
online data pool provided by Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada (Ipea), a
Brazilian public research institute that collects data from several ministries and
other public sources. It contains information on GDP, quality of education and
health provision, and homicide rates as a measure of crime at the microregia˜o level.
Quality of education and health are measured using an index constructed and
annually updated by the Industrial Federation of the federal state of Rio de Janeiro
(FIRJAN). The index for education provision combines information about subscrip-
tion rate of pre-school children, dropout rate, rate of teachers with higher education,
average daily teaching hours, as well as the results of a national education develop-
ment score. The health provision quality index comprises the number of pre-natal
consultations, deaths due to badly defined causes, and child-deaths due to evitable
causes.
I also use data on formal sector wages from the national industrial census (RAIS)
provided at aggregate level by the online portal Dataviva (DataViva, 2016). All
4This definition follows that of the United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects (UNWUP)
(Christiaensen et al., 2013).
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variables used and their source are specified in the appendix in table A.5 (page
183).
1.3 Descriptive Statistics
1.3.1 Patterns of internal migration in Brazil
Figure 1.1: Map of greater regions and metropolitan cities of Brazil.
Figure 1.1 shows a map of Brazil, its five greater regions and the 22 metropolitan
cities that are the focus of this analysis. The metropolitan cities are located mainly
along the coast with the exception of the state capitals in the South-eastern region,
Goiaˆnia in the Central-West, Manaus in the Amazon as well as the national capital
Bras´ılia.
Labour migration within Brazil is historically very common and mainly attrib-
uted to socio-economic differences between regions and between the underdeveloped
rural areas and several large urban centres (Yap, 1976). In recent years, migration
patterns in Brazil have been changing. Of all Brazilian internal migrants in the year
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before the Census of 2010, 47 percent moved between non-metropolitan areas (Table
1.1). The second largest movement is into and out of metropolitan cities from and
to non-metropolitan microregio˜es (Table 1.1) comprising around 20 percent each of
all recent migrants, a substantial share of migration in the country. The remaining
12 percent of migrants move between the metropolises.
Table 1.1: Migrants between metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es
between 2009 and 2010.
Destination
Non-metropolitan Metropolitan
Origin N % N %
Non-metropolitan 380,627 46.9 167,781 20.7
Metropolitan 162,647 20.1 99,143 12.2
Total N=810,196, using survey weights
The graph in figure 1.2, plots the out-migration rate from cities with over one
million inhabitants in Brazil from 2004 to 2009. The rate at which people leave big
cities has been increasing.
Figure 1.2: Out-migration rate from metropolitan cities in Brazil from 2004 to
2009.
Table 1.2 shows migration flows by region. The majority of migrants who leave
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metropolitan cities and move to non-metropolitan areas move within their own re-
gion. This is illustrated by the large diagonal elements in table 1.2. Only workers
from the Central-West region cross the regional borders relatively more often.
Table 1.2: Cross-tabulation of origin and destination regions of migrants moving
out of metropolitan microregio˜es between 2009 and 2010.
Destination
North Northeast Southeast South Central-West Total
Origin
North 75 % 8 % 7 % 6 % 5 % 100 %
Northeast 5 % 75 % 13 % 4 % 4 % 100 %
Southeast 3 % 13 % 71 % 9 % 4 % 100 %
South 2 % 2 % 6 % 86 % 3 % 100 %
Central-West 18 % 15 % 16 % 6 % 44 % 100 %
Proportions by origin computed using survey weights.
Not presented in the table, at the level of the federal state, 43 percent of the
metropolitan out-migrants leave their state of birth, the other 57 percent stay within
the same state when they move. On average metropolitan out-migrants move 930km.
For example, the distance from Sa˜o Paulo to Rio de Janeiro is 440km whereas
the distance from Sa˜o Paulo to the capital Bras´ılia is around 1,000 km. These
observations confirm that the level of analysis at microregia˜o level captures also
intra-regional population dynamics, the largest movements in the country.
The map in figure 1.3 shows the destinations of the most recent metropolitan
out-migrants. The majority of them moves to the Southeast and Central-West, but
also to more remote microregio˜es in other parts of the country. Some of the non-
metropolitan destinations are those neighbouring the metropolitan cities and thus
reflect the agglomeration at work around large cities, others are located in areas far
away from a metropolitan city.
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Figure 1.3: Map of destination microregio˜es of migrants leaving metropolitan cities
in 2009.
1.3.2 Comparing origins and destinations
Table 1.3 compares metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es in terms of
socio-economic characteristics. In the second and fourth column, I also include the
coefficient of variation for the metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es to
illustrate how diverse especially non-metropolitan areas are.
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of metropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es in 2010
Metropolitan Non-metropolitan
Mean Coeff. of Mean Coeff. of
Variation Variation
Population 2,679,687 1.11 213,680 0.79
Room rent (Brazilian Reais (R$), mean) 82.14 0.24 50.63 0.39
Room rent (R$, median) 72.47 0.23 45.22 0.42
Hourly wage (R$) 12.11 0.22 7.23 0.29
Share of
Unskilled workers 0.37 0.09 0.37 0.14
Skilled workers 0.31 0.11 0.40 0.14
High skilled workers 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.23
Formally employed 0.58 0.11 0.40 0.36
Unemployed 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.41
Share of workers in
Agriculture 0.09 0.36 0.30 0.39
Industry 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.37
Services 0.53 0.08 0.35 0.23
Public services 0.11 0.25 0.12 0.24
People living in
Urban residence 0.97 0.04 0.73 0.20
Adequate living conditions 0.57 0.28 0.36 0.67
Other measures
Log(GDP) 16.73 0.06 13.57 0.08
GDP growth 2005-2010 0.16 0.31 0.18 0.79
Health quality index (0 to 1) 0.82 0.09 0.79 0.11
Education quality index (0 to 1) 0.77 0.14 0.73 0.14
Homicide rate (per 100,000) 38.00 0.54 18.58 0.77
Skill level of workers is based on the occupation classification by the International Labor Organization
(ILO).
Industries include extractive industry, processing industry, electricity/gas, sanitation/sewage, con-
struction. Services include commerce, transport, housing/food, information/communication, finan-
cial services, real estate, professional consulting, science and technology, administrative services,
arts/culture/sports, domestic services, and other services. Public services include public administra-
tion, security, education, health and social services, international organizations/foreign institutions.
Six of the microregio˜es had missing values for homicide rates. I replaced them with 0 due to the way
homicides are reported. For a more detailed discussion, see appendix section B.3 on page 188.
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Metropolitan cities have on average around ten times more inhabitants than
non-metropolitan microregio˜es. In terms of prices, metropolitan residents face room
rents that are more than 50 percent higher than in non-metropolitan areas. At
the same time they earn similarly higher wages. As expected, high skilled occu-
pations are concentrated in the metropolitan areas and labour markets are much
more formalized in these big cities. The employment share of various sectors is
highest for services with 53 percent in the metropolitan areas and 35 percent in
non-metropolitan microregio˜es. Yet, agriculture in the non-metropolitan areas em-
ploys around 30 percent compared to only 9 percent in metropolitan cities. While
GDP is higher in metropolitan regions, it is growing faster in the non-metropolitan
regions. In terms of living standards, almost 60 percent of metropolitan residents
live with adequate sewage, water and electricity provision compared to only 36 per-
cent outside of these cities.5 This illustrates the stark spatial inequality not only in
economic but also in social aspects. Similarly lower are the indices for the quality
of health and education provision in non-metropolitan areas in contrast to higher
standards in the big cities. In contrast, crime is concentrated in big cities with a
homicide rate of 38 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants compared to around 19 in
non-metropolitan areas.
The variation in these characteristics among non-metropolitan microregio˜es is
large. The second and fourth columns show the coefficients of variation for met-
ropolitan and non-metropolitan microregio˜es respectively. It is relatively larger for
non-metropolitan areas in almost all categories but population, public service worker
share and education quality. This motivates the analysis of the metropolitan out-
migrants’ destination choice. Labour mobility is expected to respond to this spatial
variation of real wages and other socio-economic characteristics.
Furthermore, smaller microregio˜es have been catching up economically. GDP
and wages increase more in these locations than in metropolitan cities over the 2000’s
5The definition which type of sewage, water and electricity provision is adequate comes from
the report on subnormal agglomerations in Brazil (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica
(IBGE), 2010)
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as shown in figures 1.4 and 1.5. The non-metropolitan areas can offer opportunities
as alternative to expensive and congested metropolitan cities.
Figure 1.4: Average annual GDP per capita in microregio˜es 2000-2010 by population
size of microregia˜o.
Figure 1.5: Average annual formal sector wages in microregio˜es 2002-2010 by pop-
ulation size of microregia˜o.
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1.3.3 Comparing migrants and residents
Metropolitan out-migrants are unlikely to be representative of the population of
metropolitan cities. In tables 1.4 and 1.5, I compare the characteristics of non-
metropolitan residents, of metropolitan out-migrants and of metropolitan residents.
Non-metropolitan residents are typically workers who live in non-metropolitan mi-
croregio˜es and who have never migrated. Metropolitan residents are also defined as
non-migrants, but they live in metropolitan microregio˜es. The comparison of these
residents with metropolitan out-migrants allows to shed light on the differences
between migrants and residents at the origin and destination. For simplification, in
the descriptive analysis, this comparison does not account for the fact that migrants
could all be concentrated in a specific sub-set of non-metropolitan microregio˜es so
that residents in all non-metropolitan microregio˜es might not represent the exact
comparison group of that specific subset.
Migrants are on average slightly younger than residents and relatively more of
them are male. Overall, they are much better educated than the average resident
at the non-metropolitan destination and their education is very similar to that of
metropolitan residents. A slightly larger share of migrants has a tertiary education
compared to metropolitan residents. From this comparison, it does not seem that
low or high educated workers are more likely to leave metropolitan cities than the
respective other group.
Compared to non-metropolitan residents, out-migrants live in more expensive
housing, but they also are on average richer with a per capita household income of
R$1,350 in contrast to only R$770 of non-metropolitan resident workers. Yet, around
21 percent of these out-migrants live below the national poverty line compared to
only 16 percent of metropolitan residents.
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Table 1.4: Characteristics of migrants and non-migrants 2010
Non-metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan
residents out-migrants residents
Number of observations 4,184,904 19,318 1,598,869
Population size 31,054,034 155,288 24,508,716
Age 40.25 36.85 40.22
Female 0.41 0.37 0.45
White 0.51 0.51 0.51
Education level
None, primary incomplete 0.47 0.29 0.29
Primary, secondary incomplete 0.16 0.16 0.17
Secondary, higher incomplete 0.26 0.33 0.36
Higher complete 0.11 0.21 0.19
Marital status
Separated, divorced, widowed 0.09 0.11 0.10
Married 0.52 0.43 0.47
Single 0.39 0.46 0.42
Household characteristics
Partner works 0.57 0.45 0.53
Share of children in household 0.19 0.2 0.17
Urban area 0.79 0.88 0.98
Rent per room 57.12 80.39 91.66
Household income p.c. (R$) 767.4 1,348.3 1,316.1
Poor (National poverty line) 0.28 0.21 0.16
Adequacy of living situation
Adequate 0.46 0.51 0.63
Semi-adequate 0.51 0.48 0.37
Inadequate 0.03 0.01 0
Proportions and means computed using survey weights.
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Table 1.5 documents the labour market characteristics of out-migrants and res-
idents. Around 12 percent of workers who left the metropolitan cities for non-
metropolitan destinations are unemployed in contrast to an unemployment rate of
only 5 percent among non-metropolitan residents. This indicates, that while met-
ropolitan out-migrants on average have a higher income than residents at their
destinations, they are a heterogeneous group and some clearly lose out at their new
destination. However, the high unemployment rate might just capture a period of
adjustment for very recent migrants who have not found a job yet at their new
destination.
In terms of wages, migrants earn on average more than their non-migrant coun-
terparts at non-metropolitan destinations and they earn almost as much as resid-
ents in metropolitan areas. This might only reflect differences in the productivity
of locations where migrants live as well as different observable and unobservable
characteristics of migrants in contrast to residents. The regression analysis in this
chapter aims to disentangle these factors.
More than 60 percent of non-migrants in the metropolitan cities are employed
either in the public formal or private formal sector, whereas only around 46 percent
of non-migrants in non-metropolitan towns work in the formal sector. Migrants
appear to find relatively more formal employment at the destinations outside of the
big cities compared to the residents there.
Most migrants work in service sectors. Only few work in agriculture at the
non-metropolitan destinations even though the main sector of activity there is ag-
riculture. In the metropolitan cities, services are the main sectors of employment.
This suggests that most migrants are unlikely to change their sector of activity when
they move out of metropolitan areas.
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Table 1.5: Labour market characteristics of migrants and non-
migrants 2010
Non-metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan
residents out-migrants residents
Unemployed 0.05 0.12 0.06
Log(monthly wages) 6.59 6.95 6.98
Sector
Formal private 0.40 0.43 0.56
Formal public 0.06 0.08 0.06
Informal 0.26 0.23 0.21
Self-employed 0.02 0.02 0.01
Small business 0.26 0.24 0.15
Industry, ISIC
Agriculture 0.26 0.14 0.09
Industry 0.22 0.27 0.21
Services 0.38 0.44 0.54
Public services 0.15 0.17 0.17
Proportions and means computed using survey weights. Industries include
extractive industry processing industry, electricity/gas, sanitation/sewage,
construction. Services include commerce, transport, housing/food, inform-
ation/communication, financial services, real estate, professional consult-
ing, science and technology, administrative services, Arts/culture/sports, do-
mestic services, and other services. Public services include public adminis-
tration, security, education, health and social services, international organiza-
tions/foreign institutions.
These observations highlight three findings: First, there is a significant difference
in economic and social characteristics between metropolitan and non-metropolitan
microregio˜es that are likely to determine migration between these. Prices of hous-
ing, non-tradable living costs, are much higher in the metropolitan cities and the
non-metropolitan areas are catching up economically. Secondly, there is a large
spatial variation in the characteristics of non-metropolitan microregio˜es across the
country. Hence, metropolitan out-migrants are unlikely to be indifferent between
destinations in their choice where to move. Thirdly, migrants are not a random draw
of the population and they are a heterogenous group. It is important to account for
underlying selection in the econometric analysis of this chapter.
36
1.4 Destination choice of migrants
1.4.1 Empirical methodology
The empirical analysis now focuses on the estimation of the effect of various local
attributes on the destination choice of migrants. The analysis is based on a multiple
choice setting such as presented by McFadden (1974). The empirical application
is restricted to those who migrated.6 As in Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013), I model
destination choice conditional on the individual being a migrant.
Migrants are assumed to choose their location in order to maximize their utility.
Motivated by a random utility model, a migrant i residing in current location o
chooses among all possible destinations J . Let zij be a vector of destination attrib-
utes that vary across alternatives and can vary by migrant i and let cj be the cost
of moving to destination j from the current location o. Therefore, I define cj = 0 if
j = o. The utility of moving to destination j is assumed to have the following form:
Uij = β
′zij − cj + ij (1.1)
The utility of migrant i from moving to destination j depends on the destination
attributes, moving costs and an idiosyncratic random component ij. The observed
choice by the migrant is assumed to reflect the maximum utility of all J utilities.
The probability that migrant i chooses destination j is therefore
Prob(Uij > Uik) for all other k 6= j (1.2)
It is assumed that the error terms are distributed independently and identically
with Weibull distribution as in McFadden (1974):
6The model allows to include also residents in the analysis and assume that they chose not to
move. In the empirical application, this would result in a sample so large that it is not feasible
to handle. The decision to migrate itself yields a selection bias distinct from the location choice.
Costs of moving are heterogeneous for workers so that some of those who did not move might have
done so due to high costs or risk which gives rise to a selection bias in the decision to migrate.
By excluding the choice to stay at one’s origin, and estimate the destination choice model with
migrants only, this specific selection bias does not arise.
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F (ij) = exp(−e−ij) (1.3)
The probability of moving to destination j is now modelled conditional on mi-
gration (i.e. leaving location o). If Yi represents a random variable indicating the
destination choice of migrant i, the probability that this choice is destination j
conditional on migration can then be expressed as:
Prob(Yi = j|Yi 6= o) = e
β′zij−cj
[
∑J
j=1 e
β′zij−cj ]− eβ′zio−co (1.4)
This is equal to:
Prob(Yi = j|Yi 6= o) = e
β′zij−cj∑J
j 6=o e
β′zij−cj
(1.5)
Equation 1.5 represents a conditional logit model. The vector zij may comprise
individual-specific but destination-invariant characteristics wi and the attributes
of each destination xij, which vary across destinations and can also vary across
individuals:
zij = g(wi, xij) (1.6)
In this analysis, the interest lies on the attributes of destinations and not on
migrants’ characteristics. Greene (2000) shows how wi drops out of the probability
in equation 1.5 so that this model automatically controls for any individual-specific
factors in the destination choice.7 However, this also implies that I cannot estimate
the effect of such factors as age of the migrant etc. Hence, the alternative specific
conditional logit model takes the following form:
Prob(Yi = j|Yi 6= o) = e
β′xij−cj∑J
j 6=o e
β′xij−cj
(1.7)
7In some applications, e.g. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013), this is called individual fixed effect
alternative specific conditional logit. It is however not to be confused with the inclusion of fixed
effects like in a panel model.
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This model can be estimated by the method of maximum likelihood. Let dij = 1
if Yi = j and 0 otherwise. Then the log-Likelihood function is:
log L =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
dij log Prob(Yi = j|Yi 6= o) (1.8)
For the estimation, there are N observations and regressors for each of the 17,501
metropolitan out-migrants.8 They choose from J = 529 possible non-metropolitan
microregio˜es as destinations. Only one of the destinations will have a positive out-
come as chosen destination, i.e. the one observed in the data. This results in
9,258,029 individual-destination observations for the multivariate analysis. I cluster
standard errors at the metropolitan microregia˜o of origin o because it is likely that
migrants from the same origin share a pattern in their destination choice.
Based on the human capital migration model (Sjaastad, 1962), the destination
attributes of interest in this analysis are wages and prices. One measure for prices
would be a Consumer Price Index, which is not available at the level of microregio˜es.
Deaton and Dupriez (2011) showed that food trade is strongly integrated across
Brazil, so that prices for these consumption goods do not vary much across space.
Price differences in non-tradable goods, such as housing, therefore appear more
suitable to capture differences in cost of living between metropolitan origins and
non-metropolitan destinations. Living costs are proxied with the amount of rent
per room reported in the survey. If individuals do not report rent, the average rent
in the microregia˜o of residency is imputed (see Morten and Oliveira (2016) who use
the same approach for Brazil). This is the most disaggregated available measure
of prices for non-tradable goods in Brazil. In order to measure the impact of local
development, I additionally include population and GDP, as well as homicide rates
as destination attributes. I also look at public service provision. This is an index
for the quality of education and one of health provision at local level.
Migration costs are measured by the Euclidean distance between origin and des-
8The sample of metropolitan out-migrants is slightly reduced as I only include those in the
analysis who are matched so that the results are comparable. Those dropped were not matched.
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tination in kilometres and additionally by a dummy whether a migrant moved out of
her state of birth to a different state. This captures social proximity of a destination
to the migrant’s origin as in Brazil people have a strong identity with their birth
state. Both of these variables imply also the social cost of being farther away from
one’s family and friends. I further include an interaction term of distance and the
‘other-state’ dummy in order to disentangle the impact of these two factors.
Average wages in a location need not reflect the wages a migrant can expect to
earn. I therefore predict expected wages for migrants based on their characteristics
and the coefficients from a wage estimation of residents at each location.
First, I estimate a wage regression separately for all 6.9 million resident obser-
vations in each microregia˜o. The wage regression takes the following form:
W ji = αj(a
j
i − a¯j) + βj(Eji − E¯j) + γj(Sji − S¯j) + χHji + δj + vji (1.9)
Log hourly wages of individual i in location j are determined by the individual
characteristics aji , E
j
i , S
j
i , household characteristics H
j
i , a dummy for the microregia˜o
δj and an idiosyncratic error term v
j
i . The variable a
j
i summarises age and age-
squared, Eji the education level, and S
j
i measures gender and race (white vs. non-
white). Each of these variables is demeaned at the level of the microregia˜o, so
that the coefficients αj, βj and γj capture the return to these characteristics spe-
cific to each location. Additionally, this implies that δj measures the unconditional
microregia˜o-specific average wages. Household characteristics, Hji , include the pro-
portion of children and a dummy for whether the partner works, as these might vary
by region, e.g. in more rural areas households tend to be larger and female labour
force participation lower, so that wages would be overestimated in these areas if this
was not controlled for. I use the survey weights in these regressions in order to make
the estimates representative of the population.
For each microregia˜o, the coefficients α̂j, β̂j, γ̂j from this regression are then used
to predict a measure of expected wages for each migrant. This predicted wage
reflects what each migrant can expect to earn in each microregia˜o conditional on
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her characteristics ai, Ei and Si, and the unconditional local wage level δ̂j:
̂E[W ji |Xi] = δ̂j + α̂j(ai − a¯j) + β̂j(Ei − E¯j) + γ̂j(Si − S¯j) (1.10)
In appendix table A.1 (page 177), I present the coefficients of the wage predictions
corresponding to equation 1.10. The results confirm the relationships documented in
the literature: age has a positive, but diminishing effect on expected wages, women
earn less, white Brazilians more, and wages increase with the level of education.
This approach assumes that migrants are a random draw from the resident pop-
ulation so that the returns to individual characteristics should be the same for
migrants and residents. In the descriptive statistics, I showed that migrants differ
from the resident population in a number of observable characteristics. This implies
that the expected wage measures used in the analysis so far could be biased by un-
observable characteristics. I thus estimate another measure for expected wages that
should reduce the selection bias. I predict expected wages in non-metropolitan des-
tinations from a sample of previous migrants from the same origin as the migrant.
These migrants have moved more than a year ago to the destinations. They are as-
sumed to be more comparable to migrants than residents in terms of unobservable
characteristics specific to migrants, for example risk-taking preferences.
For the metropolitan origins, I predict expected wages based on a matched
sample of residents at origin. I apply coarsened exact matching (CEM) to use
only those residents that look most similar to the migrants. In the appendix section
A.1 (page 172), I discuss the advantages of CEM over Propensity Score Matching in
this analytical setting and I explain in detail the matching procedure. In brief, CEM
bounds the degree of model dependence in the main analysis and the data is auto-
matically restricted to common support. The large dataset of the Census at hand
allows for this exact matching method, without facing the trade-off of conventional
matching methods between bias and variance.
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1.4.2 Results
In the specific application of this chapter, metropolitan out-migrants choose their
destination not only based on destination attributes, but on these attributes relative
to the attributes of migrants’ metropolitan origins. For each location attribute, I
thus compute the difference between the destination and origin, e.g. the cost of living
in destination j minus the cost of living in origin o. Table 1.6 gives an overview over
the differences between destinations and origins of all variables of interest and how
these differences vary between the destinations that migrants chose to those that
they did not choose.
Table 1.6: Difference between non-metropolitan destination and metropolitan origin
comparing chosen destination to alternative destinations
Difference between destination
and origin in: Chosen Alternative t-statistic,
destination destinations difference
in mean
Expected hourly wages (log) -0.52 -0.58 -21.16
Rent per room (log) -0.43 -0.63 -57.24
Other state than origin 0.57 0.92 174.73
Distance to origin (km) 1020.31 1123.94 28.83
Population (log) -2.32 -2.81 -58.14
GDP (log) -2.82 -3.59 -68.47
Homicide rate -9.52 -12.52 -16.77
Education provision quality index (0 to 1) -0.03 -0.07 -33.04
Health provision quality index (0 to 1) -0.02 -0.05 -32.03
This table already indicates some patterns of destination choice. Similar to what
we observed earlier in the descriptive part, nominal wages are on average always
lower in non-metropolitan areas. Migrants tend to choose locations, where this gap
is relatively smaller, -0.52 compared to -0.58. Similarly, prices for housing, measured
in rent per room, are on average higher in the big cities. Migrants settle in locations
where this price gap is not as big as in other possible destinations. This could
indicate a trade-off between higher wages and lower prices at destinations. The
difference of prices between chosen destination and alternative locations is larger
than that of wages. This could indicate that prices matter more than wages for the
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location decision.
A clearer pattern is revealed with regards to the geographic and social distance
of chosen destinations. 57 percent of chosen destinations are in a different state than
the origin, that is also the state of birth of the migrants, contrasting 92 percent of
the destination alternatives and reflected also in a lower average distance of chosen
destinations to the migrants’ origin.
The difference in GDP is also statistically significant. Migrants choose locations
with a higher level of GDP compared to alternative destinations, but GDP is always
lower in non-metropolitan destinations on average than in metropolitan origins. The
same is the case for population size. Chosen destinations are on average larger than
their alternatives. Based on their average size, they are however not the smallest
locations, but still medium-sized microregio˜es. In terms of amenities, chosen des-
tinations have relatively higher levels of homicide rates in contrast to alternative
destinations. Education and health service provision is on average higher in the
chosen microregia˜o than in alternative destinations.
These averages are all statistically different between chosen and alternative des-
tinations. Many of these factors are highly correlated with each other which makes
it necessary to apply a multivariate analysis to disentangle their influence on the
metropolitan out-migrants’ destination choice.
Table 1.7 reports the results of the alternative specific conditional logit model
that estimates the probability for destination choice conditional on migration as
specified in equation 1.8. The interpretation of coefficients in the alternative specific
conditional logit model is not straightforward. It is not possible to compare the
coefficient size directly, but only in relative terms which I will do later in section
1.4.4. To interpret the the direction of the effect, I draw on the formula of the
elasticity as presented in Greene (2000). Let the probability of choosing destination
j be Pj, then the elasticity of Pj with respect to an attribute xij evaluated at the
mean x¯ij can be written as:
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δlog(Pj)
δlogxij
= x¯ij(1− Pj)βx (1.11)
where βx is the coefficient of the destination attribute from the conditional logit
estimation. Because the attributes xij are defined in terms of differences between
destination and origin, it is important to keep in mind for each variable whether it
was on average higher or lower at the destinations compared to the origins in order
to know whether x¯ij is positive or negative.
Table 1.7 reports the results. The specification in column 1 is that of only wage
and price differences. The first coefficient in column 1 is that of wage differences.
Its value is -0.132. Wage differences are on average negative as documented above
in table 1.6 implying that the elasticity itself is positive. An increase in the wage
difference in destination j compared to an alternative implies an increase in the like-
lihood for migrants to choose this destination. In the current setting, an increase
in wage differences means that wages get closer to those in the metropolitan origin
of migrants. Metropolitan out-migrants hence prefer to move to non-metropolitan
microregio˜es that have a relatively smaller wage difference to the origin than altern-
ative destinations.
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Table 1.7: Destination choice conditional on migration, alternative specific logit
Likelihood to select chosen destination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expected wages (log) -0.132 -0.683*** -0.526*** -0.389* -0.216 -0.272
(0.286) (0.213) (0.192) (0.208) (0.185) (0.183)
Rent per room (log) 1.323*** 1.163*** 0.647** 0.962*** 0.876*** 0.854***
(0.190) (0.197) (0.264) (0.262) (0.263) (0.295)
Population (log) 0.500*** 0.676*** 0.673*** 0.684***
(0.170) (0.176) (0.179) (0.179)
GDP (log) 0.137 -0.055 -0.032 -0.048
(0.151) (0.128) (0.124) (0.122)
Homicide rate 0.010** 0.009* 0.008 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Education quality index -3.766** -4.044** -4.281***
(1.714) (1.681) (1.637)
Health provision quality index 4.042** 4.054** 4.171**
(1.782) (1.836) (1.828)
Destination specific:
Distance to origin (log) 1.381* 1.548 1.284 1.299 -0.195
(0.838) (1.096) (0.997) (1.038) (0.426)
Other state 9.353 10.175 9.412 9.694 -2.302***
(6.141) (7.491) (7.035) (7.258) (0.306)
Distance * Other state -1.696* -1.812* -1.720* -1.760*
(0.883) (1.081) (1.021) (1.054)
Observations 9,258,029 9,258,029 9,258,029 9,258,029 9,258,029 9,258,029
Chi-squared 56.6 184 1,112 1,326 1,360 1,558
Number of cases 17,501 17,501 17,501 17,501 17,501 17,501
Number of alternatives 529 529 529 529 529 529
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the metropolitan microregia˜o of origin.
Estimator is alternative specific conditional logit. In each column, the first set of regressors are the difference between
destination and origin for each destination alternative. The second set, indicated as Destination specific, are measured
at destination relative to origin. Column 5 and 6 use expected wage differences based on past migrants at destination
and matched residents at origin as explained in section 1.4.1.
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For living costs, it is the opposite is the case. The second coefficient in column 1
is positive. Due to much higher prices in metropolitan cities the difference in the cost
of living is on average negative, but migrants prefer to keep this difference as large
as possible. Metropolitan out-migrants prefer destinations that are cheaper than
their origin and relatively cheaper than alternative destinations. This coefficient is
strongly significant. The coefficient for wages is, however, insignificant.
In the second column, I extend the specification by the costs of migration, the
distance to move and the social distance. The latter is the dummy whether a
destination is in a different state than a migrant’s origin. I also interact these two
variables. The distance between destination and origin and the interaction term
appear weakly significant. There is a negative relationship between the interaction
term and the likelihood to choose a specific destination. Migrants are less likely to
move to locations that are farther away and at the same time outside of their state
of origin. The coefficients of distance to origin and of leaving one’s own state are
both positive which means that migrants who stay within their state of birth move
longer distances.
Wages and prices remain with their expected signs and are now both significant
predictors of destination choice once I add other control variables in columns 2, 3
and 4, but their coefficients become a bit smaller.
In column 3, I add population, GDP and homicide rates. By construction met-
ropolitan out-migrants move to locations with fewer inhabitants than their metro-
politan origin. They also seem to prefer relatively smaller locations among their
destination choices. The level of economic activity measured in the log of GDP does
not appear to significantly predict the location choice. Metropolitan out-migrants
significantly prefer destinations where the homicide rate is relatively lower than in
their metropolitan origins.
Then I add local amenities in column 4. The contribution of wages, prices, popu-
lation and homicide rates to the destination choice remain significant. Additionally,
it appears that migrants show preferences for locations with relatively better edu-
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cation quality, but they accept relatively lower health provision quality.
Lastly, in column 5, I use expected wages that are corrected for selection as
explained in the previous section. The selection-corrected wage differences between
non-metropolitan destinations and metropolitan origins are thus based on wage pre-
dictions using the previous migrants at destinations and matched residents at origins.
The coefficient of expected wage differences becomes smaller and insignificant now
that I control for selection. It is plausible that wage differences are less stark once
observable and some unobserved characteristics are accounted for. This indicates
that such characteristics of migrants led to an upward bias in expected wage dif-
ferences. The coefficients of the other variables remain the same in terms of sign.
The coefficient of housing prices becomes a bit smaller, but it remains positive and
strongly significant. Homicide rates are no longer significantly correlated with the
destination choice. The coefficient of education quality becomes larger. The other
results are unchanged.
Due to concerns about collinearity between the variables of distance, moving to
another state and their interaction, I also present results of a regression that excludes
the interaction term in column 6. This reveals that only the indicator for moving to
another state remains significant and its coefficient becomes negative. This result,
however, is in line with the initial interpretation that migrants prefer locations that
reduce the distance to their origin. The exclusion of the interaction term minimally
changes the sizes of the coefficients of other variables, but it does not affect their
direction or significance.
In summary, the results of the multivariate analysis confirm that prices matter
significantly for the destination choice of metropolitan out-migrants. Wages are
weakly significant and become insignificant when I account for potential selection
bias. Furthermore, the interaction of physical and social moving costs appear to
matter. Lastly, I document that also amenities in terms of public service provision
are significantly correlated with the destination choice.
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1.4.3 Robustness: Hedonic housing prices
The second main variable of interest in the destination choice analysis are the prices
or living costs, proxied so far by the average rent per room in a microregia˜o. In the
Census data, households are asked to state the monthly rent they pay if they live in
a rented apartment or house and the number of rooms of the unit. I used this data
to aggregate the average room rent at the microregia˜o level. This measure ignores
the possibility that the price differences might just reflect differences in housing
quality. Similar to Li and Gibson (2014), I construct a hedonic housing index that
measures the differences in housing costs based on location-specific amenities rather
than housing specific characteristics.
Households are asked to provide information on the quality of walls, floors, and
the presence of toilets. Additional questions inform about the quality of sewage,
waste water and electricity access. With these variables I can estimate a hedonic
housing price for each location. I regress the rent per room on these character-
istics weighted by the household survey weight and I include a dummy for each
microregia˜o. These regression results are presented in the appendix table A.4 (page
179). The coefficients of the microregia˜o dummies capture any location specific
amenities that contribute to spatial price differences. I extract these estimates to
construct a location specific hedonic living cost measure. This variable is independ-
ent of differences in housing quality.
Using this measure provides no change in the signs of the estimates of the in-
fluence of price differences on destination choice compared to the initial results (see
table 1.8). The coefficients of the hedonic price index are positive and strongly
significant. They become slightly smaller when I use selection corrected wage dif-
ferences (column 2 and 3). These results suggests that migrants prefer destinations
where living costs are relatively cheaper than at their metropolitan origins. Other
coefficients of the analysis do not change significantly.
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Table 1.8: Destination choice of metropolitan out-migrants. Changes in wage
and price measures; Inclusion of unemployment rate
Likelihood to select chosen destination
(1) (2) (3)
Difference in:
Expected wages (log) -0.430** -0.232 -0.241
(0.185) (0.175) (0.159)
Housing prices (log) 0.916*** 0.799*** 0.761***
(0.230) (0.241) (0.226)
Population (log) 0.692*** 0.676*** 0.657***
(0.142) (0.146) (0.152)
GDP (log) -0.026 0.008 0.030
(0.087) (0.087) (0.100)
Homicide rate 0.009* 0.008 0.008*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Education quality index -3.529** -3.835** -3.894**
(1.765) (1.745) (1.839)
Health provision quality index 4.167** 4.118** 3.925**
(1.878) (1.934) (1.607)
Unemployment rate -1.870
(5.087)
Destination specific:
Distance to origin (log) 1.225 1.248 1.250
(0.977) (1.023) (1.020)
Other state 9.276 9.578 9.610
(6.941) (7.209) (7.194)
Distance * Other state -1.702* -1.744* -1.751*
(1.007) (1.046) (1.045)
Price measure: Hedonic price index
(instead of rent per room)
Samples for expected wages: Unmatched Past migrants at destination
residents and matched residents at origin
Observations 9,258,029 9,258,029 9,258,029
Wald-test 1,189 1,162 1,153
Number of migrants 17,501 17,501 17,501
Number of alternatives 529 529 529
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the metro-
politan microregia˜o of origin. Estimator is alternative specific conditional logit. In each
column, the first set of regressors are the difference between destination and origin for
each destination alternative.
In the first column are results from the estimation using the wage differences based on
predictions using the sample of unmatched residents at the origin and price differences
using a Hedonic price index. Column 2 and 3 present the same results, but wage
differences are now based on predictions using the sample of matched residents at the
origin and previous migrants at destination, price differences are computed using the
Hedonic price index. In column 3, unemployment is added as regressor.
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In column 3 of table 1.8, I add the difference in unemployment rate to the re-
gression. In the migration literature, it has been suggested that not only expected
wages, but also the likelihood to earn these matter for migration decisions. In the
case of Brazilian workers moving out of metropolitan cities, differences in unemploy-
ment rates are not significantly related to their destination choice. This could be
due to the fact that the unemployment rates in non-metropolitan microregio˜es are
on average only 1 percentage point lower than in metropolises.
1.4.4 Relative effect size
Marginal effects of the alternative-specific logit model can be computed for each
possible location choice, but this is computationally burdensome and ineffective in
presenting the results. To illustrate and compare the effect size, we can look at one
destination alternative, e.g. the one with a price difference very close to the average
price difference to metropolitan origins. I take the significant regressors from the
full specification with selectivity robust price and wage measures as in column 3 of
table 1.8 and compute their elasticities using Greene’s formula (Equation 1.11) for
this example location. They are presented in table 1.9:
Table 1.9: Elasticities of independent variables for example location
Mean Elasticity
Other state 0.923 -2.133
Population (log) -2.812 -1.924
Distance to origin (log) 6.926 -1.595
Rent per room (log) -0.492 -0.381
Education quality index -0.072 0.293
Health provision quality index -0.048 -0.203
Homicide rate -12.519 -0.113
The elasticities reveals that by far the largest effect on migrants’ destination
choice is that of a migrant leaving her or his state of birth, not quite as large but
with an elasticity of greater than 1, is also the distance to origin. These variable
captures the physical and social costs of moving. This confirms that migration
costs in Brazil are still high and a significant factor in labour mobility (Morten and
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Oliveira, 2016). The effect of population size is equally large, which reflects the large
gap in terms of city sizes between the metropolis and small towns. The elasticity of
price differences is much smaller than that of distance, but it is still sizeable: A 1
percent increase in the price difference between the metropolitan origin of a migrant
and this specific location make it on average 0.3 percent more likely to be chosen as
destination, e.g. if prices rise in metropolitan cities by 1 percent migrants are more
likely to choose this location. Local amenities concerning public service provision
are significant predictors for the destination choice but their effect size is smaller
than that of prices, with education appearing slightly more important than health,
followed by the homicide rates.
1.5 Counterfactual earnings of metropolitan out-
migrants
The previous results showed that prices play a sizeable and significant role in the
destination choice of metropolitan out-migrants whereas expected wages do not
appear significant once I control for self-selection of migrants. It is possible that
this is due to incorrect expectations of migrants about their earnings. Thus, this
section focuses on the actual observed earnings of migrants at their destination in
contrast to expected wages. The actual earnings are compared to a prediction of
what a migrant would have earned had she not moved out of the metropolitan city,
her counterfactual wage. With this comparison, this section aims to see whether and
how metropolitan out-migration is associated with a wage loss or gain and what role
living costs play in this question.
1.5.1 Empirical methodology
The wage return to migration is defined as the difference between income at destin-
ation, yd, and at the origin, yo:
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r = yd − yo (1.12)
In the empirical application, income is proxied by the log of hourly wages, W .9
The comparison of migrant wages between origin and destination can be interpreted
as an evaluation problem. Let migration be the treatment with Mi = 1 if the
individual moved, Mi = 0 if not. For each individual, two outcomes in terms of
wage differences, can be defined as
Y 0i = log(wi,0)− log(wi,0) if Mi = 0 (1.13)
Y 1i = log(wi,1)− log(wi,0) if Mi = 1 (1.14)
Thus, the wage difference due to migration can be identified for migrants as
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):
ATT = E(Y 1 − Y 0 |M = 1) = E(Y 1 |M = 1)− E(Y 0 |M = 1) (1.15)
The first term on the right hand side is observable in the data at hand, the wages
of migrants at their destination. The second term represents the counterfactual
outcome, what migrants would have earned had they not migrated which cannot
be observed. I only observe wages for migrants at their destination and for non-
migrants at origin. If wages were estimated using OLS and then compared, the wage
differences would be biased due to selection into migration arising from individual-
specific unobservable characteristics.
It is necessary to account for this potential bias in the empirical estimation of
migrants’ counterfactual wages. This is especially important in a context where
spatial wage differences have been found to reflect variation in labour force compos-
9I choose to look at hourly wages earned in the main job instead of total income as hourly
wages in the main job should mostly reflect the return to individual characteristics based on
location whereas total income also depends on household composition and other factors.
52
ition and industry concentration. In Brazil, the labour force is distributed unequally
across space, concentrating better-educated workers in metropolitan areas and eco-
nomically stronger regions. Thus, the returns to education based on observable
characteristics explain around half of the spatial wage differences (Almeida dos Reis
and Paes de Barros, 1991; Foguel et al., 2015; Ferreira et al., 2006). Furthermore,
Brazilian workers have shown little mobility across industries so that it seems reas-
onable to focus on the self-selection by location and not by sector (Menezes-Filho
and Muendler, 2011; Hering and Paillacar, 2015).
I therefore use the predicted wages from the matched sample of residents in met-
ropolitan origins of migrants as described in section 1.4.1. The difference between
the actual observed wages at destination and the predicted counterfactual wages at
the origin is the return to migration out of metropolitan cities. Real wages are com-
puted using the local average rent per room as denominator of actual and predicted
nominal wages.
1.5.2 Results
This section presents the results of the counterfactual analysis. Table 1.10 presents
the average return to migration as the difference between average actual and coun-
terfactual wages for migrants moving out of metropolitan areas. These migrants
earn significantly lower wages at their non-metropolitan destinations. Once I ac-
count for the local living costs by using real wages, the difference becomes positive.
This indicates that metropolitan out-migrants lose in nominal terms, but gain in
real wages due to lower living costs in non-metropolitan destinations.
In the appendix table A.2 (page 178), I present the results without applying
matching. The nominal wage differences are around 0.1 log points larger than when
matching is applied. This indicates an overestimation of wages at origin when not
accounting for selection and it suggests that out-migrants are negatively selected
from the metropolitan working population.
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Table 1.10: Differences in actual and predicted
wages for metropolitan out-migrants, after match-
ing
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 15,424 1.816
Predicted 15,424 2.069
Difference -0.253***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 15,424 -2.237
Predicted 15,424 -2.396
Difference 0.159***
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% for t-test of dif-
ference in means between observed and predicted wages.
Predicted wages are based on a matched sample of met-
ropolitan residents.
Table 1.11 documents heterogeneity in wage returns along the education level of
migrants. I define high educated workers as those who completed high school or any
higher level of education. Low educated workers are those who did not complete
high school or any lower level of education. Results show that real wages are higher
at destination than origin for both groups. For highly educated individuals leaving
the big cities the real wage gains are larger, because their loss in nominal wages is
relatively small. In contrast, low educated workers see a large loss in nominal terms,
and a relatively smaller gain in real wages. For both groups the nominal and real
wage differences are statistically significant.
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Table 1.11: Differences in actual and predicted
wages for metropolitan out-migrants, by education
level
High educated
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 3,107 2.846
Predicted 3,107 2.930
Difference -0.084***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 3,107 -1.270
Predicted 3,107 -1.544
Difference 0.274***
Low educated
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 12,317 1.556
Predicted 12,317 1.851
Difference -0.295***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 12,317 -2.481
Predicted 12,317 -2.611
Difference 0.130***
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% for t-test of dif-
ference in means between observed and predicted wages.
Predicted wages are based on a matched sample of met-
ropolitan residents.
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So far, the counterfactual wage comparison has focused on the average wage
return. However, the distributional graphs of actual and counterfactual wages doc-
ument the return to metropolitan out-migration along the wage distribution. Figures
1.6 and 1.7 show the wage distributions of workers who have moved out of a met-
ropolitan areas. They compare the observed wages of migrants at their destination
and the predicted counterfactual wages at origin. As suggested from the results
in Table 1.10, for nominal wages the distribution of observed wages lies left of the
predicted earnings in metropolitan origins. Wages are generally higher in origins
and out-migration implies a loss in nominal terms.
Figure 1.6: Kernel density plots of actual and predicted nominal wages of metropol-
itan out-migrants with matching.
For real wages (see figure 1.7) the distribution of observed wages lies now a bit
to the right of counterfactual wages in metropolitan origins reflecting the positive
return in real terms to leaving expensive cities.10
10The distributions are tested to be significantly different with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
equality of distributions. Both, the nominal and real wage distributions are significantly different.
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Figure 1.7: Kernel density plots of actual and predicted real wages of metropolitan
out-migrants with matching.
1.5.3 Robustness: Price measures
In section 1.4.3, I computed a hedonic price measure to control for location-specific
differences in housing quality. The results did not change qualitatively, but the
coefficients became slightly smaller, thus indicating that this measure better cap-
tures unconditional housing prices. I therefore also compute the real wages using
the hedonic price as denominator. Results are presented in table 1.12. The wage
difference remains positive and statistically significant, but it is smaller by around
a third than in the initial results.
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Table 1.12: Differences in actual and predicted
real wages for metropolitan out-migrants using
hedonic prices as denominator, after matching
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 15,424 -2.105
Predicted 15,424 -2.155
Difference 0.050***
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1% for t-test
of difference in means between observed and pre-
dicted wages. Predicted wages are based on a
matched sample of metropolitan residents.
Further concerns regarding the measure of living costs could arise from the fact,
that low and high educated workers probably face different housing markets with
different average prices. In appendix table A.3 (page 179) the results of the counter-
factual analysis are presented using education-group specific living costs as denom-
inator when computing real wages. I also use the median prices in the microregia˜o
instead of the mean. The signs and significance of wage differences remain the same
as in the initial results, but their size changes. For high educated workers, the
estimates yield larger positive wage differences when I use education-group specific
living costs. The differences are 0.37 and 0.3 log points for average and median rents
specific to high educated workers. For low educated workers the education-specific
wage differences are smaller than unadjusted ones. Applying the median prices faced
by low educated workers yields the smallest difference of 0.07 log points compared
to 0.13 in the initial results. Rents are on average lower for low educated workers
so that their gain from leaving metropolitan cities becomes smaller than when I did
not account for the education-group specific rents. The opposite applies for high
educated workers.
In the analysis of the destination choice of migrants we learned that metropolitan
out-migrants face a trade-off in choosing between destinations where their loss in
nominal wages is smallest, but their gain in lower living costs largest. This can
explain why some individuals do not experience a positive return to migrating out
of metropolitan areas across the income distribution. Some might fail to successfully
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evaluate their destination alternatives, some might lack the information about wages
and prices at all destinations and others might just not be successful in acquiring
the wage employment they had expected or they migrate for other reasons such as
family. In this way, some metropolitan out-migrants lose out, while on average they
gain in real wage returns.
1.6 Conclusion
The economic literature on migration in developing countries has been focusing on
rural to urban movements and the growing metropolitan cities because this was the
dominant observation in most countries, among them Brazil. In the decade of the
2000s, the movements of workers across Brazil have shown to lead equally out of
metropolitan cities as into them.
This chapter uses the Brazilian Census data of 2010 to study this movement. I
estimate the importance of real wages in the destination choice of metropolitan out-
migrants and find that migrants maximize their utility by moving into smaller towns
not far from their metropolitan origins. In these destinations they face lower nominal
wages, but also lower prices. The counterfactual analysis reveals that on average the
migrants achieve a positive return in real wages. This finding is especially strong for
low educated workers who appear to lose from leaving the big cities if only nominal
wages were considered. Non-metropolitan areas have on average worse quality of
public service provision. The metropolitan out-migrants reveal a preference for
education provision over health service emphasizing that preferences are different
even between local amenities.
The findings are in line with the literature on wage returns to migration. It is
confirmed that the comparison of wages conditional on individual skills is important
for the destination choice, but migrants seem to consider them only with account-
ing for living costs (Tunalı, 2000; Dahl, 2002; Kennan and Walker, 2011; Moretti,
2011). Furthermore, selection corrected expected wages did not enter the model
of destination choice significantly, which could indicate that workers have incorrect
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expectations about their wages and they could do even better in their destination
choice. Rather, metropolitan out-migrants choose destinations that reduce their
costs of moving as well as their living costs, which is why I find a positive return in
real wages.
The Brazilian government invested heavily in regional development targeting
those areas that were economically lagging behind. The regions that received most
funding and that have been growing fastest in this period (Mata et al., 2005; Lall
et al., 2009). The migration patterns I document could be a response to this regional
development.
I analysed the out-migration from metropolitan cities in 2009, the year when
Brazil was briefly affected by the international economic crisis following the fin-
ancial crisis that had erupted in 2007. Even though not specifically identified, it
is possible that the crisis played a role in the migration decisions and destination
choice of metropolitan out-migrants. Metropolitan cities in Brazil concentrate many
exporting industries and GDP declined in these cities in the years of the crisis. It
is therefore not unlikely that these events contributed to the large migratory move-
ments out of these primary cities. Boustan et al. (2010) and Monras (2015) showed
how migration is one response of workers to economic crises in past and present
times. If this was also the case in the observations of this paper, it would be another
example of how the growth of smaller urban areas can offer alternative opportunities
to workers responding to economic crises.
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Chapter 2
Internal migration and crime:
Municipal homicide rates in Brazil
2005-2010
2.1 Introduction
A lot of attention has been paid to empirical evidence for the consequences of im-
migration (e.g. Borjas (2003); Card (2001)). Only few studies, however, investigate
the effect of internal migration on labour markets (Boustan et al. (2010); Kleemans
and Magruder (2017)). They find a negative impact on residents’ employment and
wages. The negative effect of internal migration on local labour markets can have
further consequences, such as an increase in crime. Theoretical and empirical evid-
ence relates crime to unemployment and low income (Becker, 1968; Lin, 2008). I
hence analyse in this chapter whether migration has an effect on crime rates at des-
tinations. This question has not been investigated for internal mobility of workers,
but only for international migration (e.g. Spenkuch (2011); Bianchi et al. (2012);
Bell et al. (2013); Chalfin (2015)).
Literature on international migration finds that immigrants with good labour
market prospects at their destination do not commit significantly more crime than
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native workers. There are some results suggesting that very low-skilled immigrants
or those who are restricted by law from working are more likely to commit crime
than residents at destinations (Spenkuch, 2011; Bianchi et al., 2012; Bell et al.,
2013).
These results might also apply to internal migrants, but there are some differ-
ences. First, internal migration is less costly so that more people can move and
those moving might differ in their characteristics. For example, due to lower costs
poorer and less educated people might move. Secondly, internal migrants are much
closer substitutes to residents in the destination labour markets than their inter-
national counterparts. They do not face language barriers or legal restrictions to
their participation. Consequently, their arrival directly increases labour supply at
destinations and puts downward pressure on wages and employment (Kleemans and
Magruder, 2017). A decline in income and job availability can in consequence in-
duce more participation in crime. At the same time, easier access to the labour
market implies a lower likelihood to be involved in crime for the internal migrants
themselves (Spenkuch, 2011; Bianchi et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013). This could lead
to a reduction in crime.
It therefore remains an empirical question whether there is an effect of internal
migration on crime and in which direction it goes. If there is an effect, the subsequent
question to ask is whether it differs by the structure of destination labour markets.
Assessing the impact of internal migration on crime at destinations is meth-
odologically challenging. On the one hand, destinations with low crime are more
attractive to migrants and on the other hand higher crime rates could attract specific
types of migrants so that the estimated effect would be biased. To overcome this
endogeneity issue, I apply an instrumental variable approach to estimate the effect
of internal migration rates on homicide rates in Brazilian municipalities from 2005 to
2010. Using the nationally representative Brazilian Census survey of 2010, I recon-
struct annual migration rates from people’s former and current location of work and
residence for the period from 2001 to 2010. Exogenous variation in the immigration
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rate over time comes from local labour demand shocks in the manufacturing sector
in migrants’ origins (Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2013; Monras, 2015;
Diamond, 2016; Morten and Oliveira, 2016). This instrument is combined with the
migration rates from 2001 to 2004 to establish the sorting of migrants from each
origin across all possible destinations (Card, 2001; Boustan et al., 2010; Spenkuch,
2011; Bell et al., 2013; Jaitman and Machin, 2013; Chalfin, 2015; Kleemans and
Magruder, 2017; O¨zden et al., 2017). The advantage of the Brazilian data is that it
allows the analysis at a fine geographic level, the municipality, as well as of annual
dynamics.
I find an elasticity of 1.2% between immigration rate and homicide rate for
Brazilian municipalities in the studied period. The elasticity varies between 1%
and 1.8% depending on the sub-sample applied and on how I deal with measure-
ment issues in homicide rates. The magnitude of the effect compares to what other
studies find as impact of international immigration on crime.1 The result is only
significant for municipalities with a small informal labour market and high historical
crime rates. This suggests that the impact is heterogeneous across labour market
structures. Criminal activity rises if migrants arrive at destinations with fewer easily
accessible job opportunities and at locations with a large and established criminal
sector.
Brazil provides a good case study as crime rates are among the highest in the
world and explanations for its variation across locations are rare (World Bank, 2006;
Reichenheim et al., 2011; Sachsida, 2013; Dix-Carneiro et al., 2017). High crime,
especially homicides, comes at high economic costs. Aside from public safety ex-
penditures, violent crime is related to other socio-economic costs, such as the neg-
ative impact on human capital (Monteiro and Rocha, 2017) or health (Manacorda
and Koppensteiner, 2015). According to the Annual Brazilian Public Safety Report
2014, violent crime costs Brazil an equivalent to 5.4% of the country’s GDP (Forum
1O¨zden et al. (2017) find a negative elasticity of -1.8% of international immigration on violent
crime in Malaysia. Bianchi et al. (2012) find no effect on most crime, but an elasticity of 1% of
immigration on robbery in Italy.
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Brasileiro de Seguranc¸a Pu´blica, 2014). Moreover, around 20% of Brazilians had
moved to another municipality according to the Census of 20102 so that the as-
sessment of potential impacts of internal migration is of relevance. Like in many
developing countries, labour markets in Brazil are segmented with a large informal
sector that offers more flexibility at low wages than the higher paying but rigid
formal sector. Kleemans and Magruder (2017) find that such structures can lead
to differential impacts of immigration. In their study, wages only respond in the
informal sector to immigration, whereas employment effects were restricted to the
formal sector. This chapter provides evidence that these labour market structures
can also have differential implications for outcomes such as crime.
The chapter is structured as follows: An overview of literature on crime and
migration in section 2.2 is followed by setting the context of crime in Brazil in
section 2.3. Next comes a description of the data and definitions used for the analysis
(section 2.4). Section 2.5 explains the empirical methodology. Thereafter, results
are presented and discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 presents robustness checks.
Section 2.8 discusses possible channels of the effects before I conclude in section 2.9.
2.2 Literature review
This chapter is related to the literature on migration and its consequences for local
labour markets as well as that on crime and its determinants.
The empirical literature finds that unemployment, low wages and inequality are
main determinants, especially for property crimes in the US (Gould et al., 2002;
Grogger and Willis, 1998). Kelly (2000) emphasizes that only inequality matters
significantly for violent crimes in the US. Evidence for developing countries is thin-
ner despite the high prevalence of crime and inequality in some regions, such as
Latin America. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) present cross-country evidence for the pos-
itive effect of inequality on crime including developing countries. They also doc-
ument that crime behaves counter-cyclically and past crime is a strong predictor
2Author’s own calculations based on the Census survey.
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for current crime levels. Demombynes and O¨zler (2005) find that in South Africa
higher inequality is related to higher property crime. Evidence for Latin America
comes mainly from Mexico, where homicide rates have increased severely in the past
decade. Inequality significantly predicts drug-related homicides (Enamorado et al.,
2016). For Brazil, there is evidence that inequality, urbanization and unemployment
are determinants of federal homicide rates (Sachsida et al., 2010; Sachsida, 2013),
but also income, density of male population, drug use, firearm ownership, incarcer-
ation rate and police effectiveness appear to matter (Cerqueira, 2014b). The recent
study by Dix-Carneiro et al. (2017) is the first to identify the causal effect of local
economic shocks on crime in a developing country by exploiting the trade liberaliz-
ation in Brazil as exogenous shock. Their findings confirm that worse employment
rates increase crime in the medium run. However, this study and the previously
mentioned literature do not consider the role of internal migration for variation in
crime.
A fast growing strand of literature investigates the impacts of international im-
migration on crime rates in destination countries (Bianchi et al. (2012) for Italy,
Bell et al. (2013) for UK, Spenkuch (2011); Chalfin (2014, 2015) across US counties,
O¨zden et al. (2017) for Malaysia). They conclude that there is no or only a weak
positive effect of immigration on property crime, but all emphasize that there is
heterogeneity in the group of immigrants and their impact on crime. Immigration
of groups with little labour market perspectives, e.g. unskilled Mexican immig-
rants in the US or asylum seekers in the UK, leads to higher property crime rates,
whereas those immigrants with qualifications and legal access to the labour market,
e.g. Polish immigrants in the UK, have no effect on property crime or they are even
associated with lower crime rates relative to native residents.
Finally there is the literature that investigates the impact of internal migration
on labour markets. For example, Boustan et al. (2010) find that the arrival of
internal migrants had no effect on local wages in the destination cities in the US.
It significantly raised out-migration of residents and reduced their time at work.
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The only evidence on this topic from a developing country comes from Kleemans
and Magruder (2017). They study the effect of internal migration on local labour
markets in Indonesia and find that immigration increases unemployment and lowers
wages for residents in the destination areas. Furthermore, they demonstrate how the
impact differs for formal and informal sector workers. The formal sector is affected
in terms of employment, whereas incomes are affected in the informal sector.
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following way. First, I analyse a
possible determinant of crime that has not been considered so far, internal migration.
In the economic model of crime (Becker, 1968), unemployment and low wages both
reduce the opportunity costs of crime. Hence, I empirically test whether internal
migration contributes to a reduction in the opportunity costs and consequently
increases crime. Secondly, the literature on migration and crime has focused so
far only on international migration even though internal migration differs in its
mechanisms and the migrants’ characteristics. My analysis provides evidence how
these differences can imply different results. Thirdly, by focusing on Brazil this
chapter enriches the literature of migration and crime as well as migration and its
impact on labour markets in developing countries.
2.3 Homicides in Brazil
The literature on migration and crime focuses on property crime because it can
be seen as an economic activity (Becker, 1968). Economic gains are achieved, for
example, by the profit made from selling a stolen car. Furthermore, empirical studies
in developed countries in most cases do not find any significant effect of international
immigration on violent crimes (Bianchi et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013). In these
countries violent crime is comparatively low in contrast to Brazil, which ranks as
one of the most violent countries in the world in terms of homicides. Many Latin
American countries have high homicide rates, driven either by civil war-like struggles
(Colombia) or wars between the state and drug gangs (Mexico) (Fernandes and de
Sousa Nascimento, 2007). In Brazil, this is not the case. Violence is the result of
66
different factors, hence the challenge to identify determinants of high homicide rates.
In some areas of the country, such as large metropolitan cities or the Amazon, illegal
markets have emerged over the past decades. Drug trade or trade of tropical woods
are markets outside the legal order and agents use violence to enforce their rules
(Chimeli and Soares, 2011). Violence between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro regularly
hit the global news and are often accompanied by crime unrelated to drugs in the
surroundings of drug trade areas in the city (Fernandes and de Sousa Nascimento,
2007). Other sources of conflict are those of land, dating back to the colonisation
of Brazil and today are often also encountered in the conflict with indigenous or
landless population of Brazil (Hidalgo et al., 2010).
Additionally, during the dictatorship many weapons have found their way into
the country and thus unreported firearm ownership is common. Small crimes like
street robbery can easily result in violent and often deadly crimes. “Brazil is a soci-
ety with rates of firearm victimization that surpass some countries at war” (p.228 in
Fernandes and de Sousa Nascimento (2007)). Despite the introduction of a disarma-
ment law, crime was not reduced. The state of Sa˜o Paulo was the only one successful
in the reduction of death due to firearm (De Castro Cerqueira and Pinho De Mello,
2012). All these points of conflict contribute to high homicide rates. Those who are
mainly involved in committing homicides and those mostly victimised are young,
non-white men, reflecting the underlying socio-economic issues of violence in Brazil
(Reichenheim et al., 2011).
2.4 Data, variables and definitions
2.4.1 Migration
The migration data come from the Brazilian Population Census survey of 2010.
Every ten years the Brazilian National Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
conducts a nationally representative household survey (Censo Demogra´fico 2010,
IBGE 2012). This survey comprises around 20 million individuals in all municip-
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alities of Brazil, covering 10% of the whole population. It contains information
on household composition, living conditions, labour market, education, geographic
location, and on migration.
I construct a panel of annual migration between municipalities from the retro-
spective information about migration that the individuals provide. Each individual
is asked about their former municipality of residence and the time since migration
in years. For each year from 2005 to 2010 based on which year the individual stated
as the year of her or his move, I aggregate the in- and out-migration rates at muni-
cipality level. The sample of migrants is restricted to working-age3 male and female
Brazilians, because the interest lies in labour market dynamics. For the aggregation
from the individual to the municipality level, I apply population survey weights.
The immigration rate Mm,t is the number of immigrants arriving in municipality
m in year t relative to the local population in the previous year:
Mm,t = Immigrantsm,t ∗ 100, 000/Populationm,t−1 (2.1)
This is the immigration rate per 100,000 inhabitants. I use the rate of migration
relative to population and not the absolute number of migrants, because I expect
the effect of migration to be different if ten immigrants arrive in a municipality of
100 people compared to one with 100,000 people. It is also the same unit as the
dependent variable, homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, which allows for an easier
interpretation of the estimates.
This definition reflects the annual new arrivals of workers in a destination mu-
nicipality. The measure differs from other studies which look at the change in the
stock of migrants relative to the population (e.g. Bianchi et al. (2012) or Kleemans
and Magruder (2017)). In contrast, I assume that internal migrants become part of
the resident population after their arrival. I am therefore only interested in the im-
pact of new arrivals on crime and not in the change of the population composition of
3The legal working age in Brazil is 16 years and the retirement age for men is 65 years. All
individuals in the sample are currently not in school.
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migrants and natives. I justify this assumption with the fact that internal migrants
are the closest substitutes to natives. They share the same nationality and do not
face language barriers or other such restrictions that international immigrants are
often confronted with. It is therefore not of interest to look at the change in the
stock of internal migrants at a destination, but instead I want to estimate how the
inflow of new workers affects the destination.4
I restrict the definition to people who move at least 339 kilometres. This is
the median distance that migrants in the data move. I do this to avoid capturing
people who just move to their neighbouring town and who remain in the same
local labour market. This definition also reduces the concern of spatial correlation
between the instrument measured at the origins and the dependent variable observed
at destinations. In the robustness checks (section 2.7.1 on page 84), I will change
the distance cut-off and see whether and how this affects my results.
2.4.2 Origins and destinations
One concern in the analysis of internal migration arises from the fact that in each
municipality migrants arrive, but others also leave at the same time. This would
imply to measure the outcome at locations that are both, origin and destination.
The studies that analysed the impact of immigration on crime or local labour mar-
kets were able to separate the origin from the destination because they looked at
international immigration.
To identify the impact of internal migration on local labour markets, Kleemans
and Magruder (2017) defined rural areas as the origins of migrants and urban areas
as destinations. The urbanization rate in Brazil is around 80 percent and almost as
high as that of the United States (Chauvin et al., 2016) so that it does not seem
sensible to look at rural to urban migration. The largest share of migration would be
ignored if it was restricted to rural-to-urban movements. Instead, I define sending
4Furthermore, data limitation does not allow to construct a stock variable. The stock of mi-
grants would only be for those who moved between 2000 and 2010, as the survey does not include
longer time periods than that. This would not measure the ‘true’ stock of internal immigrants.
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and receiving municipalities based on past migration patterns. This reflects the
locations pushing and pulling migrants within the country.
I distinguish origins from destinations by their past net-migration rate. I sum
up the migration rates from the pre-study period, 2001 to 2004, and compute net-
migration rates as the difference between in- and out-migration rate. Then I define
the net-sending municipalities to be the origins, meaning those that saw more work-
ers leaving than arriving in that period. Net-receiving municipalities are destina-
tions.
This definition leaves me with 2,125 destination and 3,439 origin municipalities
to conduct the analysis. I map these destinations and the origin municipalities in
figure 2.1 to illustrate their distribution across the country.
Figure 2.1: Map of origin and destination municipalities.
70
The darker locations are the destination municipalities. There is no clear geo-
graphical clustering. The North-eastern region overall appears to have seen more
people leave over the pre-study period than the rest of the country, but even within
that region there are still net-receiving municipalities.
2.4.3 Homicides
Crime rates in most studies are a combination of property crime, such as burglary
and theft, and violent crime, with homicide as the most extreme case. In contrast
to the US for example, there is little reliable data on property and other crimes
aside from homicides available for Brazil. Dix-Carneiro et al. (2017) show highly
significant correlations of homicides and various other crimes for municipalities in
the two most populous states of Brazil, for which data on other crime is available.
Homicide rates are therefore a strong indicator of general crime rates in Brazil and
any effect found on homicide rates can be seen as a lower bound estimate for the
impact on overall crime.
Homicide rates, i.e. the number of homicides per 100,000 persons living in a mu-
nicipality, come from the Brazilian System of Death Registration (SIM) maintained
by the Brazilian Ministry of Health (Ministe´rio da Sau´de). Data were extracted
from the Department of Public Health Information (DATASUS) which is regarded
as the most reliable information source on homicides in Brazil (Cerqueira, 2012).
Homicides are deaths registered with the codes X85 to Y09 according to the inter-
national coding of violent deaths in the Global Burden Disease 2004 Update by the
World Health Organization (Murray et al., 2013).
The main problem with this source is that it only reports homicides for muni-
cipalities where they have been reported in the system. Municipalities that did not
actually experience any homicides are not listed with zeros, but they appear with
missing values. They look exactly like municipalities with missing values due to mis-
reporting. This can create a bias in the results if municipalities with no homicides
reported are systematically different than those that report positive values. I test
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whether this is the case and how this affects the results in the robustness checks in
section 2.7.5 (page 88).
The average homicide rate in Brazil from 2005 to 2010 is 25 (Table 2.1). On
average each year 25 out of 100,000 people in a municipality are murdered. This
rate is very high in international comparison, where the average is around 9 and
the median only 3.5 in 2010 (World Bank, 2016). Homicide rates dramatically vary
across the country. As I show in figure 2.2, some locations have a rate of only 10
per 100,000 while in other municipalities it is as high as 150.
Figure 2.2: Map of homicide rate in destination municipalities.
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2.4.4 Migration and crime in Brazil from 2005 to 2010
In table 2.1, I present the summary statistics of the two main variables, homicide
and immigration rates, in destination municipalities. The number of observations
is only 7,354 due to the missing values of homicides in some locations and years.
The immigration rate into net-receiving destinations is on average 696 migrants per
100,000 inhabitants for the study period from 2005 to 2010.
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of main vari-
ables, destination municipality-year observa-
tions
N Mean Std.dev.
Homicide rate 7,354 25.7 20.8
Immigration rate 7,354 696.5 827.8
Homicide and migration rates are the number of
persons killed or of people who moved into a des-
tination municipality per 100,000 inhabitants of
that municipality.
The standard variations of the main variables presented in Table 2.1 indicate
a large variation across municipalities. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show a map of Brazil
with the local variation of homicide rates (Figure 2.2 on page 71) and immigration
(Figure 2.3) for the study period 2005 to 2010. The North-East experienced lower
immigration in contrast to the rest of the country. The Central-West and Northern
regions appear to have both higher immigration and higher crime rates than the rest
of the country, but there is variation also within these regions. These maps show
how much crime and immigration rates vary at municipality level within regions
and states, and that high crime is not only concentrated in the big cities. This
emphasizes the value of an analysis at this level.
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Figure 2.3: Map of immigration rate in destination municipalities.
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2.4.5 Additional variables
Data on municipal population size is obtained from Ipeadata.5 They are projections
based on the Census from 2000 and 2010.
The data for the instrumental variable comprises employment and wages in the
manufacturing sector at municipality and national level and they come from the
RAIS (Annual Social Information Report)6, a national employment registry. The
federal government of Minas Gerais publishes the annual national wage growth and
the total number of formal employments in each municipality by sector aggregated
from the individual level RAIS data on the Dataviva online platform.7
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Empirical strategy
I estimate the impact of internal migration on local crime rates drawing on the
literature on the effect of internal migration on local labour markets, especially
Kleemans and Magruder (2017).
The sample for the analysis includes only net-receiving municipalities, the des-
tinations of internal migrants, and the study period is from 2005 to 2010. I estimate
a log-log fixed-effects model8 of crime on immigration:
ln(H)m,t = βln(M)m,t + αm + δt + γst + m,t (2.2)
The log of the homicide rate H in municipality m in year t is a function of the log
5Ipeadata is an online data pool provided by Ipea (Instituto de Pesquisa Econoˆmica Aplicada),
a Brazilian public research institute, which collects the data from several ministries and other
public sources.
6The Annual Social Information Report (RAIS, Relac¸a˜o Anual de Informac¸o˜es Sociais) is col-
lected by the Ministry of Labor and Employment and comprising around 97% of Brazilian formal
enterprises.
7Manufacturing sector is used as broad term for the processing industry. It is category ’C’ in
the updated national code of economic activities (CNAE) by the Brazilian Institute for Geography
and Statistics (IBGE) and it includes the two digit level from 10 (”Production of food products”)
to 33 (”Maintenance, reparation and installation of machinery and equipment”) (IBGE 2010).
8I do not estimate a first-difference model due to issues of missing values so that the panel is
not perfectly balanced.
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of the immigration rate M into municipality m in year t. The coefficient β measures
the percentage change in homicide rates associated with a one percent change in the
migration rates.
I include municipality dummies, αm, that capture any time-invariant unobserv-
able characteristics of each locality. The year dummy δt controls for year-specific
events that affect all municipalities.9  is an idiosyncratic error term. I also include
a state-year trend, γst, that captures any state-specific trends in the dependent vari-
able. In Brazil, public safety falls under state legislation. For example, the state
of Sa˜o Paulo invested in policies that were successful in reducing homicide rates
by almost half over the study period (see figure B.1 on page 187). The trend thus
controls for policy differences between states.10
The errors are clustered at the level of microregio˜es. They are an agglomeration
of municipalities that share a local labour market and some areas of administration.
In my sample, a microregia˜o comprises on average seven destination municipalities
and the sample covers 486 microregio˜es. If migration is expected to affect crime rates
through the labour market, it is important to allow errors to be correlated across
municipalities within the same local labour market. All regressions are weighted by
municipality population following the literature.11
Two econometric issues arise in the context of estimating β. First, there might be
unobservable factors that affect homicide rates and immigration rates, for example
unemployment rate or the labour market structure. Assuming that unobserved
variables, such as labour market institutions, do not vary over the study period the
municipality fixed effects, αm, control for such factors.
12
9Brazil’s economy was hit by the global economic crisis for a short period in 2009/2010. This
implied a decline in national employment and wages in the manufacturing sector (figure 2.5) and
consequently a slump in the manufacturing employment share in the destination municipalities as
depicted in figure B.2 (page 187).
10For robustness I also check for non-linearities in the trend by including a quadratic or cubic
state-specific trend (see Appendix table B.2 on page 185). The linear trend appears to be the best
fit as results do not change when applying a quadratic or a cubic trend.
11The argument comes from the health literature that shows that mortality realisation is an
estimator of the underlying mortality probability. It was shown that “the variance of this estimator
is inversely proportional to population size” p14, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2017). Other applications
are seen for example in Bell et al. (2013).
12I do not include additional time-varying control variables, such as unemployment rate, because
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Secondly, there is the problem of reverse causality between crime and migration.
The lower crime rates are, the more attractive a location might be for migrants. This
would bias the estimate downwards. Alternatively, the higher the crime rates are
the larger the illegal market, which could attract specific types of migrants. In this
case one would overestimate the impact. To identify the causal effect of immigration
on crime I apply an instrumental variable (IV) strategy.
2.5.2 Instrument for immigration rates
For the aforementioned reasons, an instrument is required to estimate the causal
effect of internal migration on crime. The IV has to be a strong predictor of migra-
tion but independent of crime rates at the destination of migrants. It has to predict
that migrants leave their origin and that they choose one destination over another
one (Card, 2001). In order to estimate a fixed-effect panel model, the instrument
for this analysis also needs to predict variation in migration over time.
Monras (2015) and others showed that if a sector experiences a slump at national
level, then wages and employment fall in locations where this sector usually employs
a large share of workers. This crisis affects workers’ mobility decision to stay in or
leave these locations. In this analysis, I use such Bartik-style local labour demand
shocks in the manufacturing sector to create exogenous variation in the migration
rate (Bartik, 1991). This approach follows recent applications in the local labour
market literature, such as Bound and Holzer (2000); Notowidigdo (2013); Monras
(2015); Diamond (2016); Morten and Oliveira (2016). None of these studies uses
the Bartik shock as instrument for migration, but they all show that it can be used
to predict changes in local wages and employment.
The intuition behind the first stage is the following: A municipality m hosts
immigrants from a specific origin o. If origin o is affected by a local labour demand
shock S, I expect this to change the rate of migrants arriving in municipality m
from origin o in the following period. The immigration rate, Mm,t, into municipality
they are likely to be endogenous.
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m in year t is determined as:
ln(M)m,t = b1So,t−1 + b2Sm,t−1 + αm + δt + γst + um,t (2.3)
The sector-specific local labour demand shock in year t, So,t, is an interaction of
the employment share in a specific sector in location o in the pre-study year 2003,
eo,2003, and the national wage growth of that sector, w¯
S
t , in each year t of the analysis:
So,t = eo,2003 ∗ w¯St (2.4)
The local labour demand shock is sector specific. If wages at the national level
in sector S fall, demand for workers in this sector is lower and people lose their jobs.
The wages or other economic shocks in one municipality cannot change this national
trend.13 This is why I can assume the national wage growth to be exogenous.14 If
the employment share of the sector in a specific municipality, eo,2003, is large, this
location will be affected more strongly by the changes in national trends. The
mobility of workers is likely to be affected by this variation. The out-migration of
workers would change the employment share. I therefore use the employment share
in 2003 preceding the study period. This provides variation across origins and the
national wage growth creates annual variation. Figure 2.4 maps the employment
share in the manufacturing sector in 2003 in origin municipalities and figure 2.5
plots the national wage growth over the study period.
13In my sample of origin municipalities the local sector employment share is on average lower
than in destinations (10% compared to 18% respectively). I am therefore not concerned that any
of these locations could be the driver of national trends in the sector.
14Instead of the national wage growth Monras (2015) used a dummy indicating whether the year
was before or after the financial crisis hit the US. Bound and Holzer (2000) used hours worked in a
specific sector. I will use national wage growth like Diamond (2016), but in the robustness checks
I will use sector employment growth like (Bartik, 1991).
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Figure 2.4: Map of instrument in sending municipalities, employment share in the
manufacturing sector.
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Figure 2.5: Annual national wage growth in the manufacturing sector.
In the specification 2.3, each municipality is assigned exactly one origin o as
for example in Munshi (2003). Empirically, municipalities receive migrants from
various origins, so that one possibility would be to use the top 3 or 4 origins in form
of several instruments. In order to exploit the full information provided in the data,
I follow Kleemans and Magruder (2017) and create a composite instrument of the
shock across all origins.
I can therefore rewrite the first stage of the 2SLS instrumental variable estimation
like this:
ln(M)m,t = b1
O∑
o=1(m 6=o)
(po,m ∗ So,t−1) + b2Sm,t−1 + αm + δt + γst + um,t (2.5)
The composite measures sums up the local labour demand shock in all origins
weighted by the term po,m. This term reflects the importance of each origin o as
migrant sender to each specific destination municipality m. The weight is based
on migration patterns pre-dating the study period and it follows the literature ex-
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ploiting the variation of historical migration flows between origin-destination pairs
(Bell et al., 2013; Bianchi et al., 2012; Jaitman and Machin, 2013; Spenkuch, 2011;
Chalfin, 2014, 2015; O¨zden et al., 2017). The idea is that the destination choice of
migrants follows certain patterns that were established in the past and evolved over
time due to networks (Munshi, 2003). A migrant from origin A is more likely to go
to destination B than to C, if in the past more people moved from A to B than
from A to C.
First, I aggregate all migrants that moved out of an origin municipality during
the years 2001 to 2004. Next, I compute how many migrants moved to each specific
destination municipality m. Then po,m is the share of the origin-destination specific
migrants over all migrants that left origin o. One can think of it as the probability
for migrants leaving origin o to move to destination m. The probability for migrants
who move in response to a local labour demand shock S to arrive in municipality m is
therefore the sum over the shocks in all origins O weighted by the destination specific
migration probabilities of each origin po,m. In section 2.7.3 (page 88), results are
shown for the case in which the weights were computed using different time periods,
using all data available from 2001 to 2010 or only the study period 2005 to 2010.
Finally, the first and second stage also include a control of the lagged local
labour demand shock in the destination municipalities, Sm,t−1, to capture potential
correlation of these shocks across origin and destination municipalities. This is to
ensure that the demand shock is only related to crime through the migration rate
as required by the exclusion restriction.
In the second stage, homicide rates are regressed on the predicted immigration
rate:
ln(H)m,t = β1 l̂n(M)m,t + β2Sm,t−1 + αm + δt + γst + m,t (2.6)
With a valid instrument, the estimation of equation 2.6 gives a consistent estim-
ate of β, the impact of internal migration on crime.
81
2.6 Results
2.6.1 First stage results
Table 2.2 reports the results from the first stage of the IV two-stage least squares
estimation. It is important to note that the sample is not a balanced panel at the
municipality level due to missing values in the dependent variable. I return to this
issue in section 2.7.5 (page 88).
The instrument is a significant predictor of immigration rates in destinations. In
the first column, I included only year and municipality fixed effects whereas in the
second column, I also add a state-year trend. This increases the coefficient of the
instrumental variable and the Kleibergen-Paap F-test for weak identification. The
latter is in both cases well above the rule-of-thumb value of 10 which confirms the
relevance of the instrument for the first stage.
Table 2.2: First stage of the 2SLS regression
Ln(Immigration rate)
(1) (2) (3)
IV : Origin labour 0.146*** 0.157*** 0.161***
demand shock in t-1 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Destination labour 0.464
demand shock in t-1 (0.664)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
State trends No Yes Yes
N 6,589 6,589 6,589
Kleibergen-Paap F-Test 41.2 47.8 49.6
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are
clustered at the microregia˜o level and all estimations are weighted
by the municipality population. MC fixed effects refers to muni-
cipality fixed effects.
The results here show a positive coefficient of the instrument. If at national level
wages in the manufacturing sector there is higher wage growth than in the previous
year, more people migrate out from municipalities with a relatively larger share of
the manufacturing sector and the opposite applies for slower wage growth. In the
third column, a control of the lagged local labour demand shock in the destination
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municipalities is included to capture potential correlation of these shocks across
origin and destination municipalities. If they were correlated, their inclusion in the
regression should change the size of the coefficient of the immigration rate. Yet, the
inclusion barely changes the estimated effect (column 3). It seems that destination
labour demand variation is not a major pull factor for the sample of municipalities
in this analysis.
The positive relationship between the instrument and immigration rates can
be explained with the fact that, in some contexts, out-migration can be larger in
response to a positive compared to a negative shock due to the presence of migration
costs and credit constraints (e.g. Notowidigdo (2013)).
Guriev and Vakulenko (2015) show that the out-migration rate from less de-
veloped locations in Russia increases with an increase in income and decline in
credit constraints in those areas. Hirvonen (2016) finds that Tanzanians exposed to
negative income shocks are less likely to migrate at the individual and household
level. Morten and Oliveira (2016) find that “37% of the total incidence of a [local]
shock falls on residents [if migration is costly], compared to 1% in a model where
migration is costless”15 for Brazil. In the context of this chapter, the origins are
relatively less developed municipalities (see table 2.5 on page 91) and thus I expect
the majority of workers to be in the lower quantiles of the income distribution so
that migration costs matter.
In the appendix table B.1 (page 184) I estimate a fixed-effects regression of local
GDP, wages and formal sector employment in origin municipalities on the first lag of
the instrument, the manufacturing sector labour demand shock. The estimates show
a positive significant relationship for GDP and wages, but not for employment. This
would support the argument that migration depends on income at origin. A positive
shock increases wages in origins and GDP so that workers gain more income and
can afford to move. If employment was affected, workers would be laid off and have
an incentive to move in response to this negative shock. If employment increased,
15cited from the abstract of Morten and Oliveira (2016)
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workers would have more opportunities at the origin and less incentives to move
away. This would imply a negative first stage result. It is hence plausible that the
first stage shows a positive correlation between local labour demand shocks at origin
and immigration at destination.
2.6.2 Second stage results
I now present the main results in table 2.3. In the first column are the results
of a simple fixed-effect estimation that does not account for the endogeneity of
immigration and crime. In this regression, there is a weakly positive relationship
between immigration and crime. Once I instrument for the immigration rate in
column 2, there is a strongly significant impact of immigration rate on crime with an
elasticity of around 2%. As expected, reverse causality leads to an underestimation
of the relationship so that the IV-2SLS result is larger than the OLS result. In the
third column, a state-year trend is included. This is important because Brazilian
federal states are independently deciding about their budget for public safety and
policies targeted at the reduction of crime. Once these state-specific trends are
accounted for, the coefficient of immigration becomes smaller, but more precise.
Table 2.3: 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on immigration rates
2005-2010, Second stage results
Ln(Homicide rate)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Immigration rate) 0.056* 2.341*** 1.134*** 1.162***
(0.031) (0.360) (0.165) (0.190)
Destination labour 0.539
demand shock t-1 (1.487)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trend No No Yes Yes
N 6,589 6,589 6,589 6,589
Kleibergen-Paap Test 44 50 54.2
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at
the microregia˜o level. Each regression is weighted by municipality popu-
lation. MC fixed effects refers to municipality fixed effects.
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Lastly, in column four, I present the results of my preferred specification that also
includes the local labour demand shock in destination municipalities. Destinations
have on average a larger share of employment in the manufacturing sector than
origins (18% compared to 10% respectively). Thus, variations at the national level
should matter even more for destinations than for origins. It is therefore important
to control also for changes in the labour demand in destinations. Demand shocks
at destination are insignificant and the impact of immigration on homicides is only
marginally larger.
I find that on average an increase of immigration rate into net-receiving muni-
cipalities in Brazil in the period from 2005 to 2010 was associated with a significant
increase in homicide rates of 1.2%. This effect is comparable to the magnitudes that
other studies found for the impact of immigration on crime, when they looked at
international immigrants. O¨zden et al. (2017) find a negative elasticity of -1.8% of
international immigration on violent crime in Malaysia. Bianchi et al. (2012) find
no effect on most crime, but an elasticity of 1% of immigration on robbery in Italy.
16
2.7 Robustness and sensitivity of results
2.7.1 Challenges to the exogeneity of the instrument
One major challenge to identification is posed by the possibility that manufacturing
sector labour demand shocks at origins predict not only out-migration from origins,
but also other economic activity between origins and destinations, such as trading of
goods. This could then affect local homicide rates through labour market spill-overs
16One major challenge in the analysis of the impact of internal migration on local outcomes is
that each destination does not only receive internal migrants, but also experiences out-migration.
The impact on the labour force in the destination caused by the arrival of new migrants might be
much lower or not important if at the same time a significant share of workers leave this location. I
therefore also tried to conduct the same analysis only using net-migration instead of immigration.
The effect is still positive and significant, yet much smaller as expected. Out-migration of workers
dampen the impact of the arrival of immigrants (Boustan et al., 2010). Results are presented
in the appendix table B.3 (page 185), but the instrumental variable does not appear to be a
good predictor for net-migration rates. One would need to find another instrument to predict the
out-migration from destinations to then jointly predict the net-migration.
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at the destinations.
For example, a negative shock in one origin might not only have the consequence
that fewer workers leave this location but it might also cause changes in prices of
goods produced and their trade. The firms affected will lower the prices of their
goods in order to be able to compete in the national market. Their goods become
cheaper relative to the goods produced in another municipality. Thus, internal trade
from the municipality hit by the shock to an unaffected location should increase.
This would put pressure on the firms in that destination and it could imply negative
consequences for the local labour market there. Such negative spill-overs could in
turn lead to more crime in destinations.
Ideally, I would test this relationship with data on internal trade which is not
available. Instead, I conduct the same estimation with different samples for each of
which migration is defined through a different minimum distance. The first estim-
ation is done at a minimum distance of 100 kilometres and followed by estimations
up to a minimum at 2,000 kilometres in steps of 100. Trade and labour market spill-
overs from the local labour demand shock at origins to the destinations are much
more likely under the scenario when distances are shorter. If my main results were
driven by inter-municipality trade and labour demand spill-overs, I would expect
the effect to be strongest for locations that are closer.
I plot the estimated coefficient of immigration on crime from each of these sep-
arate regressions in graph 2.6. The effect is smaller and insignificant for distance
cut-offs below 300 kilometres. From 300 kilometres and higher, the effect is fairly
robust to changes in the distance cut-off. As my main analysis was conducted us-
ing the distance cut-off of 339km, the main results should not be affected by such
spill-overs.
2.7.2 National employment growth
The construction of the Bartik-style local labour demand shock requires an exogen-
ous component that varies over time (Bartik, 1991). The most common approach in
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Figure 2.6: Results for different distance cut-offs in the migration definition.
the literature is to use wage or employment growth at the national level specific to
a sector. So far, I constructed the instrument using national nominal wage growth.
Now I use national employment growth to construct the instrument and present the
estimation results in table 2.4, column 1. The elasticity reduces from 1.2% to 0.9%,
but it is still positive and strongly significant.
Another option is to use the wage growth at the state level instead of the national
level. This would still be exogenous to wage growth at each individual municipality,
but it would allow for differential trends in greater economic areas. The results are
presented in column 2 of table 2.4. The first stage F-test is very high indicating
strong predictive power of this version of the instrument. The elasticity is smaller
than the initial result of 1.2%, but very close to an effect of 1%, similar to the
case when using employment instead of wage growth. The type of labour demand
variation might induce different types of migrants to move and hence results in
different effects.
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Table 2.4: IV-2SLS regression: Sensitivity analysis
Ln(Homicide rate)
Other instrument Altering periods for weights Altering periods for analysis
National level State level 2001 - 2010 2005 - 2010 2005 - 2007 2008 - 2010
employment growth wage growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Immigration rate) 0.889*** 0.972*** 1.161*** 1.160*** 0.947** 0.888***
(0.196) (0.147) (0.218) (0.221) (0.388) (0.252)
Destination shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,589 6,589 6,589 6,589 3,112 2,947
Kleibergen-Paap Test 40.2 116 57.1 60.4 16 21.4
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the microregia˜o level. Each regression is weighted by municipality
population. MC fixed effects refers to municipality fixed effects. Destination shock indicates that the regression includes the local labour
demand shock variable at destination.
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2.7.3 Alternative weighting of origins
The construction of weights is based on migration rates from 2001 to 2004. Hence,
one concern could be that this short period yields migration patterns specific to
these years but not to the study period. As robustness check, I also compute these
weights using the full period of migration data available, that is from 2001 to 2010,
and only for the study period from 2005 to 2010. The results of these estimations
are presented in table 2.4 in columns 3 and 4 respectively. Both estimates are not
different from the original estimate of 1.2%.
2.7.4 Recall bias
The migration data is constructed from retrospective information self-reported by
the migrants in 2010. As discussed by McKenzie and Sasin (2006) this can lead
to a recall bias, meaning that the most recent movements are more likely to be
(correctly) reported than migration a longer time ago. This implies that the estim-
ated effect in my analysis should be different for the early years compared to the
later ones. I run the regression just for the sample of most recent migration, from
2008 to 2010 (column 6, table 2.4), and for migration longer ago, from 2005 to 2007
(column 5). Despite losing power, the coefficients of immigration rates on crime are
not statistically different from each other and only slightly smaller than the effect
measured with the full sample due to the shorter periods analysed.17
2.7.5 Misreported homicide data
Homicides can be considered as being reported more accurately than other types of
crimes due to their severity. However, in Brazil there are known issues with regards
to reporting of homicides (Cerqueira, 2014a). For example, Brazil has a high number
of police killings which are often not reported or hidden. Thus, I conduct a matching
exercise to impute values for missing homicide rates. The detailed discussion of this
17I conduct a Chow-test whether the coefficients across these two sub-samples are different. The
F-test statistic is 0.04 and the p-value for the difference in coefficients is 0.9888. I thus cannot
reject the validity of pooling the sample across these years.
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issue is presented in the appendix (see section B.3 on page 188). The results of
this exercise are very similar to the main result with effects between 0.9 and 1.4
percent depending on the assumptions and corresponding imputations for missing
values made.
2.7.6 Dynamic effects
I estimate the model including the first and second lag of the immigration rate.
Results are in appendix table B.4 (page 186). Both lags are positive and signific-
ant indicating that past immigration also affects crime. This could suggest that
internal immigrants need some time to find a job at destination or that the labour
market adjustment takes more than one year, but it also suggests criminal inertia.
Immigrant inflow increases crime and this by itself leads to higher crime rates in the
future. It is important to note that the period of analysis is a short panel and it
looks at annual changes. It is therefore plausible that also the lagged immigration
rate are correlated with current crime rates.
2.8 Discussion of possible channels
2.8.1 Channels at the individual level
The results indicate that an increase in immigration into net-receiving municipal-
ities leads to a small but significant rise in homicide rates in these locations. The
literature on migration and crime suggests different channels to explain this result.
Migrants could be criminals and thus increase the crime rates upon their arrival. To
test this, one would usually look at incarceration or conviction data to compare the
share of crime committed by immigrants compared to that of natives. In the context
of internal migration it is difficult to distinguish migrants, because the incarceration
data only reports basic demographics, but not the former and current municipality
of residence.
Another explanation in the context of international migration is that hate crime
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against immigrants increases when more immigrants arrive. This is unlikely to be the
case for internal migrants and even if hate crimes against internal migrants existed
it is impossible to differentiate them from residents in Brazilian victimization data.
The literature further suggests that those immigrants with restricted access to the
labour market might be more prone to commit crime due to lower opportunity costs.
Internal migrants, however, do not face legal or language barriers to participate in
the destination labour market.
Studies investigating the impact of internal migration on local labour markets
found negative effects of migration on wages and employment of residents at destin-
ations (Kleemans and Magruder, 2017). This could in consequence lead to higher
crime committed by those residents that lose their job or receive lower wages. In
order to confirm this hypothesis, I would have to estimate the impact of immigration
on labour market outcomes of residents at the destinations at the individual level.
Unfortunately, for this estimation I only have one cross-section of data so that the
results would not be comparable to the panel estimates. The only panel of labour
market outcomes at municipality level available is the RAIS data, but it only covers
formal sector employment. This is not very informative for the Brazilian case, be-
cause the informal labour market is very large. I would not be able to see whether
residents or migrants are unemployed as a result of the immigration or whether
they work in the informal sector. Neither could I detect effects of immigration on
informal sector wages. Kleemans and Magruder (2017) document that in a devel-
oping country with a large informal sector, the impact of rural to urban migration
is different for formal and informal sector workers.
Given the data at hand, I investigate the possibility that due to the different
characteristics of origins and destinations the increase in crime could be an export of
crime from poorer origins to richer destinations via crime-prone migrants. Table 2.5
contrasts the main characteristics of net-sending origin and net-receiving destination
municipalities. Destinations are overall the locations with slightly better labour
market conditions. Unemployment and informality are lower, more high skilled jobs
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are located here, and agriculture is less important. It is plausible that internal
migrants on average prefer these locations over the net-sending municipalities. It
also implies that on average workers who leave the net-sending municipalities are
probably less skilled and more often confronted with unemployment or low paid
informal work in their origins. They could be more likely to be involved in illegal
activities and their migration would simply imply an export of crime from origins
to destinations.
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of origin and destination characteristics 2010
Destinations Origins
(Net-receivers) (Net-senders)
Mean Mean Difference
GDP growth rate 0.05 0.046 0.004
Unemployment rate 0.057 0.062 -0.005***
Population 48,265 25,642 22,623***
Informality rate 0.57 0.68 -0.11***
Share of high skilled workers 0.31 0.27 0.04***
Share of non-white workers 0.48 0.57 -0.09***
Agricultural work share 0.31 0.38 -0.07***
Observations 3,439 2,125
*** The difference in means between origins and destinations is statistically significant
at 1%. The data for GDP growth rate come from Ipeadata.
I look further into the characteristics of workers who migrate in response to the
sector-specific demand shocks. Those who are most involved in crime in Brazil are
young, low educated men (Reichenheim et al., 2011). I run a regression at the
individual level predicting the probability of a migrant being either low-educated,
female, young or a young, low-skilled man on the sector-specific shocks.18 The res-
ults, reported in table 2.6, show that the migrant workers who move in response to
a local manufacturing labour demand shock in the origin municipality are signific-
antly more likely to be low educated or to be aged above 25 years. There are no
significant differences between the sexes. Consequently, the young, male and low-
skilled workers are significantly less likely to move in response to the instrument.
18These regressions are estimated using the individual level data and for each year of migration
separately.
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The results from all years are reported in the Appendix table B.5 (page 186).
Table 2.6: Migrants’ characteristic in response to local labour demand shocks at
origin in t-1, 2010
Probability to be
Low-skilled Female Young Young, male,
(16 to 25 years) low-skilled
Manufacturing shock 1.009** 0.333 -0.567 -0.455*
(0.307) (0.316) (0.315) (0.230)
N 44,212 44,212 44,212 44,212
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. These are the marginal effects from separate
probit estimations of the probability of a migrant to be either low educated, female or
young/male/unskilled on the local labour demand shock in a migrant’s origin in t-1 for
migrants who moved between 2009 and 2010. Standard errors are robust. All regressions
include dummies for the state of origin.
The main results can partly be explained by the fact that relatively more low
educated workers move in response to a manufacturing demand shock. These work-
ers add to the unskilled workforce at destinations, increasing the competition for
low-skilled jobs and thus the crime rate. One could argue that these unskilled mi-
grants either are criminals themselves or at least the most likely to commit crime.
Their movement from net-sending to net-receiving municipalities could thus imply
an export of crime. While it is not possible to exactly test this hypothesis, those
most likely to be involved in crime, the young and uneducated men, are less likely to
move in response to the instrument applied here. This provides suggestive evidence
against the hypothesis of crime export.
2.8.2 Labour market structure: Informal and criminal sec-
tor
Becker’s economic model of crime argues that individuals are more likely to particip-
ate in criminal activities if the opportunity costs and deterrence are very low (1968).
Lower deterrence implies a lower probability of getting caught and punished. Hence,
the costs to participating in crime are lower. This depends on sentences in response
to crime, but also on the probability of being caught based on policing measures. If
the criminal sector is very large and long established, then this is often associated
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with less successful policing activities and low deterrence. Fajnzylber et al. (2002)
documented in a cross-country panel comparison that past crime is a significant
predictor for higher current crime. I thus expect that the impact of immigration on
crime is larger in areas where there is a large established criminal sector.
Opportunity costs are another factor that affect crime. If immigrants indeed
increase the competition in the labour market, this may increase unemployment,
which may make crime a more attractive outside option. In Brazil and many other
developing countries, the existence of the informal sector creates a form of buffer
between formal employment and unemployment. If the informal sector is very large,
immigrants as well as natives will find many opportunities in this sector whereas
the formal sector is less easily accessible.
I investigate these two hypotheses in the data. In table 2.7, I present the results
of my main regression for specific sub-samples. The first column shows the impact of
immigration on crime in municipalities where the homicide rate has been above the
median in the past (in 2000). The effect is slightly larger than the main result. In
those municipalities where the past homicide rate was below the median, the effect
is negative and statistically insignificant (see column 2).
In the third and fourth column, I conduct the same exercise with locations where
the informal sector is above or below the median size based on the 2010 data.19
As hypothesised, in municipalities where the informal sector is relatively small the
arrival of more workers is associated with a significantly higher homicide rate and
zero in places where the informal sector is large. In the last column, I look at
destinations where both scenarios apply: a high past homicide rate and a small
informal sector. The effect is again significant and the coefficient even larger than
for the respective sub-samples. With 1.9% it is larger than the initially estimated
elasticity of 1.2%.
19Using the informal sector size of 2010 could imply that the sector size is itself a result of
immigration. It is not possible to match exactly the municipalities from the Census of 2000 to the
municipalities in 2010 due to changes in administrative codes. Yet, as I do not use the informal
sector size within the regression, but purely to define the sub-sample, I am less concerned that this
should affect the results. Furthermore, recent analysis showed that the informal sector has been
shrinking in the past years (Haanwinckel and Soares, 2016) which would work against my result.
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These results suggest that the prevalence of crime in combination with low avail-
ability of outside options to the restrictive formal labour market is associated with
a stronger impact of immigration on local crime rates.
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Table 2.7: IV-2SLS regressions, Sub-samples
Ln(Homicide rate)
Sub-samples: Homicides in 2000 Informal sector size Homicides high, Homicides low,
High Low Large Small informal sector small informal sector large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Immigration rate) 1.731*** -0.179 0.477 1.399*** 1.962*** -0.166
(0.479) (0.313) (0.931) (0.299) (0.603) (0.298)
Destination shock Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,276 2,508 2,623 3,966 1,520 5,069
Kleibergen-Paap Test 28.4 20.8 1.71 40.6 22.6 26.2
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the microregia˜o level and all regressions weighted
by municipality population. Destination shock indicates that the regression includes the local labour demand shock variable at
destination. Sub-samples are divided into those above and below the median homicide rate in 2000 (18.3), the median share of
workers in the informal sector in 2010 (55%) in net-receiving municipalities (destinations).
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2.9 Conclusion
This chapter aims to estimate the causal effect of internal migration on crime rates
in Brazilian municipalities. In order to overcome the endogeneity of migration, I
instrument it with local labour demand shocks in migrants’ origins.
The results indicate a significant and positive effect of internal immigration on
homicides at municipality level. A one percent increase in in-migrants relative to
the local population leads on average and ceteris paribus to an increase of 1.2% in
the homicide rate in a Brazilian municipality in the period from 2005 to 2010. This
result is comparable in size to those obtained in studies of the impact of international
immigration on local crime rates. The estimated effect is the elasticity of homicide
rates to immigration rates. The average migration rate in the study period is 700
per 100,000 inhabitants, that of homicide rates is 25. If the in-flow of migrants
increases to 770, homicides are expected to increase to 25.3, which is on average
approximately 11 homicides per year more in a municipality than before. Due to
data limitations, crime is measured with homicide rates. This is the most extreme
form of crime and therefore the results are expected to reflect the lower bound for
the effect of internal migration on crime.
I show that the estimated effect applies strongly to low-skilled migrants who are
most likely to move in response to local labour demand shocks in the manufacturing
sector at their origins. There is, however, no indication that migrants are crime ex-
porters whose migration reduces crime in origins while increasing it at destinations.
It is not possible to say more about whether it is the migrants or local residents who
commit more crime due to a lack of corresponding data.
The hypothesis of this chapter was that internal migration has an impact on
destination labour markets and through these affects crime. I therefore investigated
heterogeneous effects with respect to labour market structures. Many developing
countries (including Brazil) have segmented labour markets with a large informal
sector. The effect of migration appears to depend on such local labour market
structures. One may hypothesize that the more flexible, lower paying informal
97
sector can help absorb migrants and thus reduce incentives to participate in crime.
Indeed, I find that the estimated effects are the largest for municipalities with a
small informal labour market.
In line with the traditional view by Fields (1975), large shares of informal work
contracts in Brazil are due to the strict labour market regulations that make firing
difficult and expensive, require payment of minimum wages, contribute to social pro-
tection and low working hours and that relax the role of trade unions (Barros and
Corseuil, 2001; Mariano Bosch, 2007). This incentivizes employers to hire inform-
ally. Most recent evidence suggests that formally registered firms hire approximately
40-50 percent of their workforce informally, depending on firm size. The wage dif-
ferential between formal and informal workers is zero within firms, conditional on
individual characteristics (Ulyssea, 2010). Thus, the traditional view of informality
as way to keep labour costs low seems valid in the Brazilian context. If the informal
sector is very large, immigrants as well as natives will find many opportunities in
this sector, whereas the formal sector will be less easily accessible. The results of
Kleemans and Magruder (2017) reflect this. Informal wages are affected by migra-
tion, but not informal employment, while formal employment is directly affected by
the increase in labour supply. If the informal sector is small, low-skilled workers
will be confronted with a very rigid formal labour market and higher chances of
staying unemployed. This reduces the opportunity costs for crime for these workers.
This chapter confirms that the impact of immigration on local labour markets is
different from previous model predictions and from empirical analyses that did not
include an informal sector (Card and Lemieux, 2001; Borjas, 2003). In many devel-
oping economies such as Brazil, the informal sector is very large and thus should be
accounted for.
In chapter 1, I provided a snapshot of the opportunities that many locations in
Brazil yield for migrants to optimize their location choice. However, the results also
revealed that not all migrants were able to realise positive returns to their move.
This could be explained by the lack of access to jobs in highly formalised local
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labour markets. Improving the capacity of local markets to absorb new workers
should therefore be of policy interest as migration appears to be a common strategy
for Brazilians to adjust to local shocks.
I further find that the effects are largest in municipalities that have historically
high crime rates, consistent with the interpretation that these are regions with low
levels of deterrence. For policy makers, the focus should thus be on improving
deterrence to avoid that “crime” is an economically important activity or “industry”
(Becker, 1968, p.170).
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Chapter 3
The nature and impact of
repeated migration within
households in rural Ghana
joint work with Julie Litchfield
3.1 Introduction
Internal migration is a common and sizeable phenomenon in many developing coun-
tries. An estimated 740 million people live outside their region of birth (Bell and
Muhidin, 2009). Differences in regional economic performance induce people to leave
poorer areas and move to those where more and better opportunities are located.
In Ghana, around 35 percent of people in the population Census of 2010 had moved
from their place of birth to another location within the country (Ghana Statist-
ical Service, 2013). Many people move from poorer to richer regions, some move
with the whole household, others send a member of the household (Litchfield and
Waddington, 2003; Molini et al., 2016).
Internal migration plays an important role in poverty reduction and economic
development at the individual, household and macroeconomic level. On the one
hand, it contributes to structural change in the country when rural workers move
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into non-agricultural work in urban areas (Harris and Todaro, 1970). On the other
hand, migration of a household member can insure the sending household against
income shocks in the origin. Such insurance can prevent households from falling into
poverty. Moreover, the income earned by the migrant member can raise consumption
levels at home or even pay for investments in profitable technologies (Stark and
Bloom, 1985). Additionally, geographic mobility offers young people to advance
their education and gain new skills if their origins do not provide these opportunities.
Because of its size and relevance for economic development, economists study
internal migration, but data limitations and methodological issues remain a chal-
lenge. One focus of research is the question whether and how internal migration
affects households at origin. This chapter contributes to this strand in the literat-
ure. We investigate the impact of having a new migrant on the welfare of sending
households conditional on their prior migration experience.
The engagement in migration of some village or community members was shown
to significantly reduce migration costs for later migrants from that same network.
This local migration experience would also increase the probability to be successful
at destination in terms of finding a job. Thus, households are more likely to send
a migrant if they have access to such a network of migration experience (Munshi,
2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). Households themselves can gain migration
experience through their engagement in migration. Bryan et al. (2014) provide ex-
perimental evidence that the idiosyncratic migration experience of a household in
contrast to that of social networks significantly predicts the repetition of migra-
tion within this household. Migration experience at the household level is hence
important for future migration decisions and their impacts on the household.
Furthermore, the focus on new migrants is adequate for a setting in which house-
holds have several migrant members who move at different points in time. This is
revealed by the data available in this chapter. We use primary data from a new
two-wave household panel survey conducted in Ghana in 2013 and 2015.1 The sur-
1As part of my PhD, I contributed to the completion of the data set by cleaning the data
and ensuring that households and individuals can be matched between survey waves in close
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veys were designed with the goal to collect as much information as possible about
migration.
The econometric challenge of the comparison between migrant and non-migrant
households is unobserved heterogeneity. There are unobservable factors that determ-
ine both, the fact that a household has a migrant and the outcome of interest, for
example household income. Any result from a simple comparison of these households
with and without migrants would be biased. Instrumental variables and selection
models have been used to address this issue, often however restricted by the cross-
sectional structure of the data employed (Litchfield and Waddington, 2003; Adams
et al., 2008).
Comparing households that all have prior migration experience reduces the selec-
tion bias to some extent in the analysis of this chapter. Gibson et al. (2011) provide
experimental evidence for different stages of selection, first that into migration, then
into who moves. We apply entropy balancing weights (Hainmueller, 2012), similar
to matching methods, and exploit the panel nature of our data to overcome remain-
ing selection and omitted variable bias. The outcome variable of interest is an asset
index.
Because there is little existing evidence on the consequences of idiosyncratic
migration experience of households, we first describe migrants and their households
in our new data to explore the dynamic patterns of migration. A comparison of
the new migrants to those migrants who left the household before documents that
new migrants are from a younger generation within households, such as children or
grandchildren of the head. Their migration costs are lower, which might be related
to family networks and the households’ prior engagement in migration. From these
observations we derive hypotheses for the impact assessment. Then we estimate
how the asset welfare of households with a new migrant changes compared to those
without, conditional on the fact that all households have previously had a migrant.
We analyse whether there are heterogeneous effects by gender of the migrant, by
collaboration with the survey team in Ghana.
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type of migration (seasonal or permanent), reason for migration (family or work),
and by destination (within or across region).
We find no effect of sending a new migrant on the change in the asset index
of origin households compared to those households who do not engage further in
migration in the same period. This result is robust to a sensitivity analysis. Our
interpretation is that the returns to migration might not show after the short period
of our study. Households in our sample use their savings to finance migration. They
hence do not experience a drop in their asset index. However, they also do not
experience an increase in their asset index since the new migrant left. This could
be, on the one hand, due to their use of savings to cover migration costs instead of
investing into more assets and, on the other hand, because new migrants send only
rarely and low remittances. We further suggest that due to prior engagement in
migration our sample of households does not experience an initial decline in welfare.
This could be caused by the migration costs or the loss in labour due to a member
leaving (Taylor and Lo´pez-Feldman, 2010). We however document that migration
costs for new migrants are smaller than for prior migration, which indicates that
migration experience at the household level reduces the costs of migration. In ad-
dition, prior to their move new migrants are either in school or doing unpaid work.
It is thus less likely that their migration implies a loss in labour income for the
household.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, 3.2, we discuss the
literature on impacts of migration on households left behind with respect to meth-
odological challenges, knowledge gaps and evidence for our context. This is followed
by the analytical framework for this study in section 3.3. Then we present the data
used for the analysis (section 3.4) followed by a description of the migrants, mi-
grant households and their prior migration experience (section 3.5). In section 3.6,
we explain the methodology to estimate the impact of sending a new migrant on
the welfare of origin households. In section 3.7, we provide results and robustness
checks. Section 3.8 concludes.
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3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Evidence on the impact of migration on origin house-
holds
The research interest of this chapter is the short-term relationship between having a
new migrant and the welfare of migrant sending households in rural Ghana. Many
studies explored the more general question looking at the impact of having a migrant
or not on some measure of well-being of the origin household. There exists also
research that examines the effect of migration on the migrant’s own welfare, e.g.
Beegle et al. (2011), but this is not the focus of this chapter.
Theoretical models such as from the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM,
Stark and Bloom (1985)) cannot predict the direction of the impact of migration on
origin households. The reason for this is that the impact depends on counteracting
factors. For example, De Brauw and Harigaya (2007) model the impact of migration
on consumption growth. It depends at the same time on the loss of farm production
incurred by migration and the increase in consumption due to remittance receipt
(De Brauw and Harigaya (2007), p.436) aside from the costs of moving.
Despite the use of similar outcome variables in the literature, results differ. Ant-
man (2012) reviews the research that examines the impact of migration on the left
behind family members and Mendola (2012) reviews studies looking at rural out-
migration and its impacts on sending households. Both summarise mixed results
from the literature. The following examples illustrate the inconclusive findings.
Empirical evidence from China by De Brauw and Giles (2012) documents an
increase in consumption growth as well as “increased accumulation of housing welfare
and consumer durables” (p.3). Quisumbing and McNiven (2010) consider the impact
of migration and remittances on assets, consumption and credit constraints in the
rural Philippines. They find that a larger number of migrant children reduces the
values of non-land assets and total expenditures per adult equivalent in the origin
households. However, remittances have a positive impact on housing, consumer
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durables, non-land assets, total (per adult equivalent) and educational expenditures.
They find no effect on status of credit constraint. Mendola (2008) finds an increase
in investments in agricultural production among the left behind households with
international migrants in Bangladesh, but she does not find an effect for internal
migration. Taylor and Lo´pez-Feldman (2010) provide evidence of a positive effect
of migration to the US on land productivity of migrant-sending families in Mexico.
They also document an increase in per-capita income via remittances. Damon (2010)
finds only weak increases in asset accumulation in El Salvador, he finds no impact
of migration and remittances on investments in agricultural production.
What gives rise to these mixed results? One explanation is that the counteracting
factors of costs and rewards to migration materialize at different speeds (Taylor and
Lo´pez-Feldman, 2010). The loss in labour is felt immediately as are the costs of
paying for the migration of a household member. The returns to migration in form
of remittances contribute to higher consumption levels. They delay however until
the migrant arrived at the destination, found a job and earned enough income to
send some of it back home. It might take even longer for remittances to accumulate
enough to invest in productive assets.
Other aspects that contribute to the mixed results are the different data, defin-
itions for migration and methodologies used. Migrants, or migrant households, are
not a random sample of the population, but observable and unobservable factors
determine their participation in migration. These factors can affect the outcomes of
interest at the same time. In addition, the outcome itself can affect the migration
decision. This is especially an issue in cross-sectional data. Aside from very few
randomized control trials (Bryan et al., 2014) or natural experiments (Gibson et al.,
2013, 2011; Yang, 2008), the most common approach to overcome endogeneity of
migration is to use an instrumental variable (e.g. Damon (2010)). For example, De
Brauw and Harigaya (2007) use historical policies and migration patterns to predict
the number of migrants in households in Vietnam. Additionally, they estimate the
effect of migration on consumption growth with generalized method of moments
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(GMM) to control for reverse causality. Such an approach is only possible with lon-
gitudinal data or a large set of retrospective information on the relevant variables
as in De Brauw and Rozelle (2008).
Only few studies consider migration experience at the household level in the form
of seasonal migration. De Brauw and Harigaya (2007) and De Brauw (2010) provide
evidence about the impact of seasonal migration on household welfare or agricultural
production in Vietnam. While seasonal migration is most likely a repeated event,
the authors do not specifically account for the repetition and potential learning
process of the household. They measure the change in the number of migrants in
the household without differentiating between households that have never had a
migrant or those who have a migrant and send another one. Their choice to look
at seasonal migration was purely motivated by pragmatic reasons due to the way
migration information was reported in their data (De Brauw and Harigaya (2007),
p.434).
Bryan et al. (2014) conduct a randomized control trial in a region in Bangladesh
that is seasonally affected by famine to understand underused seasonal migration.
Their intervention was a cash transfer to vulnerable households conditioned to fin-
ance seasonal migration of one household member. The results show significant
improvements of consumption levels for the treated households. According to the
authors’ model, migration results in success or failure in terms of finding a job at
destination and sending remittances. Households learn from this experience and
it predicts their future engagement in migration. Further evidence for the role of
migration experience within the family is provided by Giulietti et al. (2014). The
authors develop a model that differentiates between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ network
ties and their role for migration decisions. Their findings suggest that networks at
community level (weak ties) and prior migration of a family member (strong ties)
act complementary, but weak ties have a have a higher impact on the migration de-
cision. No further analysis is conducted to investigate how such different networks
might impact migration and household outcomes.
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In this chapter, we assess the impact of having a new migrant on origin house-
holds. We condition the analysis on prior migration experience. Thus, we contribute
to the literature aiming to understand whether households learn from migration and
what the implications are for future migration at household level. This chapter uses
the first panel data in Ghana that contain an extensive migration module and applies
a new method from the evaluation literature.
3.2.2 Migration in Ghana
Ghana is a lower-middle-income country according to the World Bank definition.
It has been able to improve living standards remarkably in the past decade. The
country’s poverty headcount ratio decreased from 31.1 in 2005 to 24.2 in 2012 (World
Bank, 2017). Despite these improvements, there remain challenges and small-scale
agriculture is still the predominant income source in most regions. This gives rise to
internal migration. Based on 2000 Census data, Castaldo et al. (2012) map poverty
and migration rates at district level and find a clear correlation. Most people move
out of the poor and into the richer regions.
Researchers document migration patterns in Ghana using various rounds of the
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS). Litchfield and Waddington (2003) show
that in early rounds of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) (those of 1991/92
and 1998/99) internal migration in Ghana was high and led mostly from rural to
rural areas. This pattern is confirmed by Castaldo et al. (2012) for the GLSS5 in
2005. These movements were in most cases for economic reasons, to look for jobs,
but around a third of migrants move also for family reasons. Molini et al. (2016)
confirm with the latest GLSS6 (2012/13) that families in Ghana move to locations
in hope of better prospects. Most migration in this recent survey leads again not
only from rural to urban areas, but often from rural to rural areas, but into richer
regions.
The evidence on impacts of migration on household welfare is mixed also for
Ghana. Adams (2006) find a poverty-reducing effect of internal and international
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remittances at household level after controlling for selection and the application of
an instrumental variable. Adams et al. (2008) show that remittances are not used
differently than income from other sources. At the margin, remittance-receiving
households do not spend more on consumption or investment than households that
do not receive remittances. These results stand in contrast to Adams and Cuecuecha
(2013) who find a marginal decrease in food consumption and an increase in in-
vestments, particularly in education, housing, and health for remittance-receiving
households. They conduct the same analysis, a multinomial two-stage selection
model with an instrumental variable. Their instrument draws on historical railroad
networks and employment opportunities in destination countries, whereas Adams
et al. (2008) relied on social networks among ethnic and religious groups. The use
of different instruments could explain the contrasting results.
Ackah and Medvedev (2010) also use the GLSS5 to define determinants of in-
ternal migration at the individual and community level as well as the impact of
migration on household expenditure. They apply a Heckman two-stage selection
model to control for the non-randomness of migration. Migration drivers are higher
education and youth, as well as worse infrastructure in home communities. House-
holds with internal migrants are relatively better off than those without. The effect
is, however, only significant for rural to urban migrants and not for those who remain
in rural areas. Also applying a Heckman selection model, Mahe´ and Naude´ (2016)
find that Ghanaian internal migrants send relatively little remittances and often
even receive support from their origin households using the GLSS6 (2012/13) data
in combination with the Africa Sector Database (ASD). Their hypothesis is that
migration is in this case often a long-term strategy based on the observations that
migrants are often young members of the household moving to obtain higher educa-
tion. Molini et al. (2016), exploit the GLSS6 to compare households who migrated
as a whole to those who stayed. They make use of historical migration networks
as instrument in a two-stage selection model. The positive impact of migration on
consumption that they find is attributed to specific directions of movement, from
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the inland to coastal areas, and to male headed and better educated households.
The authors also emphasise the absence of sectoral change in the migration strategy
of households.
Due to weak instruments and bound to the use of cross-sectional data these stud-
ies lack means to control for unobservable factors that could contribute to reverse
causality. It is therefore difficult to reconcile their results. This chapter contributes
to the understanding of internal migration in Ghana and its consequences for origin
households by using novel data. We utilize its rich questionnaire to document the
diverse patterns of migration and we exploit the panel nature to reduce concerns of
bias.
3.3 Analytical framework
This chapter investigates whether having a new migrant is related to a change in
the welfare of the migrant’s household at origin conditional on migration experience.
The analysis is set in two periods, baseline and follow-up. All households have at
least one member who is a migrant in the baseline period. Thus, they have previously
engaged in migration, which we define as ‘migration experience’. A migrant is
defined in the surveys as a member of the household who is currently absent, left at
least three months ago, but not more than five years.
A new migrant is defined as a household member who is present in the household
in the baseline period and who then moves at least to another community and is
still away in the follow-up period.2 We look at new migrants, because it appears to
be common for households to have more than one migrant and to see them move at
different times. Thus, we are not interested in just the number of migrants, but in
the dynamic aspect of another member migrating. Furthermore, it removes some of
the selection bias of households into migration.
2It is possible that the new migrant had migrated in the past. In such a case, not only the
household as a whole would have migration experience but also the individual migrant. The
response rate to the question asking how many times a migrant moved before is unfortunately very
low so that we cannot control for this in the analysis.
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To give an example, imagine a household as depicted in the following table 3.3:
Household member Migrant in baseline Migrant in follow-up
A 1 1
B 0 0
C 0 0
D 1 0
E 0 1
Total: 2 2
This household has five members. At baseline, member A and member D are
away as migrants. In the follow-up period, member A is still away as a migrant, while
member D has returned to the household. Now member E is away as a migrant.
If we were to compare only the total number of migrants away, we would see no
difference between these two periods for this household. However, member D might
have returned with money for the household, and will now contribute again to the
household production (farm or business), and he or she potentially returned with
new skills that could improve the returns to her or his labour. At the same time, for
member E to migrate, the household had to incur some costs, maybe by selling assets
or using savings. These factors have different impacts on the household welfare, so
that we focus on new migrants instead of the total number of migrants. Thus, this
example household would be defined as a household with migration experience and
a new migrant. Member E would be this new migrant.
Different aspects determine the impact of having a new migrant. First, migration
is costly and can initially lead to a decline in welfare due to the costs incurred as well
as the loss in labour. Secondly, migration is beneficial when migrants send money
back to their origin household and thus create another source of income. Thirdly,
migration can be beneficial for the migrant him or herself directly. There might
be more and better opportunities to earn an income or pursue further education at
destination than at origin. Moreover, the household has one member less to care for
and it might derive utility from the fact that the migrant can find a better livelihood
somewhere else.
However, it is not clear in which direction the effect should work and which factor
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dominates. The aforementioned factors work in different directions. Additionally,
in our specific case households have migration experience at baseline before they
have a new migrant which can influence the effect. While sending a new migrant
can incur costs, these might be lower conditional on prior migration experience of
the household.
Following this discussion, we look at the impact of sending a new migrant con-
ditional on migration experience. The sample is therefore first restricted only to
households with migration experience at baseline. Then, households are assigned
to a group called ‘treated’ and another one named ‘control’. Households are in the
treated group if they have at least one new migrant between the two periods. The
remaining households without a new migrant between the two periods are in the
control group.3
This definition implies that households can have more than one new migrant and
they can have several baseline migrants. Our sample is restricted to those households
whose new migrants were present members of the household in the baseline period.4
Obviously, these definitions restrict the sample to a smaller set of observations than
the original full survey.
3.4 Data
The data used for this analysis is a household survey collected in April/May 2013
and again at the same households in April/May 2015.5 The data was collected
by the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), University of Ghana, Legon, through
funding from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and made
3We could include households that had a return migrant at baseline, but no current migrant.
They also have migration experience. However, there are no such households in our data.
4A special case are households that grew overall, which means that they had more members in
the follow-up period than in the baseline due to new household formation. This can for example
happen, when the son of the household head marries and his new wife and maybe a relative of
hers join the household. If any of the newly joined household members then is a migrant in the
follow-up period, we drop this household from the analysis. These households might represent a
different form of household formation.
5In this way, the households are interviewed during the same season to avoid issues of seasonality
between survey waves.
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available by the Migrating out of Poverty Research Consortium, University of Sussex,
UK.
In the first wave, around 1,400 households were surveyed, and in the second
wave the team was able to follow up with around 1,100 of them.6 The households
are not nationally or regionally representative, but they were specifically chosen to
oversample migrant sending households. While migration is a common phenomenon,
it remains difficult to get a feasible sample in most nationally representative surveys.
The survey was conducted in five regions, the Northern region, the Upper East,
Upper West, Brong Ahafo, and Volta region. These regions were major source areas
for internal migration based on the information in the 2010 Ghana Population and
Housing Census (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The sampling procedure followed
a two-stage stratified design. Using the Census, enumeration areas (EAs) were
chosen that were “proportional to the total number of out-migrants from that region”
(Sugiyarto and Litchfield (2016), p.2). In the second stage, a list of households
without migrants, with seasonal, returned or currently absent migrants was obtained
for each Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in each EA. Then, 4 non-migrant households
and 11 migrant households were chosen at random in each of these PSUs to be
interviewed.
The questionnaire was directed at the household head and asked about the demo-
graphics of each household member, their education and employment status, as well
as their migration history. The questions about migration are either about current
migrants or in an extra section directed towards returned migrants. These sections
cover, for example, information on destination, reason for migrating, financing of
the move, remittance sending, and occupation at destination.
The construction of the panel data set required a rigorous checking of data
6While our analysis is based on a balanced sample, we still investigate the attrition of house-
holds. Specifically, we look at how many households that were not tracked in 2015 had a migrant at
baseline. These households would have been included in our sample either in control or treatment
group. We then compare their baseline characteristics to those of the treated and comparison
households to assess to which group they might have belonged. Comparing also their asset index
indicates how their attrition might bias our results due to their attrition. See appendix C.2 on
page 199 for a detailed discussion.
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consistency. We were able to correct the majority of errors of misreporting caused
by wrong manual entries of some enumerators in the questionnaires, e.g. skipping
rows in the household roster. We were able to rely on our local partners to identify
name changes based on their local knowledge and we were able to correct other
errors by manually checking each individual questionnaire when we had doubts.
In the questionnaire, migrants are members who are currently not living in the
household and who have been away for at least three months, but less than ten (in
2013) or five years (in 2015). This definition follows Bilsborrow et al. (1984), page
146. 60 percent of households in the sample for this analysis have only one new
migrant, 25 percent have two, and the remaining 15 percent have three or more new
migrants in the study period.
The outcome variables of interest are measures of economic status. The ques-
tionnaire in 2013 did not contain a consumption module and questions about income
are inconsistent between the survey waves and thus not comparable. We therefore
use asset information to construct an index as measure for a household’s economic
status.
After cleaning the data and making sure that the main variables of interest are
available for all households in both survey waves, we are left with a balanced panel of
960 household-year observations. 131 migrant households are in the treated group,
and 349 in the control group. The majority of households with a new migrant is
located in Brong Ahafo and in the Volta region and the majority of the comparison
group live in the Volta and the Northern region (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Sample of treatment and control households across regions in 2013
Control Treatment Total
Region N % N % N %
Brong Ahafo 61 17.5 40 30.5 101 21
Northern 93 26.6 19 14.5 112 23.3
Upper East 54 15.5 25 19.1 79 16.5
Upper West 43 12.3 18 13.7 61 12.7
Volta 98 28.1 29 22.1 127 26.5
Total 349 100 131 100 480 100
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3.5 Descriptive statistics
The rich information about migration in this survey allows us to draw a detailed
picture of migration in these areas of Ghana. We explore the characteristics of
migrants and their households and we compare those migrants who had moved at
baseline to the new migrants who only moved between the baseline and the follow-
up survey. This comparison reveals interesting patterns. From these descriptions
we can then move on to the analysis of the welfare impact of having a new migrant
in section 3.6.
3.5.1 Baseline and new migrants
First, we turn to the individuals who migrate. We compare those who were migrants
in the baseline (2013) and those who moved as new migrants between baseline and
follow-up survey (2015). This comparison helps to document how new migrants
differ from previous migrants within households with migration experience.
In our sample, we have 951 migrants in 2013, and 215 new ones in the follow-up
survey. The response rates to the questions about migrants vary. We hence always
report the number of responses for each question. Due to such missing values we
cannot utilise all information in the impact assessment. This motivates detailed
descriptive statistics which later help us explain our results. Table 3.2 provides an
overview of the basic demographic characteristics of the migrants by migrant status
and gender. Of the 2013 migrants, 38 percent are female, in 2015 the share of women
increased to 50 percent.
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Table 3.2: Demographic information of migrants, by migrant status and gender
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
N all 592 359 107 108
Age (in years) 32.4 30.7 25.6 26.8
Marital status
N 543 330 95 92
Single (%) 44.6 42.7 68.4 47.8
Married/living with partner (%) 54 50.6 30.5 48.9
Separated/Divorced/Widowed (%) 1.5 6.7 1.1 3.3
Relation to household head
N 592 359 107 108
Head (%) 8.3 1.9 3.7 1.9
Spouse / partner (%) 3.4 11.4 2.8 3.7
Child/adopted child (%) 52.4 49 49.5 51.9
Grandchild (%) 4.7 6.7 13.1 12
Niece/nephew (%) 5.6 7 14 13.9
Parent (%) 5.4 2.2 0.9 2.8
Sibling (%) 17.2 12.5 10.3 5.6
Son/daughter-in-law (%) 0.2 2.2 1.9 0
Sibling-in-law (%) 1.2 3.1 0.9 1.9
Parent-in-law (%) 0 2.2 0 1.9
Grandparent (%) 0.2 0.6 0 0
Other relatives (%) 1.2 1.1 1.9 2.8
Not related (%) 0.3 0 0.9 1.9
Education
N 520 296 97 89
None (%) 14 18.6 23.7 31.5
Primary (%) 16.7 18.6 22.7 15.7
Middle/Junior (%) 31 30.4 27.8 22.5
High/Senior (%) 21.5 19.3 15.5 16.9
College/Technical (%) 16.7 13.2 10.3 13.5
Occupation prior to migration
N 436 232 70 68
In school / education (%) 16.7 20.3 32.9 36.8
Paid employee (%) 8.9 4.7 10 5.9
self-employed (%) 35.1 27.6 24.3 17.6
Unemployed, looking for job (%) 9.9 7.8 8.6 8.8
Doing unpaid work (%) 24.1 30.2 21.4 27.9
Retired (%) 0.5 0
Apprenticeship (%) 2.3 5.6 1.4 1.5
Others (%) 2.5 3.9 1.4 1.5
Activity prior to migration
N 241 97 42 34
Farming (%) 43.2 34 42.9 26.5
Trading (%) 7.5 35.1 7.1 14.7
Self-employment (%) 10 17.5 2.4 8.8
Teaching (%) 9.1 5.2 7.1 14.7
Others (%) 30.1 8.2 40.5 35.3
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Age and marital status
The migrants in 2013 are on average 31 years old and around half of them are
married.7 In contrast, the new migrants in 2015 are only 26 years old and a third
of the men are married, but 49 percent of women are married. Separated, divorced
or widowed migrants are mostly found among women who are baseline migrants.
Overall, it seems that new migrants are more likely to still be single, especially men.
Position in the household
Around half of migrants are children of the household head and there is not much
difference between the sexes. There is however a difference between baseline and
new migrants. The former are relatively more often the head himself or his wife as
well as the brother or sister of the head. It is the first or second generation in the
household, who moves first. New migrants are relatively more often from the third
generation, 12 percent (13 percent for men) are grandchildren of the household head,
or they are relatives of second degree such as nieces or nephews. It is possible that
there exist priorities in who gets to move first, starting with the head or spouse, the
children or the siblings of the head, and eventually other younger relatives.
Education
The new migrants are relatively less educated and a third of women in this group
have no completed education. Only 14 percent of male and 19 percent of female
migrants in 2013 state to have no education at all, while around a quarter of the
new migrants is uneducated. Female migrants in both groups are relatively less
educated with larger shares having no or only primary education than male migrants.
The most common level of education is middle/junior high school; 30 percent of
baseline migrants, 28 percent of new migrant men and 23 percent of new migrant
7Age is measured in 2013 for baseline migrants, and in 2015 for new migrants. This is in order
to avoid to make the baseline migrants artificially older by noting their age only two years after
they had already been identified as migrants. However, we acknowledge that the baseline migrants
might have been much younger when they moved, but the question about time since migration has
a very low response rate, so that we cannot compute the age at migration.
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women have completed this level. Higher levels are most likely among male baseline
migrants (22 percent completed senior high school, 17 percent technical/college or
tertiary education) followed by their female counterparts. Among new migrants, a
slightly larger share of women achieved these higher levels of education, 30 percent,
compared to 26 percent of their male counterparts.
Occupation prior to migration
Almost a third of women migrants in 2013 were doing unpaid work. While 28 percent
of women did unpaid work in 2015, 37 percent of them were in education before
their move. Yet, relatively more women are in education than men are before their
move. Relatively fewer of the new migrant men were self-employed before migrating
compared to those at baseline, 24 percent compared to 35 percent respectively.
Around 10 percent of migrant men in both groups were paid employees before their
move compared to only around 5 percent of female migrants.
In terms of the type of work the employed or self-employed did prior to their
move, farming is the most common among men in both years with a share of around
42 percent. While women were also active in farming prior to their move, they often
worked as traders or in some other type of self-employment. 35 percent of baseline
migrant women were traders, but only 15 percent of new migrant women. This group
was primarily active as teachers or in service work, such as hairdressing, dressmaking,
domestic work, specified in the category ‘others’. For men the category ‘others’
mostly included crafts, such as masonry and carpentry, or services like driving.
117
Table 3.3: Migration decision and facilitation
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Who was mainly involved in the migration decision?
N 461 251 85 80
Self (%) 73.3 62.5 67.1 41.3
Father (%) 11.9 15.9 14.1 25
Mother (%) 3.3 4.8 2.4 7.5
Siblings (%) 1.5 3.2 1.2 2.5
Relative (%) 5.2 6.4 8.2 12.5
Community members (%) 0.2 0 1.2 0
Recruitment agent (%) 2.2 2 1.2 1.3
Others (%) 2.4 5.2 4.7 10
What was the main reason to migrate?
N 467 254 88 81
Job transfer/opportunity (%) 17.1 13.8 15.9 6.2
Seek work/better job (%) 61 50 47.7 22.2
Study training (%) 12.6 13 12.5 25.9
To get married (%) 0.4 6.3 0 12.3
To accompany family (%) 0.2 1.2 2.3 1.2
To join family (%) 2.8 12.2 11.4 13.6
Declining yields in agriculture (%) 3.4 1.6 2.3 1.2
Civil conflict/war (%) 0.6 0.4 0 0
Family dispute (%) 0.2 0.4 1.1 0
Flood (%) 0.2 0 0 0
To join friends (%) 0.2 0 0 0
For medical treatment (%) 0 0.4 1.1 0
Others (%) 1.1 0.8 5.7 17.3
Contact at destination
N 481 259 87 83
Yes (%) 54.3 69.1 64.4 74.7
Type of contact
N - - 56 61
Father (%) 10.7 6.6
Mother (%) 7.1 9.8
Siblings (%) 17.9 14.8
Relatives (%) 55.4 55.7
Recruitment agent (%) 5.4 3.3
Other specified (%) 3.6 9.8
Job fixed up prior to moving
N 479 256 85 71
Yes (%) 20.3 19.9 29.4 8.5
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Decision makers
Now, we are turning to the migration decision, facilitation of migration and its costs.
We report the descriptive statistics for these categories in table 3.3. Gender differ-
ences exist when it comes to the migration decision itself. In both years, relatively
more male migrants made the decision themselves according to the household head
who is answering these questions. 73 percent in 2013 and 67 percent in 2015 of male
migrants contrast 63 percent and only 41 percent of female migrants respectively.
The father or other relatives make the decision for female migrants relatively more
often, especially for the new migrant women. In line with their younger age and
lower education, it is plausible that older relatives are main decision makers when
it comes to the migration of these women.
Reason for migration
Among baseline migrants, 78 percent of men and 64 percent of women moved for
better job opportunities (including the categories ‘job transfer/opportunity’ or ‘seek
work/better job’). 19 percent of female migrants moved to get married, accompany
or join family in contrast to only 3 percent of male migrants moving for family reas-
ons. Around 13 percent of baseline women moved for studying or training purposes.
In 2015, work is still the dominating reason to move for male migrants (63 percent),
but relatively more join family than baseline migrant men (11 percent compared
to 3 percent). Female new migrants move relatively more for studying (26 percent
compared to 13 percent of baseline migrants). Joining or accompanying family is
more common among new migrants. 14 percent of male and 15 percent of female
migrants do so. 12 percent of new migrant women moved to get married whereas
that was the case for only 6 percent of baseline migrant women.
Contacts at destination
Contacts at the destination can provide an important support for migrants. In our
sample, women rely on networks relatively more. Almost 70 percent of women who
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were migrants at baseline and 75 percent of the new migrant women had a contact
at destination prior to their move. In 2013, the corresponding number for men is 54
percent and 64 percent for 2015. For new migrants, we also know which contacts
the migrants had at destination. Around 55 percent of times, the migrant had a
relative at destination, and 18 percent of men and 17 percent of women had their
parent at destination. From table 3.2 we know, that most of these new migrants are
second or third generation within the household and often not direct descendants of
the household head. It is therefore possible to imagine that nieces and nephews or
grandchildren follow their parent who moved in the past.
Finally, we also observe whether migrants already had a job agreed before their
move. This is less common, especially among female new migrants. In contrast,
almost 30 percent of new migrant men state to have a job waiting for them at
destination. At baseline, around 20 percent of migrants had a job fixed up prior to
their move irrespective of their gender.
Financing migration (Table 3.4)
In terms of costs, female migrants pay on average less than male migrants for their
move, 212 Ghanaian Cedi (GHS) at baseline and 112 for new migrants compared
to 220 and 137 respectively for men. It is worth noting that new migrants pay
on average less than baseline migrants do. Previously, we learned that relatively
more of the new migrants have a contact at their destination and their household
has prior engagement in migration. These observations suggest that costs can be
reduced through migration experience.
The most common way to finance migration in 2013 were savings (70 percent)
indicating that migration is an investment under credit constraints. If loans are
taken then only from family. In no or very few cases formal sources for credit are
used and only in very few cases migrants rely on a moneylender or recruitment agent.
Around 12 percent of migration was financed by selling assets. New migrants in 2015
also rely on savings (42 percent of male and 38 percent of female migrants), but less
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so. Selling of assets is less likely to be used to finance the migration of a new female
migrant at only 5 percent. A third of new migrant men and 42 percent of new
migrant women state ‘others’ as source of financing. The specified sources among
this category are mainly money from a parent and in some cases from the migrant
her or himself. We consider this type of money as individual savings. Another source
of financing are private transfers to the household from other migrants, remittances.
Around 9 percent of female migrants used remittances to cover their moving costs,
male migrants less so at baseline and 6 percent of new migrant men.
Table 3.4: Migration costs and means of financing
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Migration costs
N 220 111 65 58
in GHS of 2015 222.5 212.3 137.1 111.6
Financing of migration
N 371 173 79 79
Savings (%) 72 67.6 41.8 38
Formal loan (%) 1.1 1.7 0 0
Loan from family (%) 7 6.9 6.3 5.1
Borrowing from money lender (%) 0.8 0.6 2.5 0
Advance from recruitment agent (%) 1.6 2.3 0 1.3
Sale of assets (%) 12.7 11 10.1 5.1
Government schemes (%) 1.6 0 0 0
Scholarship (%) 0.3 0.6 0 0
Remittances from other migrants in the HH (%) 3 9.2 6.3 8.9
Others (%) 0 0 32.9 41.8
Repeated migration, seasonality and destination (Table 3.5)
The baseline migrants have relatively more migration experience, around half moved
once before their current migration. In 2015, around 70 percent of the new migrants
move for the first time. Again, this is in line with the younger age of the new
migrants, their unmarried status and activity prior to migration (school or unpaid
work). Correspondingly, relatively fewer of the new migrants are seasonal migrants,
especially of the female migrants. At baseline, 16 percent of migrants were seasonal
workers, the same share of new male migrants moved seasonally, but only 9 percent
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of female new migrants. The new migrants moved relatively more often to another
region in Ghana than to remain in their own district or region. Female migrants
on average stayed closer to their origin, with only 47 percent of them leaving their
region in contrast to 61 percent of male migrants. This difference could be due to
those women who migrate to get married which is often tied to ethnic and family
networks that might be closer to the origin community.
Table 3.5: Migration experience: repetition, seasonality, destination and occupation
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Repeated migration
N 389 203 84 80
First time migrants (%) 49.4 59.6 70 65
Seasonal migration
N 474 259 86 84
Seasonal (in contrast to permanent) (%) 15.2 16.6 16.3 9.5
Destination
N - - 86 83
Same district (%) 10.5 18.1
Other district, same region (%) 29.1 34.9
Other region (%) 60.5 47
Occupation at destination
N 353 182 54 51
Farming (%) 19.8 12.1 14.8 21.6
Trading (%) 15.9 39.6 18.5 21.6
Self-employment (%) 16.1 26.4 1.9 9.8
Teaching (%) 7.9 8.2 9.3 7.8
Others (%) 40.1 13.4 55.7 39.3
Occupation at destination
At destination, the patterns of occupation change compared to what migrants did
prior to their move (see section 3.5.1). Self-employment is much less common among
new migrants (2 percent for men and 10 percent for women), while 16 percent of male
and 26 percent of female baseline migrants work self-employed. Between 12 and 22
percent of migrants in both years work in farming at destination. This suggests that
geographical mobility implies also some occupational mobility. Trading is again a
common occupation for baseline migrant women and also 22 percent of new migrant
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women work as traders.
Remittances
Remittance sending behaviour is different between baseline and new migrants (see
table 3.6). In the baseline group, relatively more men remit money to their families,
64 percent compared to 54 percent of female migrants. Among new migrants, only
41 percent of men and 39 percent of women remit. Baseline migrant men also remit
larger amounts than their female counterparts (GHS 788 compared to GHS 655),
but they all remit on average at least GHS 100 more than new migrants.
When asked how frequently they remit, new migrants remit relatively less fre-
quent, half of them only on special occasions or in emergencies, whereas baseline
migrants tend to remit mostly every couple of months or even monthly. New mi-
grants are also less likely to remit goods to their origin household; only around 28
percent of them do so with no gender difference. Among baseline migrants, half of
the women send goods back home and even 44 percent of men do so.
These observations that new migrants relatively more often get their migration
financed from parents or paid themselves in contrast to baseline migrants, indicates
that they might feel less obliged to remit money to their origin household.
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Table 3.6: Remittances
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Cash remittances
N 448 242 74 70
Yes (%) 63.8 53.7 40.5 38.6
Amount
N 260 112 29 24
in GHS of 2015 788.7 655.1 607.9 515.2
Frequency of remitting
N 267 120 29 26
Weekly (%) 1.1 1.7 0 3.8
Fortnightly (%) 1.1 0 0 3.8
Monthly (%) 24.3 19.2 17.2 11.5
Every couple of month (%) 43.1 40.8 13.8 15.4
Every six months (%) 5.2 6.7 13.8 3.8
Every year (%) 6.4 9.2 3.4 11.5
Only on special occasions or emergencies (%) 18.7 22.5 51.7 50
Remittance of goods
N 427 228 74 71
Yes (%) 44 49.6 28.4 26.8
Contact and support from origin households
We saw that family support is important for migration and its financing. Hence,
migrants keep in frequent contact with their families (see table 3.7). Half of the
baseline migrants contact their family at least once per week irrespective of their
gender. New female migrants are even more likely to sustain frequent contact (57
percent being in contact at least weekly), as are new male migrants (53 percent).
Despite the fact, that new migrants are less likely to send remittances to their origin
household, they are in close contact with that household.
Finally, households sometimes also send money to the migrants to support them
financially. This is relatively less common for baseline migrants, when 15 percent of
male and 22 percent of female migrants received financial support from their families
within the 12 months preceding the survey. Among the new migrants 26 percent of
female migrants got money from home and 16 percent of male migrants.
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Table 3.7: Contact and support from origin household
Baseline (2013) New (2015)
Male Female Male Female
Frequency of contact
N 457 253 86 84
More than once a week (%) 31.9 31.2 24.4 33.3
Weekly (%) 21.7 25.3 29.1 23.8
More than once a month (%) 19.9 22.9 24.4 22.6
Monthly (%) 8.3 10.3 9.3 8.3
More than once every three months (%) 5.7 3.6 3.5 3.6
More than once every six months (%) 3.9 2 1.2 1.2
More than once in a year (%) 5.9 2.8 3.5 2.4
I don’t have contact with name (%) 2.6 2 4.7 4.8
Household sends money to migrant
N 400 214 67 70
Yes (%) 15 22 16.4 25.7
These observations reveal that the new migrants in our sample are not moving
for exactly the same reasons and do not share the same relationship with their origin
households as the baseline migrants do.
3.5.2 Households
Before we investigate the impact of sending a new migrant on household welfare,
we also look closer at the characteristics of the households that have a new migrant
compared to those without. In table 3.8, we document the main characteristics of
households with new migrants compared to those who do not send another migrant
by 2015. All characteristics are measured at the baseline in 2013.
Household composition
Households who send a new migrant have on average between one and two more
members than the comparison group. This indicates that they can afford to send
members away as the remaining members are still enough to work on the family
farm, in the family business or help with housework.
They have similar demographic structures measured with the dependency ratio
(0.6) and female-to-male ratio (0.49). 29 percent of households that send a new
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migrant have a female head, 3 percentage points more than the control group. Heads
of households in this group are on average 53 years old, those in treated households
are on average one to two years older. Most heads are married, but 4 percentage
points more among the control group. Relatively more heads in the treatment
households are widowed, separated or divorced (22 compared to 18 percent). A
negligible share is single (0.6 percent at baseline and 0.5 percent in 2015).
There are some differences between the groups of households with regards to
their ethnicity. 29 percent of control households belong to the Mole Dagbani ethnic
group and only 13 percent are of the Akan, 7 percentage points less than in the
treated group. The share of Mole Dagbani is also smaller in the treatment group
(24 percent) whereas the category ‘others’ is larger which indicates a more diverse
distribution of treated households across ethnic groups.8
Education
Relatively more households sending a new migrant have heads with lower education,
84 percent completed no, primary school or middle school compared to 75 percent
of heads in the comparison group. In terms of the highest level of education in
the household, this pattern seems to reverse. It is measured as the highest level of
education of any adult member in the household to capture overall education in the
household as we do not have a measure of the years in education. The highest level of
education within households is on average higher than that of the household heads.
In a third of households lives a member with higher education such as technical
college or other tertiary education. In another 31 percent, someone has completed
senior high school. In the control group, these shares are very similar.
8The category ‘others’ include Ga-Dangme, Guan, Gruni, Grussi and other unspecified groups.
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Table 3.8: Household characteristics at baseline, by group
Households without Households with
new migrants new migrants
(Control) (Treatment)
N 349 131
Household size (excluding 5.6 7.2
currently absent migrants)
Dependency ratio 0.60 0.61
Female-to-male ratio 0.50 0.48
Female head (%) 0.26 0.29
Age of head in years 53.3 54.8
Marital status
Single (%) 0.06 0.05
Married/ living with partner (%) 0.77 0.73
Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed (%) 0.17 0.22
Ethnicity of head
Akan (%) 0.13 0.20
Ewe (%) 0.24 0.19
Mole Dagbani (%) 0.29 0.24
Others (%) 0.34 0.37
Education of head
None (%) 0.41 0.41
Primary (%) 0.09 0.11
Middle/Junior (%) 0.25 0.32
High/Senior (%) 0.12 0.07
College/Technical (%) 0.12 0.08
Highest level of education in household
None (%) 0.05 0.05
Primary (%) 0.11 0.08
Middle/Junior (%) 0.23 0.23
High/Senior (%) 0.30 0.31
College/Technical (%) 0.31 0.34
Employment status of head
employee (%) 0.16 0.15
self-employed (%) 0.52 0.52
unpaid/unemployed (%) 0.23 0.25
inactive etc (%) 0.09 0.08
Main income source
Public sector (%) 0.12 0.08
Private sector (%) 0.04 0.05
Own business (%) 0.28 0.26
Own farm (%) 0.42 0.51
Private transfers (%) 0.11 0.07
Others (%) 0.03 0.03
Migration experience
Household has returnee (%) 0.17 0.24
Number of current migrants 1.9 2.1
Number of prior migration 1.3 0.9
spells of current migrants
Share of seasonal migrants (%) 0.16 0.09
Share of female migrants (%) 0.35 0.41
Share of migrants with job (%) 0.60 0.66
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Employment status and income source
Most household heads are self-employed, more than 50 percent in both groups.
Around 24 percent of all heads are unemployed or doing unpaid work. 15 percent
of them are working as paid employees. The majority of households earns the
largest share of their income from their own farm. Farming is more common among
the households with a new migrant than among those without, 51 percent and 42
percent respectively. Around 28 percent of households without a new migrant run
their own business compared to 26 percent of households with a new migrant. 12
percent of control households rely on either public sector employment income or
private transfers, which comprise remittances from migrants or other relatives. The
respective share of households with new migrants is around 7 percent.
Migration experience
Around 24 percent of households with a new migrant had a member who returned to
the household. In the comparison group, 17 percent of households have a returnee.
Households have on average two migrants currently away in 2013 independent of
the group. This is another indication for how common migration of more than one
member is in our setting.
There are relatively more treated households whose baseline migrant moved for
the first time. In contrast, baseline migrants in control households had migrated
on average 1.3 times before. These households also have a relatively larger share
of seasonal migrants in 2013, 16 percent compared to 9 percent in households that
have a new migrant. It seems more common for control households to send the same
member away repeatedly than to have a new migrant. This is also consistent with
the difference in household size reported above.
Only a third of baseline migrants are women in households without a new migrant
contrasting 41 percent in households with new migrants. The share of migrants who
have a job at destination is relatively higher among households that later send a
new migrant. On average, 66 percent of baseline migrants from these households
128
have a job at destination. That is 6 percentage points more than for the comparison
group.
3.5.3 Summary
In summary, there are some differences between households with a new migrant
and the control group when we compare their characteristics at baseline. They
differ in household size, ethnicity and livelihood. Households with new migrants are
relatively larger and most live from family farm income. Additionally, their prior
experience with migration appears to be successful in terms of the share of baseline
migrants that have a job at destination and they are more likely to have a return
migrant who potentially transmits important information for future migration.
Our sample reflects households in a setting where family farms or businesses are
common, as is migration. Migration is mostly long-term and not seasonal, even
though repeated migration is not unusual. The migration decision is made in a
credit constraint environment. It strongly depends on the availability of savings to
cover moving costs.
We observed that new migrants are different from baseline migrants. They are
from a younger generation, often going to further their education or for work reasons.
Fewer of them send remittances to their origin households than previous migrants.
Family networks as well as frequent contact to the origin household, however, suggest
strong ties between migrant-sending households and new migrants.
From these findings we cannot clearly predict the relationship of migration and
household welfare, nor can we hypothesise its direction. In some cases, new migrants
might be sent to diversify income sources and it is seen as an investment expecting
returns to the household in form of remittances. In this case, we would expect to
see a negative impact of the initial investment costs due to our short panel period
as remittances usually delay to arrive and materialise in origin households (Taylor
and Lo´pez-Feldman, 2010). In other cases, it could be possible that migrants are
already successful at their destination and are sending remittances that improve the
129
household welfare.
Other migrants moved financially supported from their families to pursue more
education or find new opportunities in other locations. This could be in line with
human capital models of migration (Sjaastad, 1962). In these cases, it would be
possible to find a negative effect on welfare of origin households due to the incurred
migration costs and the loss in labour, but it is also possible that due to prior
migration experience there is no impact on the origin households. This could even
imply a positive impact as fewer members in the household leave more financial
resources available for those who stay.
3.6 Methodology
Theoretically, there are no clear answers to the question whether migration has
a positive or negative effect on the welfare of left-behind households. The New
Economics of Labour literature (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999) suggests
that the migration decision is part of the overall household strategy in a context of
market imperfections, but it cannot provide clear predictions for the impact of this
decision (Mendola, 2012). As documented in the descriptive part migrants move for
different reasons, which might imply different costs and different remittance sending
behaviour. Additionally, prior experience with migration at the household level is
also expected to affect the costs and migrants’ remittance behaviour.
It remains an empirical question to study how having a new migrant relates to
the welfare of origin households conditional on prior migration experience.
3.6.1 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the impact of having a new migrant on household welfare in the fol-
lowing specification:
Yi,t = β12015t + β2NewMigi ∗ 2015t + β3Xi,t + β4LMc,t +Hi + i,t (3.1)
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Our interest is to see how the welfare of households is affected when they have
a new migrant. With two time periods, we regress the outcome variable Y for
household i on the treatment status of household i, NewMigi and other variables.
NewMigi is a dummy indicating whether the household has a new migrant or not.
This dummy is zero for all control households and it is 1 for the treated house-
holds, thus the subscript t. This term is interacted with a dummy indicating the
second survey year. We also control for the general change of welfare over time by
including the variable Y eart. Further controls are household characteristics, Xi,t,
and labour market properties that vary over time, LMc,t. The specification further
includes household fixed effects, Hi to capture any unobservable characteristics of
the households that do not vary between the survey waves.
The parameter of interest is β2, the coefficient of the indicator whether a house-
hold has a new migrant or not interacted with the indicator for the second survey
year. It measures the effect of having a new migrant between the two survey waves
on the welfare of the origin household compared to those households that did not
see another member migrate. It should be interpreted as an average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT).
The time-varying household characteristics, Xi,t, are the dependency ratio, whether
the household has a returned migrant and the employment status of the household
head (unemployed/unpaid work, self-employed, employed or inactive). These can
all affect household welfare and they can change within the time period under in-
vestigation. If a household has another child or if one of the older members becomes
too old to work, the welfare might decline, as per capita income declines. Similarly,
if a household head becomes unemployed this affects household welfare negatively.
Finally, a migrant who returns to the origin household can, on the one hand, bring
home money and invest it in assets to increase welfare or, on the other hand, the
returnee might have failed at destination and now presents an additional burden to
the household.
The local labour market variable, LMc,t, is the employment rate in a community
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c. It is measured as the share of individuals who work as wage employees relative to
the local labour force. This is included because a household seeking to diversify its
income sources will consider local opportunities, where household members could
earn a wage.9
3.6.2 Dependent variable: Asset index
As outcome variable we construct an asset index. Starting from Sahn and Stifel
(2000) researchers used the rich information on assets available in many developing
country household data sets to construct an index as welfare measure. The main
argument for the use of the asset information instead of conventional measures such
as consumption or income is that the latter are much more volatile and more difficult
to measure. For a long-term assessment of the economic status of households, assets
have been proven to be more stable and more reliable measures. Filmer and Pritchett
(2001), McKenzie (2005), and Booysen et al. (2008) all used asset indices to compare
poverty reductions in various countries and the use of such welfare indices has been
increasing since the concept of multi-dimensional poverty was introduced (for a
discussion see Ravallion (2011)).
It is important to note that a welfare index is a relative, not an absolute meas-
ure. It is very useful for comparisons of welfare between groups and/or over time.
A detailed explanation of the method applied to construct the index (Multiple Cor-
respondence Analysis) can be found in the appendix C.1 on page 193.
An asset index is a composite measure using information about asset ownership
9This measure is obtained using all individuals in our data in each community. Based on
their main activity we define those who are employed and we sum all who are either employed,
unemployed, doing unpaid work or self-employed. This captures how common paid employment
is in a community and thus reflects the local opportunities for wage work outside the family
farm or business. It is important to note that this measure is not correctly measuring the true
employment rate, because our data is not representative of the local population. We looked into
the possibility to obtain local labour market information from other locally representative datasets.
However, we cannot use Census data because it is only available for one year before our survey was
conducted so that we cannot control for variation over time. Alternatively, we could use the Ghana
Living Standard Survey or the Ghana Socioeconomic Panel Survey (Institute of Statistical, Social,
and Economic Research (ISSER),University of Ghana and Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale
University, 2015), but only half of the districts in our survey are covered in these surveys and
neither of these datasets is available for the years of our survey.
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and/or other welfare indicators in survey data. The researcher is interested in one
continuous measure that captures the welfare of a household. In its simplest format,
we can think of an asset index as the sum of its weighted components:
Ai = p1a1,i + p2a2,i + . . .+ pkak,i (3.2)
The asset index of household i is the sum of each of the individual asset indicator
dummies, ak weighted by an asset specific weight, pk. Each indicator is equal to 1 if
the household owns this specific asset, 0 otherwise. There are different possibilities to
assign weights. The simplest, but most arbitrary, is to assign equal weights for each
indicator. Ideally, one would use the price of each asset as weight. That is most times
impossible due to lack of data. Alternatively, there are three statistical methods used
in the literature to retrieve the indicator weights, Principal Component Analysis
(henceforth PCA), Factor Analysis (FA), and Multiple Correspondence Analysis
(MCA). These methods follow the same idea, but differ in their assumptions and
restrictions imposed on the data. We apply the non-parametric and least restrictive
method of MCA.
We use assets which are comparable to those found in the most commonly used
household surveys in developing countries, the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS). These are indicators of housing quality. They comprise the number of rooms,
dwelling ownership, the presence of a bathroom and a toilet, main source of drinking
water, and the floor and wall material.10
In table 3.9, we tabulate the ownership of each of these indicators by year and
treatment status and describe the major changes observed.
10We were not able to include landownership, neither as a simple dummy variable whether a
household owns land or not, nor in terms of land size. The reason for this is that this question is
only available in the 2015 survey.
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Table 3.9: Asset ownership by group and year
Control Treatment
2013 2015 2013 2015
N 349 131
Number of rooms
1 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.07
2 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15
3 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.24
4 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.15
5 or more 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.37
Dwelling ownership
Owned 0.83 0.85 0.89 0.90
Rented 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.05
Other 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
Bathroom 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.98
Toilet 0.37 0.36 0.41 0.42
Main source of drinking water
Pipe borne water inside 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.16
Pipe borne water outside 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.18
Borehole 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.35
Dug well 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.14
Tanker service 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Stream/river/lake 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.12
Rain water 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Bottled or sachet water 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04
Other 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Floor material
Mud 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.16
Raw wood, boards 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Cement/concrete 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.80
Burnt brick 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Terrazo 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Floor tile 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Polished wood 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Wall material
Bamboo or other organic materials 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Cloth, cardboard, cans 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zinc 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.16
Raw wood 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mud, adobe, cane wall 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.32
Block, bricks, stone, prefabricated material, polished wood 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.46
Other 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
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The ownership status and presence of a bathroom or toilet are relatively stable.
There are some larger changes between years for floor and wall material and smaller
changes for the number of rooms and the source of drinking water. These changes
also differ between treatment and control group which is important for our identi-
fication strategy. If all changes would go in the same direction we would not be able
to identify an effect of having a new migrant on the change in the index.
Figure 3.1 presents the asset index in 2013 of households with a new migrant
and of those without, figure 3.2 depicts the same for 2015.
Figure 3.1: Asset index of treated and control households in 2013
These figures illustrate that the distribution of the asset index overlap in 2013,
but they shift apart in 2015. It seems that households without a new migrant have
a higher distribution of the index. Note that the distribution for control households
are weighted to make households comparable applying a method which is described
in section 3.6.3. This explains the overlap in the baseline year (figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.2: Asset index of treated and control households in 2015
3.6.3 Identification strategy
Several issues challenge the empirical identification of the impact of migration on
households left behind.
First, we can think of factors that simultaneously affect both the migration
decision and the outcome. For example, risk aversion of a household might prevent
it from engaging in migration or in more profitable but riskier technologies in their
farm or business. Hence, such households would be less likely to have a new migrant
and would remain at a lower welfare level. Such omitted variables would bias the
coefficient of interest. In the given example, we would overestimate a negative effect
of having a new migrant. We cannot foresee the direction of the effect, but it would
be biased upwards.
By modelling a fixed-effects specification, we capture any unobservable and time-
invariant factors at the household level and the vector of household characteristics
accounts for observable characteristics that vary over time. We assume that unob-
servable factors such as risk aversion are not varying over two years.
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Secondly, the migration decision could be influenced by the outcome variable.
This is especially a problem with cross-sectional data (Antman, 2012). The change
in asset ownership in the period preceding our baseline could affect the treatment
status of households. We cannot exploit previous data to control for this, but by
balancing households on baseline characteristics we only compare those that look
similar and thus capture any effect the prior welfare change had on households (see
detailed discussion of the weighting method in section 3.6.3).
The specification in equation 3.1 assumes that new migrants are randomly alloc-
ated across treated and comparison households. Migration is however not a random
process, but instead a strategic decision determined by observable (e.g. education,
income) and unobservable (e.g. risk attitude, motivation) characteristics of the
household. We will have to address the selection bias arising from this non-random
treatment assignment.
Depending on the main drivers of selection of a new migrant, the bias could
lead both ways, upwards or downwards. For example, the literature on self-selection
finds that highly educated migrants tend to be positively selected and thus lead to
overestimations of the outcomes of these migrants; the opposite applies to unskilled
migrants (Borjas, 1987). In our context, not only migrant characteristics, but also
household structure and prior migration experience are important determinants of
the selection into having new migrants.
For unbiased identification, natural experiments (among others Gibson et al.
(2011)) or randomized control trials (Bryan et al., 2014) are the ideal approach.
Without such settings at hand, many researchers rely on either instrumental vari-
ables or matching approaches to reduce the issue of selection bias. Common in-
strumental variables for migration are historical road or rail networks that led to
location-specific migrant networks (for example Woodruff and Zenteno (2007)). For
Ghana, Adams and Cuecuecha (2013) rely on ethnic groups and their social networks
that make it more or less likely for households to send migrants.
The common instruments could be used to predict whether households engage in
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migration or not, but less so to predict whether conditional on prior migration exper-
ience households have new migrants. We expect that this decision depends primarily
on household-level characteristics. We therefore rely on a weighting method based
on the assumptions of matching approaches.
The weighting method makes the comparison group look like the treated group
in terms of observable characteristics at baseline. This approach assumes selection
on observables. It means that conditional on observable characteristics, having a
new migrant is as good as random (Wooldridge, 2010). This balance is achieved
for observable characteristics that are expected to influence the likelihood to be a
treated household and the outcome variable (Imbens, 2015). Once these observables
are balanced, the selection bias is reduced (Heckman et al., 1998).
Entropy balancing weights
Conventional matching methods, such as Propensity Score Matching (PSM), require
the researcher to define a specification for the propensity score, which then leads
to balanced treatment and comparison groups after matching (Imbens, 2015). This
process involves several stages and adjustments of the specification and sometimes
the improvement of balance in one covariate goes hand in hand with worsening the
balance of another covariate (Iacus et al., 2012). Due to this laborious process the
matching method is prone to model dependence and researcher discretion (King
and Nielsen, 2016). For example, in many cases only the means of matching vari-
ables between treated and control group are compared, not accounting for potential
differences in the distribution of variables (Lee, 2013).
To simplify this process, some researchers have developed matching methods
that achieve balance before the matching itself. One is the entropy balancing de-
veloped by Hainmueller (2012). This approach defines weights for each observation
that ensure a predefined balance of covariates. The balance can be defined in terms
of the first, second and even higher order moments of the covariates. The main
advantages of this method are that balance checks become redundant, the majority
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of observations are retained, the computation of the weights is fast, and the method
can be combined with many other matching and regression methods, similarly to in-
verse probability weighting methods and regression adjustment procedures (Imbens,
2015).
Entropy weights, w, minimise the entropy distance metric which is defined as:
min
wi
H(w) =
∑
i|D=0
wilog(
wi
qi
) (3.3)
and which is subject to balance (Equation 3.4), and normalizing constraints
(Equations 3.5 and 3.6 respectively):
∑
i|D=0
wicri(Xi) = mr with r ∈ 1, ..., R and (3.4)
∑
i|D=0
wi = 1 and (3.5)
wi ≥ 0 for all i such that D = 0 (3.6)
qi is a base weight defined as 1 over the number of control units. cri(Xi) “are
a set of R balance constraints that are imposed on the covariate moments of the
reweighted control group” (Hainmueller and Xu, 2013). Finally, it computes a set
of weights that minimize the first equation (3.3) subject to the balance constraint,
the normalisation constraint, and the non-negativity constraint.
The procedure is easily implemented in Stata using the command ebalance. The
command first defines the first moment of the covariates using only the treated units.
Then the control units are re-weighted so that their mean is equal to that of the
treated units for the chosen covariates complying with the normalizing constraints
(3.5 and 3.6). The same procedure applies to higher moments. It is important to
note that one has to consider the sample at hand when using this method. En-
tropy balancing is a useful method only if the treated and control units do not
look radically different and there can only be as many balance conditions as control
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observations. Like in other matching methods this implies the assumption of com-
mon support. Observations that make it impossible to achieve the balance defined
by the researcher are dropped and weights are only computed for the remaining
observations.11
Once the weights are computed, they are applied to estimate equation 3.1 with
weighted least squares (WLS). This approach works like any Regression Adjustment
method (Wooldridge, 2010).
Variables to balance
The decision which variables to include in the entropy balancing weight computation
follows the suggestions about PSM by Imbens (2015). We include all variables that
we consider substantive for having a new migrant or for the outcome. We also
include squared terms of continuous variables. Smith and Todd (2005) stress the
importance to include a rich set of such covariates, preferably past measures of the
outcome variable and to ensure that one compares units within the same labour
market or, more generally speaking, from the same geographical context.
Region dummies should capture any such factors that relate to migrant networks,
regional development and economic opportunities. Most importantly, we control for
the household size and dependency ratio of elderly and children to adult members
to capture the household structure. These variables are important for the household
decision about migration as well as the household’s welfare. Another important char-
acteristic is the main household income source, that is whether the household earns
its living from agriculture, employment, its own business, public or private trans-
fers. We also control for the employment status of the household head (employed,
self-employed, unemployed or inactive) to capture economic activity. As a measure
for human capital in the household, we include the highest level of education of
adult members in the household. Many studies show that education is an important
11In our case, we drop 91 observations, 22 treated and 69 control households. Around a third of
these are dropped due to missing values for some of the covariates that we required to be balanced.
Others had extreme values for some covariates, e.g. a dependency ratio of 5.
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predictor for households’ welfare. It is also related to migration decisions as higher
educated people have higher expected incomes at home as well as at possible destin-
ations (Sjaastad (1962)). We include a dummy for female household heads, shown
to be a strong predictor for household welfare in the rural context as well as reflect-
ing a households’ options for migration decisions (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013). In
addition, age and marital status of the household head are added to control for the
life-cycle of a household (Lipton, 1980). Ethnicity was found to be an important
factor in creating and maintaining migrant networks in Ghana (Awumbila et al.,
2016). Such networks are important determinants for migration decisions as they
reduce the risk and costs associated with migration (Carrington et al., 1996), which
is why we include the ethnicity of the household head. We also include our measure
of community employment rate. We choose this measure, because if a household
seeks to diversify its income sources, it will also consider other opportunities in the
community where household members could earn a wage (Bazzi, 2017).
Economic welfare is an important predictor for migration decisions and it is
our outcome variable. In a credit constraint context, only households at a certain
level of wealth are able to afford migration (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). Thus,
only households with a similar level and distribution of welfare should be compared.
While we do not have information on economic welfare pre-dating our baseline as
suggested by Smith and Todd (2005), we include a rich set of asset indicators and
information on asset purchases. Asset indicators are those that are used to construct
the asset index. Asset purchase is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a household has
purchased a specific asset within the past five years before the baseline survey, 0
otherwise.12 In this way, we can capture a certain level of wealth and investment
behaviour of the household that pre-dates the baseline survey.
12These assets are electric household goods, white household goods, livestock, generator, car,
computer, electronic appliances, other investments, agricultural land, agricultural machinery, non-
agricultural land, new house.
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Balance statistics for treatment and control group
Here we present an overview of the balanced characteristics of treated and control
households. The summary statistics provide evidence that the balance is achieved
using the entropy weights. Figure 3.3 plots the kernel density of household size
in 2013 for treatment and control group. The latter is represented once without
applying the entropy balancing weights, and then with weighting.
Figure 3.3: Kernel density of household size in 2013, by treatment groups
Without the weights, the dashed line shows a very different distribution. Control
households are on average smaller than treatment households so that sending a new
migrant is much more likely if there are more members that could make this choice.
Thus, it is important to make households more comparable concerning this variable.
The overlap between the treated distribution and the weighted control distribution
confirm that the balance is achieved using the entropy weights.
In table 3.10, we show the mean and variance of the variables that were included
in the construction of the entropy balancing weights with the weights applied to the
control group. Using the weights leads to identical means of all variables and the
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variance is in some cases only slightly different. The last column lists the stand-
ardised differences between treated and control observations. They are all smaller
than (+/-) 0.01. The entropy balancing weights construct a comparable sample of
households to reduce the selection bias.
Even though we are not able to include the change in the outcome variable for the
years before our analysis, we included information on the asset purchases within the
two years prior to the baseline survey. Households purchased larger assets within a
two year period preceding our survey. It is therefore plausible to expect also further
changes in assets.
Table 3.10: First and second moments of covariates after
applying entropy balancing weights, by group in 2013
Mean Variance Standardised
Treated Control Treated Control difference
Dependency ratio 0.660 0.658 0.846 0.844 0.002
Female household head 0.299 0.298 0.211 0.210 0.001
Highest level of education in household
Primary 0.075 0.075 0.070 0.069 0.000
Middle/Junior 0.224 0.224 0.175 0.174 0.001
High/Senior 0.313 0.313 0.217 0.216 0.001
College/Technical 0.343 0.343 0.227 0.226 0.001
Ethnicity of head
Akan 0.194 0.194 0.158 0.157 0.001
Ewe 0.194 0.194 0.158 0.157 0.000
Mole Dagbani 0.231 0.231 0.179 0.178 0.001
Main income source
Private sector 0.052 0.052 0.050 0.050 0.000
Own business 0.269 0.268 0.198 0.197 0.001
Own farm 0.500 0.499 0.252 0.251 0.003
Private transfers 0.075 0.075 0.070 0.069 0.000
Others 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.000
Asset purchases in preceding 2 years
Electronic goods 0.403 0.402 0.242 0.241 0.002
White goods 0.187 0.186 0.153 0.152 0.000
Livestock 0.284 0.283 0.205 0.204 0.001
Generator 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.000
Car 0.067 0.067 0.063 0.063 0.000
Computer 0.052 0.052 0.050 0.050 0.000
Continued on next page
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Table 3.10 – continued
Mean Variance Standardised
Treated Control Treated Control difference
Electric Appliances 0.082 0.082 0.076 0.076 0.000
Other Investments 0.104 0.105 0.094 0.094 -0.001
Agricultural land 0.224 0.224 0.175 0.174 0.001
Agricultural machinery 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.000
Non-agricultural land 0.127 0.127 0.112 0.111 0.000
New house 0.313 0.313 0.217 0.216 0.001
Household size (excl. migrants) 7.299 7.280 9.640 9.615 0.006
Age of household head 55.276 55.136 218.021 217.450 0.009
Marital status
Married/ living with partner 0.739 0.737 0.194 0.194 0.004
Separated/ Divorced/ Widowed 0.216 0.216 0.171 0.170 0.001
Employment status of head
self employed 0.522 0.521 0.251 0.250 0.003
unpaid/unemployed 0.246 0.246 0.187 0.186 0.001
inactive etc. 0.090 0.090 0.082 0.082 0.000
Community employment rate 0.090 0.090 0.005 0.005 0.003
Household has returnee 0.246 0.246 0.187 0.186 0.001
Household receives remittances 0.545 0.543 0.250 0.249 0.003
Number of current migrants 2.090 2.084 1.842 1.837 0.004
Number of rooms (Base = 1)
2 0.149 0.149 0.128 0.127 0.000
3 0.201 0.201 0.162 0.161 0.001
4 0.179 0.179 0.148 0.147 0.000
5 or more 0.425 0.424 0.246 0.245 0.002
Dwelling ownership(Base = Owned)
Rented 0.119 0.119 0.106 0.105 0.000
Bathroom 0.403 0.402 0.242 0.241 0.002
Main source of drinking water (Base = pipe borne water inside)
Pipe borne water outside 0.209 0.209 0.167 0.166 0.001
Borehole 0.343 0.343 0.227 0.226 0.001
Dug well 0.127 0.127 0.112 0.111 0.000
Tanker service 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Stream/river/lake 0.149 0.149 0.128 0.127 0.000
Rain water 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000
Bottled or sachet water 0.052 0.052 0.050 0.050 0.000
Floor material(base = Polished wood)
Mud 0.291 0.291 0.208 0.207 0.001
Raw wood, boards 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cement/concrete 0.679 0.677 0.220 0.219 0.004
Continued on next page
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Table 3.10 – continued
Mean Variance Standardised
Treated Control Treated Control difference
Burnt brick 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.000
Floor tile 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000
Wall material (base = others)
Bamboo or other organic materials 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.056 0.000
Cloth, cardboard, cans 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.000
Zinc 0.396 0.395 0.241 0.240 0.002
Mud, adobe, cane wall 0.493 0.491 0.252 0.251 0.002
Block, bricks, stone, 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.000
prefabricated material, polished wood
Access to public services
Electricity 0.634 0.633 0.234 0.233 0.003
Natural gas 0.142 0.142 0.123 0.122 0.000
Safe drinking water 0.694 0.692 0.214 0.214 0.004
Sewerage system 0.067 0.067 0.063 0.063 0.000
Garbage collection 0.112 0.112 0.100 0.100 0.000
Telephone 0.291 0.291 0.208 0.207 0.001
Region(Base = Brong Ahafo)
Northern 0.142 0.142 0.123 0.122 0.000
Upper East 0.201 0.201 0.162 0.161 0.001
Upper West 0.134 0.134 0.117 0.117 0.000
Volta 0.224 0.224 0.175 0.174 0.001
3.7 Results
3.7.1 Main results
How does having a new migrant affect the asset welfare of households left behind
conditional on prior migration experience? To answer this question we estimate
weighted least squares regressions applying the entropy balancing weights. Table
3.11 presents the results. The coefficient of interest is the dummy variable of having
a new migrant. This estimates the average effect on the change in the asset index for
households with a new migrant between baseline and the follow-up survey compared
to households without a new migrant.
In column 1, we show results without applying entropy balancing weights sug-
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Table 3.11: Effect of having a new migrant on asset index, weighted
least squares
Asset index
(1) (2) (3)
New Migrant*2015 -0.011 -0.017 -0.016
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Household has return migrant (=1) -0.015*
(0.008)
Dependency ratio 0.002
(0.004)
Employment status of household head (base = inactive/others)
Employee 0.014
(0.015)
Self-employed -0.001
(0.016)
Unpaid work / unemployed -0.003
(0.018)
Local employment rate 0.138
(0.104)
Entropy balancing weights No Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.584 0.522 0.528
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E.
clustered at community level.
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gesting that they might be biased due to selection. The effect of migration on house-
hold welfare could be driven by the fact that only households who are less likely to
improve their welfare due to household characteristics sent a new migrant because
of these same characteristics. We then apply balancing weights to the regression in
column 2. The coefficient becomes larger but remains insignificant.
In column 3, time-varying household and local labour market characteristics are
included that we consider relevant for the welfare of households. Of all control
variables, only that indicating whether a household had a return migrant or not is
significant.13 Households are on average slightly worse off if they had a migrant
return to their home.
The inclusion of time-varying covariates improves the precision of the estimates
minimally, as indicated by a higher adjusted R-squared statistic. The coefficient
of interest becomes minimally smaller. On average and everything else constant,
sending a new migrant does not change the asset index of households significantly
compared to those who do not send another migrant.
Next, we interact the number of new migrants and its squared term with the
treatment dummy (see table 3.12). With this interaction we want to estimate the
effect of the intensity of the treatment on the outcome. Around 40 percent of treated
households have two or more new migrants. Thus, the effect might differ depending
on the number of new migrants. Yet, there is again no significant effect when we
allow for variation in the number of new migrants.
We now look further into the role of migrant characteristics. Table 3.13 lists the
coefficients of the main estimation, each time interacting the treatment dummy with
a migrant feature. These characteristics are whether the new migrant is female or
whether they are seasonal migrants. Finally, we also differentiate between the effect
of new migrants who move within the same region and those moving to another
region.
13There might arise the concern that the measure of local employment is not well defined. When
we drop this variable from the estimation, results remain unchanged (see appendix table C.4 on
page 204).
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Table 3.12: Number of new migrants, weighted
least squares
Asset index
Number of new migrants*2015 -0.008
(0.009)
(Number of new migrants)2*2015 0.001
(0.002)
Entropy balancing weights Yes
Other controls Yes
Observations 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.525
Number of clusters 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects
estimator. S.E. clustered at community level.
Other controls include whether the household has a
returned migrant, employment status of the household
head, dependency ratio and community employment
rate.
Table 3.13: Interaction of treatment with the characteristics of new migrants
Dependent variable: Asset index
Migrant characteristics (X): Female migrant Seasonal migrant Remained
in region
New Migrant * X * 2015 -0.009 0.010 -0.013
(0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
New Migrant * 2015 -0.010 -0.017 -0.005
(0.014) (0.012) (0.022)
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.528 0.528 0.528
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at com-
munity level. Other controls include whether the household has a returned migrant, em-
ployment status of the household head, dependency ratio and community employment rate.
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None of these interactions shows a significant effect on the asset index. There
are three possible explanations for the fact that we do not find an impact of having
a new migrant on households’ asset index. One refers to the outcome variable used,
one to the role of migration experience and the other to the sample investigated.
First, considering that asset indices are less volatile than for example consump-
tion measures, it might be due to their stable nature that we do not find a significant
effect in the short period of two years. We emphasise that the estimated effect is that
of households sending a new migrant compared to those who do not. Hence, even a
zero effect does not imply that there was no change in the asset index, but it means
that the index of treated households changed in the same direction and magnitude
as that of the control group. The distributional graphs of the welfare index (figure
3.1 and 3.2 in section 3.6.2) indicated some changes in the welfare of households.
It appears, however, not to be significantly different between the groups once we
control for observable and unobservable household characteristics. Booysen et al.
(2008) also point out that because assets are more durable than other consumption
goods, they tend to show an increase in asset wealth more than a reduction of the
same. As our coefficients are negative, it is possible that we cannot find a significant
effect due to this issue.
Secondly, we suggest that migration of a new migrant might be less costly than
first-time migration. If we consider migration as an investment, then we would
expect an initial decline in welfare and in the longer run an increase as suggested by
Taylor and Lo´pez-Feldman (2010). We do not observe that households with a new
migrant experience a decline in welfare that could have been caused by the cost of
migration and the loss of a working household member. In the descriptive statistics
we saw that the average costs of migration for baseline migrants in 2013 was above
200 Ghanaian Cedis (in 2015 prices) compared to on average 120 Ghanaian Cedis for
new migrants by 2015 (see table 3.4). This documents that costs for new migrants are
relatively lower than for previous migrants.14 Similar to the reduction of migration
14Using the information on previous migration we find that migrants who move the first time -
independent of whether they are new or baseline migrants - pay on average more than those who
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costs with the growth of social migrant networks, the migration experience at the
household level itself can reduce costs of migration (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007).
This could be happening through similar channels, such as information transfer and
family connections at the destination to find a job.
Another reason for not finding an effect might be that we are looking at the wrong
sample. Some of the new migrants move for family reasons, such as marriage or
joining other family members, while the majority moves for work. These reasons can
have quite different implications for household welfare. We therefore estimate the
effect of a new migrant including the interaction of the treatment with an indicator
for those households whose new migrant moves for family reasons. Table 3.14 shows
the results. They do not change neither for the main estimate, nor when we look at
specific characteristics of the migrant, for example gender. All we observe is that the
coefficient of the interaction that indicates households with a new migrant moving
for family reasons is positive, while the overall treatment effect is negative. Both
are however always insignificant.
Table 3.14: Having a new migrant by reason for migration, weighted
least squares
Dependent variable: Asset index
Migrant characteristics: All Female Seasonal Remained
migrant migrant in region
New Migrant * X * 2015 -0.011 0.011 -0.014
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021)
New Migrant * 2015 -0.019 -0.012 -0.020 -0.006
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.023)
New Migrant moves 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.014
for family reason * 2015 (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.521 0.528 0.528 0.528
Number of clusters 93 93 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered
at community level. Other controls include whether the household has a re-
turned migrant, employment status of the household head, dependency ratio and
community employment rate.
moved the second time or more often (see appendix table C.2 on page 204).
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We also conduct a Chow test of stable coefficients across the sub-samples of
family reason and work reason. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the sample
should remain pooled and we should not separately estimate the effect (see test
statistics in appendix table C.3 on page 204).15 The results presented here can
be challenged concerning methodological concerns, which we address in the next
section.
3.7.2 Sensitivity analysis
One concern is measurement error in the asset index. The measurement error could
be even larger as it is a linear variable constructed from individual factor variables.
In consequence, the estimates are still unbiased and consistent, but less precise which
could explain the insignificant results (Wooldridge (2010), pp.287). We would be
concerned if there was a reason to think that measurement error in the index was
systematically related to the independent variables in our model.
We therefore estimate the main regression and exclude each time one component
of the index to see how sensitive the results are to this.16 We find stable results
across index compositions presented in table 3.15.
15This tests whether all coefficients of the sub-sample with family migrants are equal to zero and
should thus not be treated separately from the pooled sample.
16We also change the variables we determine to be balanced with the entropy balancing weights.
Instead of the individual asset components, we include the asset index and its squared term at
baseline. When we run our main regression using these weights, the results become weakly signi-
ficant, but coefficient size only changes by 0.001 and is only significant at 10-percent level (see in
appendix table C.5 on page 205).
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Table 3.15: Sensitivity of results of asset index using different ways to construct the asset index, weighted least squares
Dependent variable: Asset index
Exclude specific item from asset index construction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number Dwelling Bathroom Toilet Drinking water Floor material Wall material
of rooms ownership
New Migrant * 2015 0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.515 0.473 0.524 0.47 0.462 0.544 0.485
Number of clusters 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community level. Other controls include whether the
household has a returned migrant, employment status of the household head, dependency ratio and community employment rate.
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3.7.3 Community shocks
One major concern challenging our identification strategy is that of unobserved
shocks experienced by the households between the two survey waves. A shock could
reduce household welfare and at the same time motivate people to leave their home
or deter migration, as savings would be used to cover the damages of the shock
instead of financing migration. This could affect whether we observe an impact of
having a new migrant on welfare of households left behind.
In 2015, the enumerators interviewed village elders to collect information about
the communities. These surveys included questions about shocks experienced by
the village, and how many people were affected by it. The questions were asked
open ended, so that the respondent could name any type of shock that s/he con-
sidered relevant. The most commonly named shocks are droughts, flooding or crop
infestation by insects. We identified the communities where at least 50 percent of
inhabitants were affected by such a shock.
In table 3.16, we present the results of the main specification, only that we
include a dummy variable indicating a major shock at the community level and
interact this with the treatment indicator. This interaction captures the impact of
households that experienced a shock and have a new migrant in 2015.
The impact of having a new migrant on the asset index remains insignificant.
Neither the coefficient of the shock variable nor its interaction with the treatment
are significant. We note that there are fewer observations in these regressions due
to missing values for the shock variables in six communities. We ran the main re-
gression including a dummy for these communities. The dummy is positive and
significant. On average, households in those communities for which we do not have
any information about shocks, experience an increase in their asset index (see ap-
pendix table C.7 on page 206). We suggest that their missing information concerning
shocks actually means that they did not experience any shock which could explain
their higher asset index. If we include them in the estimation replacing their missing
value of the shock with a zero, the main results are still insignificant (see appendix
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table C.7 on page 206).
Table 3.16: Effect of new migrant on house-
hold welfare controlling for major shocks in
community, weighted least squares
Asset index
New Migrant * 2015 -0.021
(0.018)
New Migrant * Shock * 2015 0.015
(0.023)
Shock -0.018
(0.017)
Entropy balancing weights Yes
Other controls Yes
Observations 902
Adjusted R-squared 0.521
Number of clusters 87
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed
effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community
level.
Other controls include whether the household has
a returned migrant, employment status of the
household head, dependency ratio and community
employment rate.
After this test, one could still argue that an unobserved idiosyncratic shock at
the household level interferes with our results. For example, a household would
normally have experienced an increase in its asset index, but due to a negative
shock interfered with this trajectory, for example a household member falling sick
and not being able to earn income. Instead of investing in better walls or expanding
the rooms of the house, the money is used to send another member as new migrant
to find an income somewhere else or to pay for the medical bills. We document,
however, in table 3.3 (page 117) that only in very few cases a new migrant had moved
due to negative events, such as declining yields in agriculture, a family dispute, a
flood or for medical treatment. Besides from lack of evidence that the reason of
migration is an idiosyncratic shock, new migrants barely send remittances. If they
had been sent to support the household through a crisis, one would expect regular
remittances and maybe also higher amounts.
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3.8 Conclusion
This paper documents the dynamic nature within households of internal migration
in rural Ghana. Using a new dataset from 2013 and 2015, we show that many
households with migrants at the baseline send a new migrant by 2015. Looking
more closely at these migrants and their households, we provide an insight into the
nature of such repeated migration. Within the same household, migrants move for
different reasons, at different times and their connection with the origin household
differs as well.
This motivates the question how households with prior migration experience are
affected if they have a new migrant. There are hypotheses for positive, negative or
no effect due to the variety of factors involved and their counteracting impacts.
We find that having a new migrant does not have an impact on the welfare
measured with the asset index of origin households compared to those without a
new migrant. We suggest that this is partially due to the stable nature of such
an index over the short period of our analysis. In order to identify an impact, the
households in our sample would have needed to invest in their housing to different
amounts between treated and control group. However, their investment priorities
might lie somewhere else, for example in their farm or business. Unfortunately,
the questions about other forms of investment were not consistent between the two
survey waves and those that were, had very low response rates so that we cannot
provide an answer to this hypothesis.
Another insight we gain is that new migrants pay relatively less for their migra-
tion than baseline migrants. This indicates that migration becomes cheaper with
the migration experience of the household so that a negative effect of migration in-
curred by moving costs might not materialize in this case. Furthermore, we observed
that new migrants are in many aspects different from baseline migrants. Among the
differences are for example the fact that new migrants are from a younger gener-
ation, coming straight from school and often not sending any remittances or only
for special occasions. This also supports the zero effect we find for the asset in-
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dex. Households with prior migration experience might not send a new migrant
in expectation of future remittances and income diversification. Instead, the new
migrants might move primarily to improve their own situation.
These unanswered hypotheses point at the limitations of this study. The effect
we estimate is that of only two years or less since a new migrant left the household.
The comparison of studies using longitudinal data from longer periods with those
of short periods indicates that the positive returns to migration might only present
itself after a certain period (Davis et al., 2010; Taylor and Lo´pez-Feldman, 2010).
More data collection is required to confirm our results over the longer run.
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Conclusions
This thesis documents and analyses patterns of internal migration in two developing
countries, Brazil and Ghana. Despite its important role for economic development
data limitations restrict our understanding of the dynamics of internal migration
at the individual, household and local level. I hence use the most recent nation-
ally representative population survey in Brazil and a new household panel study
primarily focused on migration in Ghana to examine causes and consequences of
internal migration. Here, I summarise the main findings of each empirical chapter,
discussing their shortcomings and offering an outlook for future research.
In the first empirical chapter, I asked why a substantial share of Brazilian workers
moved out of metropolitan cities. This question was addressed with two empirical
approaches. First, estimating the role of wage and price differences as well as local
amenities for the destination choice found that smaller towns offer an attractive
alternative to big cities due to their lower living costs. These smaller towns have
been growing rapidly in the 2000’s which also implies growing job opportunities.
Secondly, the return to moving out of the metropolises is found to be positive in
real wages based on a counterfactual wage comparison. This result was especially
meaningful for low educated workers who experience a large loss in nominal wage
terms, but gain significantly in real terms. Low educated workers form the largest
share of migrants in Brazil. They seem to be pushed out of big cities due to high
living costs.
An important policy implication of these findings is that affordable housing
should be incorporated in plans that aim to manage the agglomeration in smaller
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towns. The congestion in large metropolitan cities and resulting high prices indicate
that urbanization was not accompanied by any plans to address the challenges faced
by the largest share of the work force, the low educated workers.
The chapter exploited a large and rich data set to provide evidence for a direc-
tion of movement that has not been studied before. Yet, the possibilities for further
analysis with this data are limited. Due to its cross-sectional nature it is not pos-
sible to look at dynamic aspects of metropolitan out-migration. An aspect worth
further research is the question whether the metropolitan migrants have incorrect or
insufficient information to form their expectation about wages so that they do not
choose the optimal destination with regards to nominal wages. It could be valuable
to investigate how migration patterns have changed in the past decade also in other
developing economies. Cases comparable to Brazil based on its size, economic de-
velopment and regional diversity in economic performance could be India, Nigeria,
South Africa or Indonesia.
Exploiting the Brazilian Census survey further, chapter 2 asked whether and
how internal migration affects local crime rates. The finding is a positive effect of
immigration on local homicide rates. Exploring possible channels of this effect, I
provide indicative evidence that an increase in labour supply only leads to higher
crime in specific labour market structures. It suggests that a large informal sector
can usually absorb surplus labour supply due to its flexibility and that criminal
inertia attracts more crime. Policy makers should therefore reflect on the rigidity of
the formal sector as well as how to break the prevalence of crime.
To better understand underlying mechanisms and who actually commits the
additional crime, longitudinal data at the individual level are required. Additionally,
theoretical models aiming to explain the impact of immigration on destination labour
markets or crime should incorporate an informal sector. This would be especially
important for future research in developing countries where the informal sector is
often very large.
Migration is often repeated within households in developing countries. Using
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a new household panel survey, the third empirical chapter documented that many
households in Ghana have more than one migrant member. These migrants move
at different times and for various reasons. Given that some households already
have experience with migration, we ask, how new migrants differ from the previous
migrants and which households repeat migration with another member. We describe
these patterns of migration. Furthermore, we assess whether having a new migrant
relates to changes in asset welfare. While we do not find an effect, the descriptive
analysis offers some insights that could explain this result.
We draw a multi-faceted picture of migration based on the rich questionnaire of
the survey. In many cases, though, response rates were low and it is not possible to
fully exploit as much information as would be desirable. For example, an interesting
question to ask would be, which factors of prior migration experience of the house-
hold and previous migrants determine the decision for a new migrant to move. Such
factors could be whether past migrants found a job or send remittances. Another
limitation is that the data only covers a period of two years, which might be too
short to assess the full impact of migration on origin households. More data will be
collected to extend the survey and we aim to exploit the additional information and
longitudinal nature.
It is important to understand the reasons for internal migration at the individual
and household level as well as its interaction with local labour markets for any
policies that intend to reduce poverty or that aim at regional development. This
thesis contributes to this understanding. Moreover, it offers the insight that more
data collection including well-defined questions on migration and covering longer
periods are essential to further our knowledge about geographic mobility.
159
Bibliography
Ackah, C. and D. Medvedev (2010). Internal Migration in Ghana: Determinants
and Welfare Impacts. Policy Research Working Paper Series 5273, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 107
Adams, R. H. (2006). Remittances and Poverty in Ghana. Policy Research Working
Paper Series 3838, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 21, 106
Adams, R. H. and A. Cuecuecha (2013). The Impact of Remittances on Investment
and Poverty in Ghana. World Development 50, 24–40. Cited on 21, 107, 136, 140
Adams, R. H., A. Cuecuecha, and J. Page (2008). Remittances, consumption and
investment in Ghana. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4515, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 21, 101, 107
Aguayo-Te´llez, E., M.-A. Muendler, and J. P. Poole (2010). Globalization and
Formal Sector Migration in Brazil. World Development 38 (6), 840–856. Cited on
20, 22
Almeida dos Reis, J. G. and R. Paes de Barros (1991). Wage inequality and the
distribution of education. Journal of Development Economics 36 (1), 117–143.
Cited on 52
Antman, F. (2012). The impact of migration on family left behind. International
Handbook on the Economics of Migration (6374), 1–34. Cited on 103, 136
Aroca Gonzalez, P. and W. F. Maloney (2005). Migration, Trade, and Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico. Policy Research Working Paper Series 3601, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 20
Asselin, L.-M. (2009). Composite Indicator of Multidimensional Poverty. Technical
Report January 2009, Institut de Mathe´matique C.F. Gauss, Quebec. Cited on
194
Awumbila, M., L. Boakye-Yiadom, E.-M. Egger, J. Litchfield, J. K. Teye, and C. Ye-
boah (2016). Gains and Losses from Internal Migration: Evidence from Migrant-
Sending Households in Ghana. Working Paper 44, Migrating out of Poverty Re-
search Program Consortium, Falmer. Cited on 140
Barham, B. and S. Boucher (1998). Migration, remittances, and inequality: estim-
ating the net effects of migration on income distribution. Journal of Development
Economics 55 (2), 307–331. Cited on 21
160
Barnow, B. S., G. G. Cain, and A. S. Goldberger (1980). Issues in the analysis
of selectivity bias. In E. Stromsdorfer and G. Farkas (Eds.), Evaluation Studies,
Volume 5. San Francisco: Sage. Cited on 172
Barros, R. and C. Corseuil (2001). The impact of regulations on Brazilian labor
market performance. Research Network Working Paper R-427, Inter-American
Development Bank, Washington, DC. Cited on 97
Bartik, T. J. (1991). Who Benets From State and Local Economic Development
Policies. Technical report, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,
Kalamazoo, Mich. Cited on 76, 77, 85
Bazzi, S. (2017). Wealth Heterogeneity and the Income Elasticity of Migration.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9 (2), 219–255. Cited on 140
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and Punishment : An Economic Approach. Journal of
Political Economy 76 (2), 169–217. Cited on 16, 60, 65, 92, 98
Beegle, K., J. De Weerdt, and S. Dercon (2011). Migration and Economic Mo-
bility in Tanzania Evidence from a Tracking Survey. Review of Economics and
Statistics 93 (3), 1010–1033. Cited on 103
Bell, B., S. Machin, and F. Fasani (2013). Crime and immigration: evidence from
large immigrant waves. The Review of Economics and Statistics 95 (4), 1278–1290.
Cited on 17, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 75, 80
Bell, M. and S. Muhidin (2009). Cross-National Comparisons of Internal Migration.
Technical Report 2009/30, United Nations Development Programme, New York
City. Cited on 15, 99
Bianchi, M., P. Buonanno, and P. Pinotti (2012). Do immigrants cause crime?
Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (6), 1318–1347. Cited on 60,
61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 80, 84
Bilsborrow, R., A. Oberai, and G. Standing (1984). Migration surveys in low-income
countries: guidelines for survey and questionnaire design. an ilo-wep study. In Mi-
gration surveys in low-income countries: guidelines for survey and questionnaire
design. An ILO-WEP study. London: Croom Helm. Cited on 112
Blackwell, M., S. Iacus, G. King, and G. Porro (2009). cem: Coarsened exact
matching in Stata. The Stata Journal 9 (4), 524–546. Cited on 173
Booysen, F., S. van der Berg, R. Burger, M. von Maltitz, and G. du Rand (2008).
Using an Asset Index to Assess Trends in Poverty in Seven Sub-Saharan African
Countries. World Development 36 (6), 1113–1130. Cited on 131, 148, 194, 198
Borges, D., D. Miranda, T. Duarte, F. Novaes, K. Ettel, T. Guimara˜es, and T. Fer-
reira (2012). Mortes Violentas No Brasil: Uma Ana´lise do Fluxo de Informac¸o˜es.
In Homicidios no Brasil: Registro e Fluxo de Informacoes, pp. 333–412. Bras´ılia.
Cited on 188
Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. The American
Economic Review 77 (4), 531–553. Cited on 20, 136
161
Borjas, G. J. (2003). The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining
the impact of immigration on the labor market. Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 118 (4), 1335–1374. Cited on 60, 97
Borjas, G. J., S. G. Bronars, and S. J. Trejo (1992). Self-selection and internal
migration in the United States. Journal of Urban Economics 32 (2), 159–185.
Cited on 20
Bound, J. and H. J. Holzer (2000, jan). Demand Shifts, Population Adjustments,
and Labor Market Outcomes during the 1980s. Journal of Labor Economics 18 (1),
20–54. Cited on 62, 76, 77
Boustan, L. P., P. V. Fishback, and S. Kantor (2010). The Effect of Internal Mi-
gration on Local Labor Markets: American Cities During the Great Depression.
Journal of Labor Economics 20 (4), 719–746. Cited on 59, 60, 62, 64, 84
Brown, R. P. and E. Jimenez (2008). Estimating the net effects of migration and
remittances on poverty and inequality: Comparison of Fiji and Tonga. Journal
of International Development 20, 547–571. Cited on 21
Bryan, G., S. Chowdhury, and A. M. Mobarak (2014). Escaping Famine Through
Seasonal Migration. Econometrica 82 (5), 1671–1748. Cited on 100, 104, 105, 136
Caliendo, M. and S. Kopeinig (2008). Some Practical Guidance for the Implement-
ation of Propensity Score Matching. Journal of Economic Surveys 22 (1), 31–72.
Cited on 173
Card, D. (2001). Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Market Impacts
of Higher Immigration. Journal of Labor Economics 19 (1), 22–64. Cited on 60,
62, 76
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001). Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Return to
College for Younger Men? A Cohort-Based Analysis. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 116 (2), 705–746. Cited on 97
Carrington, W. J., E. Detragiache, and T. Vishwanath (1996). Migration with
Endogenous Moving Costs. The American Economic Review 86 (4), 909–930.
Cited on 140
Castaldo, A., P. Deshingkar, and A. Mckay (2012). Internal Migration, Remmitances
and Poverty: Evidence from Ghana and India. Working Paper 7, Migrating out
of poverty Research Programme Consortium, Falmer. Cited on 106
Cerqueira, D. (2012). Mortes violentas na˜o esclarecidas e impunidade no Rio de
Janeiro. Texto para discussa˜o, Ipea, Bras´ılia. Cited on 70, 188
Cerqueira, D. (2014a). Mapa dos Homic´ıdios Ocultos no Brasil. Texto para Discussa˜o
1884, Ipea, Bras´ılia. Cited on 88, 188, 189
Cerqueira, D. R. d. C. (2014b). Causas e consequeˆncias do crime no Brasil (33.
Preˆmio BNDES de Economia ed.). Rio de Janeiro: BNDES. Cited on 64
162
Chalfin, A. (2014). What is the contribution of Mexican immigration to U.S. crime
rates? Evidence from rainfall shocks in Mexico. American Law and Economics
Review 16 (1), 220–268. Cited on 64, 80
Chalfin, A. (2015). The Long-Run Effect of Mexican Immigration on Crime in US
Cities: Evidence from Variation in Mexican Fertility Rates. American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 105 (5), 220–225. Cited on 60, 62, 64, 80
Chauvin, J. P., E. Glaeser, Y. Ma, and K. Tobio (2016). What is different about
urbanization in rich and poor countries? Cities in Brazil, China, India, and the
United States. Technical Report 22002, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, MA. Cited on 68
Cheng, W., J. Morrow, and K. Tacharoen (2012). Productivity As If Space Mattered:
An Application to Factor Markets Across China. CEP Discussion Papers 1181,
Centre for Economic Performance, London. Cited on 20
Chimeli, A. B. and R. R. Soares (2011). The use of violence in illegal markets:
Evidence from mahogany trade in the Brazilian Amazon. Technical report, IZA,
Bonn. Cited on 66
Christiaensen, L., J. De Weerdt, and R. Kanbur (2017). Where to Create Jobs to
Reduce Poverty. Cities or Towns? Cited on 20
Christiaensen, L., J. De Weerdt, and Y. Todo (2013). Urbanization and poverty
reduction: the role of rural diversification and secondary towns. Agricultural
Economics 44 (4-5), 435–447. Cited on 24
Christiaensen, L. and Y. Todo (2014). Poverty Reduction during the Rural-Urban
Transformation. The Role of the Missing Middle. World Development 63, 4358.
Cited on 16
Cochrane, S. G. and D. R. Vining (1988). Recent Trends in Migration between
Core and Peripheral Regions in Developed and Advanced Developing Countries.
International Regional Science Review 11 (3), 215–243. Cited on 19
Dahl, G. B. (2002). Mobility and the Return to Education: Testing a Roy Model
with Multiple Markets. Econometrica 70 (6), 2367–2420. Cited on 20, 21, 58
Damon, A. L. (2010). Agricultural Land Use and Asset Accumulation in Migrant
Households: the Case of El Salvador. The Journal of Development Studies 46 (1),
162–189. Cited on 104
DataViva (2016). DataViva. http://dataviva.info. Cited on 24
Davis, B., G. Carletto, and P. C. Winters (2010). Migration, Transfers and Economic
Decision Making among Agricultural Households: an Introduction. The Journal
of Development Studies 46 (1), 1–13. Cited on 155
De Brauw, A. (2010). Seasonal Migration and Agricultural Production in Vietnam.
The Journal of Development Studies 46 (1), 114–139. Cited on 105
163
De Brauw, A. and J. Giles (2012). Migrant Labor Markets and the Welfare of Rural
Households in the Developing World: Evidence from China. IZA Discussion Paper
Series 6765, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 103
De Brauw, A. and T. Harigaya (2007). Seasonal Migration and Improving Living
Standards in Vietnam. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89 (2), 430–
447. Cited on 103, 104, 105
De Brauw, A. and S. Rozelle (2008). Migration and household investment in rural
China. China Economic Review 19 (2), 320–335. Cited on 105
de Brito Ramalho, H. M. and V. dos Santos Queiroz (2011). Migrac¸a˜o interestadual
de retorno e autoselec¸a˜o: Evideˆncias para o Brasil. Pesquisa e Planejamento
Econoˆmico 41 (3), 369–396. Cited on 174
De Castro Cerqueira, D. R. and J. M. Pinho De Mello (2012). Menos Armas, Menos
Crimes. Technical Report 1721, IPEA, Bras´ılia. Cited on 66
de Oliveira, L. A. P. and A. T. R. de Oliveira (2011). Reflexo˜es sobre os deslocamen-
tos populacionais no Brasil. Technical report, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estat´ıstica - IBGE, Rio de Janeiro. Cited on 20
De Vreyer, P. and G. Spielvogel (2009). Spatial externalities between Brazilian
municipios and their neighbours. Document de Travail DIAL 2005-11, DIAL -
Developpement Institutions & Analyses de long terme, Paris. Cited on 22
Deaton, A. and O. Dupriez (2011). Spatial price differences within large countries.
Working Papers 1321, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton, NJ. Cited on 38
Demombynes, G. and B. O¨zler (2005). Crime and local inequality in South Africa.
Journal of Development Economics 76 (2), 265–292. Cited on 64
Diamond, R. (2016). The Determinants and Welfare Implications of US Workers’
Diverging Location Choices by Skill: 1980-2000. The American Economic Re-
view 106 (3), 479–524. Cited on 62, 76, 77
Dix-Carneiro, R., R. R. Soares, and G. Ulyssea (2017). Economic Shocks and Crime:
Evidence from the Brazilian Trade Liberalization. Technical Report 23400, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Cited on 62, 64, 70, 75
dos Santos Ju´nior, E. d. R., N. Menezes-Filho, and P. C. Ferreira (2005). Migrac¸a˜o,
Selec¸a˜o e Diferenc¸as Regionais de Renda no Brasil. Pesquisa e Planejamento
Econoˆmico 35 (3), 299–331. Cited on 22
Eeckhout, J., R. Pinheiro, and K. Schmidheiny (2014). Spatial Sorting. Journal of
Political Economy 122 (3), 554–620. Cited on 20
Enamorado, T., L. F. Lo´pez-Calva, C. Rodr´ıguez-Castela´n, and H. Winkler (2016).
Income inequality and violent crime: Evidence from Mexico’s drug war. Journal
of Development Economics 120, 128–143. Cited on 64
164
Fafchamps, M. and F. Shilpi (2013). Determinants of the Choice of Migration
Destination. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 75 (3), 388–409. Cited
on 20, 36, 37
Fajnzylber, P., D. Lederman, and N. Loayza (2002). What Causes Violent Crime?
European Economic Review 46, 1323–1357. Cited on 63, 93
Fally, T., R. Paillacar, and C. Terra (2010). Economic geography and wages in
Brazil: Evidence from micro-data. Journal of Development Economics 91 (1),
155–168. Cited on 22
Fay, M. and C. Opal (2000). Urbanization without Growth: A Not-So-Uncommon
Phenomenon. Policy Research Working Paper Series 2412, Washington, D.C.
Cited on 19
Fernandes, R. C. and M. de Sousa Nascimento (2007). Mapping the Divide. Firearm
Violence and Urbanisation in Brazil. In Keith Krause (Ed.), Small Arms Survey
2007: Guns and the City, Chapter 7, pp. 226–255. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
Cited on 65, 66
Ferreira, F. H. G., P. G. Leite, and J. A. Litchfield (2006). The Rise and Fall
of Brazilian Inequality: 1981-2004. Policy Research Working Paper Series 3867,
Washington, D.C. Cited on 52
Fields, G. S. (1975). Rural-urban migration, urban unemployment and underemploy-
ment, and job-search activity in LDCs. Journal of Development Economics 2 (2),
165–187. Cited on 97
Filmer, D. and L. H. Pritchett (2001). Estimating Wealth Effects Without Ex-
penditure Data or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States
of India. Demography 38 (1), 115–132. Cited on 131, 193
Foguel, M. N., I. Gill, R. Mendonc¸a, and R. Paes De Barros (2015). The Public-
Private Wage Gap in Brazil. Ipea Discussion Paper 95, Ipea, Bras´ılia. Cited on
52
Forum Brasileiro de Seguranc¸a Pu´blica (2014). Anua´rio Brasileiro de Seguranc¸a
Pu´blica 2014. Technical report, Forum Brasileiro de Seguranc¸a Pu´blica, Sa˜o Paulo.
Cited on 62
Fu, Y. and S. A. Gabriel (2012). Labor migration, human capital agglomeration and
regional development in China. Regional Science and Urban Economics 42 (3),
473–484. Cited on 20
Ghana Statistical Service (2013). 2010 Population and Housing Census. National
Analytical Report. Technical report, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra. Cited on
99, 111
Ghana Statistical Service (2015a). Consumer Price Index (CPI) April 2015. Tech-
nical report, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra. Cited on 199
Ghana Statistical Service (2015b). Consumer Price Index (CPI) May 2015. Technical
report, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra. Cited on 199
165
Giannetti, M. (2003). On the mechanics of migration decisions: skill complement-
arities and endogenous price differentials. Journal of Development Economics 71,
329–349. Cited on 19, 21
Gibson, J., D. McKenzie, and S. Stillman (2011). The Impacts of International
Migration on Remaining Household Members: Omnibus Results from a Migration
Lottery Program. The Review of Economics and Statistics 93 (4), 1297–1318.
Cited on 101, 104, 136
Gibson, J., D. McKenzie, and S. Stillman (2013). Accounting for selectivity and
duration-dependent heterogeneity when estimating the impact of emigration on
incomes and poverty in sending areas. Economic Development and Cultural
Change 61 (2), 247–280. Cited on 104
Giulietti, C., J. Wahba, and Y. Zenou (2014). Strong versus Weak Ties in Migration.
Technical Report 8089, IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 105
Gould, E. D., B. a. Weinberg, and D. B. Mustard (2002). Crime Rates and Local
Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 19791997. Review of Economics
and Statistics 84 (1), 45–61. Cited on 63
Greene, W. (2000). Econometric analysis (4th ed.). London: Prentice-Hall Interna-
tional (UK). Cited on 37, 42
Grogger, J. and G. H. Hanson (2011). Income maximization and the selection and
sorting of international migrants. Journal of Development Economics 95 (1), 42–
57. Cited on 20
Grogger, J. and M. Willis (1998). The Introduction of Crack Cocaine and the Rise
in Urban Crime Rates. Nber working paper series, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA. Cited on 63
Guriev, S. and E. Vakulenko (2015). Breaking out of poverty traps: Internal migra-
tion and interregional convergence in Russia. Journal of Comparative Econom-
ics 43, 633–649. Cited on 82
Haanwinckel, D. and R. R. Soares (2016). Workforce Composition, Productivity,
and Labor Regulations in a Compensating Differentials Theory of Informality.
Technical Report 9951, IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 93
Hainmueller, J. (2012). Entropy Balancing for Causal Effects: A Multivariate Re-
weighting Method to Produce Balanced Samples in Observational Studies. Polit-
ical Analysis 20 (25-46). Cited on 101, 137
Hainmueller, J. and Y. Xu (2013). ebalance: A Stata Package for Entropy Balancing.
Journal of Statistical Software 54 (7). Cited on 138
Ham, J. C., X. Li, and P. B. Reagan (2011). Matching and semi-parametric IV
estimation, a distance-based measure of migration, and the wages of young men.
Journal of Econometrics 161 (2), 208–227. Cited on 20
166
Harris, J. R. and M. P. Todaro (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development:
A Two-Sector Analysis. The American Economic Review 60, 126–142. Cited on
15, 100
Heckman, J. J., H. Ichimura, and P. Todd (1998). Matching as an Econometric
Evaluation Estimator. Review of Economic Studies 65, 261–294. Cited on 137
Henderson, J. V. (1986). Urbanization in a developing country. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 22 (2), 269–293. Cited on 20
Hering, L. and R. Paillacar (2015). Does Access to Foreign Markets Shape Internal
Migration? Evidence from Brazil. Policy research working paper series, The World
Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 52
Hidalgo, F. D., S. Naidu, S. Nichter, and N. Richardson (2010). Economic Determ-
inants of Land Invasions. Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (3), 505–523.
Cited on 66
Hirvonen, K. (2016). Temperature Changes, Household Consumption, and Internal
Migration: Evidence from Tanzania. American Journal of Agricultural Econom-
ics 98 (4), 1230–1249. Cited on 82
Iacus, S. M., G. King, and G. Porro (2011). Multivariate Matching Methods That
Are Monotonic Imbalance Bounding. Journal of the American Statistical Associ-
ation 106 (493), 345–361. Cited on 173, 175
Iacus, S. M., G. King, and G. Porro (2012). Causal inference without balance
checking: Coarsened exact matching. Political Analysis 20 (1), 1–24. Cited on
137
Imbens, G. (2004). Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under
exogeneity: A review. The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (1), 4–29. Cited
on 172
Imbens, G. W. (2015). Matching Methods in Practice: Three Examples. Journal of
Human Resources 50 (2), 373–419. Cited on 137, 138, 139
Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research (ISSER),University of Ghana
and Economic Growth Center (EGC), Yale University (2015). Ghana Socioeco-
nomic Panel Survey 2009 - 2010. Technical report, Accra. Cited on 131
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE) (2010). Censo Demogra´fico
2010: Caracter´ısticas urban´ısticas do entorno dos domic´ılios. Technical report,
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE), Rio de Janeiro. Cited on
30
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE) (2012). Censo Demogra´fico
2010: Microdados. www.ibge.gov.br. Cited on 23
Jaitman, L. and S. Machin (2013). Crime and immigration : new evidence from
England and Wales. IZA Journal of Migration 2 (19), 1–23. Cited on 62, 80
167
Kelly, M. (2000). Inequality and Crime. Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (4),
530–539. Cited on 63
Kennan, J. and J. R. Walker (2011). The Effect of Expected Income on Individual
Migration Decisions. Econometrica 79 (1), 211–251. Cited on 21, 58
King, G. and R. Nielsen (2016). Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for
Matching. Technical report, Cambridge, MA. Cited on 137
Kleemans, M. and J. Magruder (2017). Labor Market Changes In Response To
Immigration: Evidence From Internal Migration Driven By Weather Shocks. The
Economic Journal (forthcoming). Cited on 17, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 74, 79,
90, 97
Lall, S. V., C. Timmins, and S. Yu (2009). Connecting Lagging and Leading Regions
The Role of Labor Mobility. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4843, The
World Bank. Cited on 20, 22, 59
Lechner, M. (2000). An Evaluation of Public-Sector-Sponsored Continuous Vo-
cational Training Programs in East Germany. The Journal of Human Re-
sources 35 (2), 347. Cited on 172
Lee, W.-S. (2013). Propensity score matching and variations on the balancing test.
Empirical Economics 44, 47–80. Cited on 137
Li, C. and J. Gibson (2014). Spatial Price Differences and Inequality in the Peoples
Republic of China: Housing Market Evidence. Asian Development Review 31 (1),
92120. Cited on 47
Lin, M.-J. (2008). Does Unemployment Increase Crime?: Evidence from U.S. Data
19742000. Journal of Human Resources 43 (2), 413–436. Cited on 60
Lipton, M. (1980). Migration from Rural Areas of Poor Countries: The Impact on
Rural Productivity and Income Distribution. World Development 8, 1–24. Cited
on 140
Litchfield, J. and H. Waddington (2003). Migration and Poverty in Ghana : Evidence
from the Ghana Living Standards Survey. Sussex Migration Working Paper 10,
Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, Falmer. Cited on 99, 101, 106
Lokshin, M., M. Bontch-Osmolovski, and E. Glinskaya (2007). Work-related Mi-
gration and Poverty Reduction in Nepal. Policy Research Working Paper Series
4231, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 20, 21
Mahe´, C. and W. Naude´ (2016). Migration, occupation and education: Evidence
from Ghana. UNU-MERIT Working Papers 2016-018, UNU-MERIT, Maastricht.
Cited on 107
Manacorda, M. and M. F. Koppensteiner (2015). Violence and Birth Outcomes :
Evidence from Homicides in Brazil. Iza discussion papers, Institute for the Study
of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 62
168
Mariano Bosch, Edwin Goni, W. M. (2007). The Determinants of Rising Informality
in Brazil: Evidence from Gross Worker Flows. IZA Discussion Paper Series 2970,
IZA Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 97
Mata, D. D., U. Deichmann, J. V. Henderson, S. V. Lall, and H. G. Wang (2005).
Examining the growth patterns of Brazilian cities. Technical Report 3724, The
World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 19, 59
Matano, A. and P. Naticchioni (2012). Wage distribution and the spatial sorting of
workers. Journal of Economic Geography 12 (2), 379–408. Cited on 20
McCormick, B. and J. Wahba (2005). Why do the young and educated in LDCs
concentrate in large cities? Evidence from migration data. Economica 72 (285),
39–67. Cited on 20
McFadden, D. (1974). The measurement of urban travel demand. Journal of Public
Economics 3 (4), 303–328. Cited on 36
McKenzie, D. and H. Rapoport (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migra-
tion and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development
Economics 84, 1–24. Cited on 100, 140, 149
McKenzie, D. and M. J. Sasin (2006). Migration, Remittances, Poverty, and Human
Capital: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges. Policy research working paper,
World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 88
McKenzie, D. J. (2005). Measuring inequality with asset indicators. Journal of
Population Economics 18 (2), 229–260. Cited on 131
Mendola, M. (2008). Migration and technological change in rural households: Com-
plements or substitutes? Journal of Development Economics 85, 150–275. Cited
on 104
Mendola, M. (2012). Rual Out-Migration and Economic Development at Origin:
A Review of the Evidence. Journal of International Development 24, 102–122.
Cited on 103, 129
Menezes-Filho, N. A. and M.-A. Muendler (2011). Labor Reallocation in Response
to Trade Reform. NBER Working Paper Series 17372, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Cited on 52
Ministe´rio do Planejamento (2010). Balanc¸o 4 Anos 2007 - 2010. PAC Programa de
Acelerac¸a˜o do Crescimento. Report, Ministe´rio do Planejamento, Bras´ılia. Cited
on 20
Mion, G. and P. Naticchioni (2009). The spatial sorting and matching of skills and
firms. Canadian Journal of Economics 42 (1), 28–55. Cited on 20
Molini, V., D. Pavelesku, and M. Ranzani (2016). Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Internal Migration and Household Welfare in Ghana. Policy Research Working
Paper Series 7752, World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 99, 106, 107
169
Monras, J. (2015). Economic Shocks and Internal Migration. Discussion paper
series, IZA Institute for the Studies of Labor, Bonn. Cited on 59, 62, 76, 77
Monteiro, J. and R. Rocha (2017). Drug Battles and School Achievement: Evidence
from Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas. The Review of Economics and Statistics 99. Cited
on 62
Moretti, E. (2011). Local Labor Markets. In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume
4b, Chapter 14, pp. 1237–1313. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Cited on 20, 21, 22, 58
Morten, M. and J. Oliveira (2016). Paving the Way to Development: Costly Migra-
tion and Labor Market Integration. NBER Working Paper Series 22158, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Cited on 38, 49, 62, 76, 82
Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the U.
S. Labor Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 549–599. Cited on
79, 80, 100
Murray, J., D. R. D. C. Cerqueira, and T. Kahn (2013). Crime and violence in Brazil:
Systematic review of time trends, prevalence rates and risk factors. Aggression
and Violent Behavior 18 (5), 471–483. Cited on 70, 188
Notowidigdo, M. J. (2013). The Incidence of Local Labor Demand Shocks. Technical
report, University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER. Cited on 62,
76, 82
O¨zden, c., M. Testaverde, and M. Wagner (2017). How and Why Does Immigra-
tion Affect Crime? Evidence from Malaysia. The World Bank Economic Re-
view (lhx010), 1–20. Cited on 62, 64, 80, 84
Quisumbing, A. and S. McNiven (2010). Moving Forward, Looking Back: the Impact
of Migration and Remittances on Assets, Consumption, and Credit Constraints
in the Rural Philippines. Journal of Development Studies 46 (1), 91–113. Cited
on 103
Ravallion, M. (2011). On Multidimensional Indices of Poverty. Policy research
working paper series, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cited on 131
Reichenheim, M. E., E. R. De Souza, C. L. Moraes, M. H. P. De Mello Jorge, C. M.
F. P. Da Silva, and M. C. De Souza Minayo (2011). Violence and injuries in
Brazil: The effect, progress made, and challenges ahead. The Lancet 377 (9781),
1962–1975. Cited on 62, 66, 91
Ribeiro Justo, W., R. de Alencar Ferreira, C. F. de Lima, and G. Nunes Martins
(2010). Os determinantes da migrac¸a˜o e da migrac¸a˜o de retorno intermunicipal
no Brasil. In Proceedings of the 38th Brazilian Economics Meeting, ANPEC -
Associac¸a˜o Nacional dos Centros de Po´sgraduac¸a˜o em Economia, 163. Cited on
174
Rodriguez, E. R. (1998). International Migration and Income Distribution in the
Philippines. Economic Development and Cultural Change 46 (2), 329–350. Cited
on 21
170
Rosenbaum, P. R. and D. B. Rubin (1983). The Central Role of the Propensity Score
in Observational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrika 70 (1), 41–55. Cited on
172
Sachsida, A. (2013). Evolucao e determinanted da taxa de homicidios no Brasil.
Texto para discussa˜o, Ipea, Bras´ılia. Cited on 62, 64
Sachsida, A., M. J. C. de Mendonc¸a, P. R. A. Loureiro, and M. B. S. Gutierrez
(2010). Inequality and criminality revisited: Further evidence from Brazil. Em-
pirical Economics 39 (1), 93–109. Cited on 64
Sahn, D. and D. Stifel (2000). Poverty comparison over time and across countries.
World Development 28 (12), 2123–2155. Cited on 131, 194
Santos, C. and P. C. Ferreira (2007). Migrac¸a˜o e distribuic¸a˜o de renda no Brasil.
Pesquisa e Planejamento Econoˆmico 37 (3), 405–426. Cited on 22
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. The Journal
of Political Economy 70 (2), 80–93. Cited on 15, 21, 38, 129, 140
Smith, J. A. and P. E. Todd (2005). Does matching overcome LaLonde’s critique
of nonexperimental estimators? Journal of Econometrics 125 (1), 305–353. Cited
on 139, 140
Soares, R. R. (2004). Crime reporting as a measure of institutional development.
Economic Development and Cultural Change 52 (4), 851–871. Cited on 190
Spenkuch, J. L. (2011). Understanding the impact of immigration on crime. MPRA
Paper 31171, Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Munich. Cited on 60, 61, 62, 64, 80
Stark, O. and D. E. Bloom (1985). The New Economics of Labor Migration. The
American Economic Review 75 (2), 173–178. Cited on 15, 100, 103, 129
Sugiyarto, E. and J. Litchfield (2016). Migrating Out of Poverty Ghana Household
Survey 2013 User Guide. Technical report, Migrating out of Poverty Research
Programme Consortium, Falmer. Cited on 111
Taylor, J. E. (1999). The new economics of labour migration and the role of re-
mittances in the migration process. International migration (Geneva, Switzer-
land) 37 (1), 63–88. Cited on 129
Taylor, J. E. and A. Lo´pez-Feldman (2010). Does Migration Make Rural Households
More Productive? Evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Studies 64 (1),
68–90. Cited on 102, 104, 128, 148, 155
Tunalı, I. (2000). Rationality of Migration. International Economic Review 41 (4),
893–920. Cited on 21, 58
Ulyssea, G. (2010). Firms, Informality and Development: Theory and evidence from
Brazil. The American Economic Review Resubmitted. Cited on 97
Woodruff, C. and R. Zenteno (2007). Migration networks and microenterprises in
Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 82, 509–528. Cited on 136
171
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data (2
ed.). Cambridge, MA; London: The MIT Press. Cited on 137, 139, 150
World Bank (2006). Crime, Violence and Economic Development in Brazil: Ele-
ments for Effective Public Policy. Technical Report 36525, World Bank, Wash-
ington, D.C. Cited on 62
World Bank (2016). World Development Indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/.
Cited on 71
World Bank (2017). Country Profile Ghana.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana. Cited on 106
Yang, D. (2008). International Migration, Remittances, and Household Invest-
ment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks. The Economic
Journal 118 (April), 591–630. Cited on 104
Yap, L. (1976). Internal Migration and Economic Development in Brazil. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (1), 119–137. Cited on 22, 25
172
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Matching
A.1.1 Coarsened exact matching (CEM)
Matching cannot eliminate the selection bias, but it can substantially reduce it.
For a valid matching estimator, two main assumptions have to be made: First, the
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA, Lechner (2000))1 which implies that
conditional on observable characteristics, the migrants’ wages had they not moved
would be the same as those of the non-migrants at origin. Secondly, the assumption
of common support which means that for each treated unit there must be at least
one untreated unit to match.
For the ATT, the CIA can be relaxed to just the control group. The matching
has to be based on variables that affect both, the migration decision M and the
outcome Y , but which are in turn not affected by the treatment M . The outcome
of non-migrants has to be independent of the treatment.
(Y 0)qM | X (A.1)
Thus, the conditioning variables included in X should be either time-invariant,
1The CIA was first established by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) named ”ignorable treatment
assignment”, it is often also referred to as ”unconfoundedness” (Imbens, 2004) or ”selection on
observables” (Barnow et al., 1980).
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such as gender and race, or measured before the treatment, e.g. education or age
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). With respect to the outcome, potential equilibrium
effects in the labour market due to labour mobility should be considered. In the
case of migrants moving out of the big metropolitan areas of Brazil it seems valid to
assume that the relatively small share of out-migration should not affect the wages
of non-migrants.
Coarsened exact matching (CEM) was developed as reaction to the balancing
problem of commonly used propensity score matching (PSM) methods (Blackwell
et al., 2009). The exact matching on coarsened variables, e.g. by education group
instead of years of education, allows the researcher to choose the balance resulting
from matching ex ante. The choice of imbalance for one variable does not affect
imbalance of others. Thus, CEM reduces the error in estimating the average treat-
ment effect due to selection bias and it bounds the degree of model dependence in
the main analysis and the data is automatically restricted to common support. The
large dataset of the Census at hand allows for this exact and full matching, not
having to fight with the trade-off between bias and variance as with PSM.
More general, CEM belongs to the Monotonic Imbalance Bounding Class (MIB)
(Iacus et al., 2011). Matching methods belonging to this class are defined to make
no assumptions about the data and therefore suitable to use for observational data.
The focus of MIB lies on in-sample imbalance in order to reduce model dependence.
The level of imbalance is chosen before the matching and thus the matched sample
results from the applied algorithm. Imbalance is bounded and it is generalized from
mean imbalance to apply to any function. This implies that not only the mean, but
other moments or interactions of covariates are balanced if the researcher considers
them important. Most importantly, as a consequence of these properties, changing
the bound for one variable will not affect the balance of the other covariates.
CEM fulfils these properties and is applied in three steps. First, covariates for
matching are coarsened according to the researcher’s discretion. Coarsening simply
means to define broader categories of information than the exact data provides. For
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example, instead of matching on age in months, I match in age groups of 10 years
because in the analysis of workers’ wages, the difference of one or two months or even
years should not matter too much. Secondly, the coarsened variables are matched
exactly by each category and observations are allocated in strata within which the
covariate takes the exact same value as defined by the coarsening. Finally, strata
that only comprise of control units are dropped and the remaining strata containing
treated and control units are used to compute weights for each observation. Let T s
be a treated unit in stratum s. Then msT is the number of treated units in stratum
s and matched units are mT =
∑
s∈Sm
s
T ; C
s, msC , and mC =
∑
s∈Sm
s
C for control
units respectively. Unmatched observations receive a weight equal to zero. Weights
for treated units are 1, and for control units they are
wi = mC/mT ∗msT/msC (A.2)
The weights are essentially the ratio of treated to control units within each
stratum normalized by the overall ratio of treated to control units in the matched
sample. These weights are then applied to predict the counterfactual wages of
metropolitan out-migrants as described next.
A.1.2 Application of CEM
The sample used for the wage predictions in metropolitan origins consists of 683,517
non-migrant residents in the metropolitan cities of origin and 16,172 migrants who
have moved within the past year before the survey from one of the 22 metropolitan
cities to any of the 529 non-metropolitan microregio˜es. Migrants are men and women
who live and work now in a different microregia˜o than one year before and different
than their place of birth. In this way, it is possible to exclude return migrants2 or
commuters to the city of former residence or to a close-by metropolitan city.
One of the issues without panel data at hand is that I cannot know exactly what
2Return migrants are expected to have a different motivation for their movement due to dif-
ferent expectations and information about their destination (for Brazil de Brito Ramalho and dos
Santos Queiroz (2011); Ribeiro Justo et al. (2010).
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the migrants’ characteristics were before they moved. However, by looking only
at most recent migrants, many characteristics are very unlikely to have changed
through migration and can thus be used for matching. The variables used for the
matching are sex, age (25 to 65 years in groups of 10 years), race (white non-white),
education level, industry and city of origin. Age of migrants and non-migrants at
time of migration for the matching can be calculated by simply subtracting one
year from their current age. Education is measured in levels of none, fundamental,
middle and higher education. As the sample is restricted to workers who are at least
25 years and currently not in education, I can assume that their level of education
has not changed since they moved.
The city of origin, in which workers lived, captures local labour market charac-
teristics as well as overall living conditions, which are not observed in specific detail
in retrospective, but which are unlikely to have changed dramatically within one
year.
I test the initial balance of the unmatched sample using the multivariate balance
statistic suggested by Iacus et al. (2011). This measure compares the distributions
of several covariates between treated and control group. It not only compares the
mean, but the whole distribution and it does so in a multivariate setting because
even if the mean of each covariate is not statistically different between treated and
control units, the multivariate distribution might still be imbalanced.
In short, the multivariate imbalance measure compares multivariate histograms
by comparing each bin. A multivariate distance, L1, of 1 implies that the distri-
butions between treated and control are completely separate, while L1 = 0 implies
complete overlap. The measure is relative, so that we first present the imbalance
statistic of the unmatched sample as point of comparison (see figure A.1).
The first column of the table lists the univariate L1 distance for each variable, the
second column the average difference, while the next columns look at the differences
along the distribution of the variable. From this table, we can see that the variable
age and industry (“activ group”) show some imbalance along their distribution.
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Figure A.1: Balancing statistics for unmatched sample
Some differences remain also for the metropolitan city and the education level.
Matching results are presented below in figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Matching summary of Coarsend Exact Matching
First, we can see that most observations were matched. The multivariate L1
distance measure indicates that the matching specification improves the balance
between samples resembled also by very small univariate differences.
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A.2 Additional tables
Table A.1: Coefficients and t-statistics of prediction of
wages for migrants based on residents at destination, OLS
Log(hourly wage)
Coefficient t-statistic
Age 0.036 67.013
Age squared -0.029 -44.827
Female -0.266 -206.027
White 0.108 76.766
Education (Base = none)
Primary, secondary incomplete 0.300 171.025
Secondary, higher incomplete 0.530 342.234
Higher complete 1.212 540.371
Mean (Log(hourly wage)) = 1.521
OLS estimates weighted with population weights. Sample are
non-migrant residents in the destinations.
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Table A.2: Observed and predicted wage differences
based on unmatched sample
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 15,424 1.816
Predicted 15,424 2.077
Difference -0.262***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 15,424 -2.237
Predicted 15,424 -2.387
Difference 0.151***
High skilled
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 3,107 2.846
Predicted 3,107 2.960
Difference -0.114***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 3,107 -1.270
Predicted 3,107 -1.514
Difference 0.244***
Low skilled
Log (nominal hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 12,317 1.556
Predicted 12,317 1.855
Difference -0.230***
Log (real hourly wages) N Mean
Observed 12,317 -2.481
Predicted 12,317 -2.608
Difference 0.127***
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% for t-test of dif-
ference in means between observed and predicted wages.
Predicted wages are based on unmatched sample.
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Table A.3: Observed and predicted real wage dif-
ferences using different measures of living costs
Log (real hourly wages)
High skilled
Skill-specific mean rents N Mean
Observed 3,107 -1.556
Predicted 3,107 -1.925
Difference 0.369***
Skill-specific median rents N Mean
Observed 3,107 -1.476
Predicted 3,107 -1.776
Difference 0.300***
Low skilled
Skill-specific mean rents N Mean
Observed 12,317 -2.433
Predicted 12,317 -2.514
Difference 0.081***
Skill-specific median rents N Mean
Observed 12,317 -2.341
Predicted 12,317 -2.411
Difference 0.070***
Significance levels * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% for t-test of
difference in means between observed and predicted
wages. Predicted wages are based on matched sample.
Rent for room is aggregated at the microregia˜o level.
Skill-specific rents are the rent per room aggregated
only for the high or low skilled observations respect-
ively in a microregia˜o applying population survey
weights. Once the mean is aggregated, in another
case the median. Lastly, I also use the median to
aggregate the hedonic housing price measure. These
different price measures are used as denominator to
compute real hourly wages.
Table A.4: Regression of housing prices on housing char-
acteristics to predict hedonic price index, OLS estimates
log(rent per room)
Urban area 0.256***
(0.005)
Type of dwelling (Base = House)
Townhouse/condominion 0.146***
(0.003)
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – continued
log(rent per room)
Flat 0.396***
(0.002)
Hut 0.196***
(0.006)
Wall material (Base = Bricks coated)
Bricks not coated -0.160***
(0.002)
Wood -0.265***
(0.003)
Plaster coated -0.461***
(0.015)
Plaster not coated -0.521***
(0.020)
Wood unprepared -0.344***
(0.010)
Straw -0.073
(0.155)
Others -0.146***
(0.015)
Bathroom (Base = none)
1 -0.213***
(0.006)
2 -0.095***
(0.006)
3 0.047***
(0.007)
4 0.220***
(0.012)
5 0.355***
(0.027)
6 0.517***
(0.054)
7 0.430***
(0.119)
8 1.046***
(0.237)
9 or more 0.356***
(0.083)
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – continued
log(rent per room)
Sanitation (Base = General sanitation network)
Septic sump -0.089***
(0.002)
Rudimentary sump -0.200***
(0.002)
Ditch -0.225***
(0.005)
River, lake or sea -0.152***
(0.004)
Other -0.212***
(0.009)
Waste water (Base = General distribution network)
Well on property 0.007**
(0.003)
Well outside property -0.088***
(0.005)
Carro-pipa -0.072***
(0.014)
Rain water cisterne -0.074***
(0.028)
Rain water other -0.097
(0.068)
Rivers, lakes etc. -0.081***
(0.023)
Other -0.155***
(0.010)
Well in village 0.165**
(0.066)
Canalization access (Base = Yes, in min. 1 room)
Yes, only on the property -0.052***
(0.004)
No -0.148***
(0.006)
Garbage collection (Base = Collected directly)
Collected in collective -0.054***
(0.002)
Burnt -0.229***
(0.008)
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 – continued
log(rent per room)
Buried -0.017
(0.043)
Tossed in public area -0.229***
(0.008)
Tossed in river, lake or sea -0.195***
(0.036)
Other 0.005
(0.027)
Electricity provision (base = Yes by company)
Yes, other -0.094***
(0.010)
No electricity -0.238***
(0.021)
Constant 4.235***
(0.016)
Dummies for microregia˜o Yes
Observations 927,192
R-squared 0.539
183
Table A.5: Variables and data sources used in chapter 1
Variable Description Source
Variables for descriptive statistics and destination choice model, at level of microregia˜o
Housing prices Average rent Census, IBGE
Education provision quality index Index from 0 to 1, computed based on: subscription rate of pre-school children, drop-out rate,
Rate of teachers with higher education, average daily teaching hours, results of the IDEB
(Indicator of development of education in Brazil) FIRJAN*
Health provision quality index Index from 0 to 1, computed based on: Number of pre-natal consultations,
deaths due to badly defined causes, child-deaths due to evitable causes FIRJAN*
Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008 Ipeadata
GDP Log of GDP in 2009 Ipeadata
Distance between origin and destination geodesic distance as indicator for fixed moving costs, author’s calculation from coordinates Census, IBGE
Additional variables for wage regression, at individual level
Partner participation Dummy whether partner is working Census, IBGE
Proportion of children in household Number of children relative to number of adults in household Census, IBGE
Marital status Separated/divorced/widowed, single, married Census, IBGE
Sector public, private, informal, self-employed Census, IBGE
Industry 21 industries according to International Standard Industrial Classification of all
Economic Activities (ISIC) Census, IBGE
Federal state 27 states Census, IBGE
Variables for matching, on individual level
Age At time of migration, i.e. one year ago Census, IBGE
Race White and non-white Census, IBGE
Education level Primary, middle, high-school, college Census, IBGE
Microregia˜o of origin/residency City of origin for migrants and city of residency for comparison group of non-migrants Census, IBGE
Other variables for descriptive statistics of microregio˜es
Formal sector wages Average annual formal sector wages in microregio˜es RAIS**
* FIRJAN (Industrial federation in Rio de Janeiro state)
** RAIS (National formal sector firm and employment registry)
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional tables
Table B.1: OLS regression of the local economy on the instrument in net-
sending municipalities, 2005-2010
Ln(GDP) Ln(Wages) Ln(Employment rate)
Manufacturing labour 0.638** 0.821*** 0.212
demand shock in t-1 (0.313) (0.119) (0.272)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 16,033 16,033 16,033
R2 0.0718 0.875 0.285
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the microregia˜o
level. Wages and employment rate are only for the formal sector.
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Table B.2: 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on immigra-
tion rates 2005-2010, Second stage results
Ln(Homicide rate)
Quadratic trend Cubic trend
Ln(Immigration rate) 1.162*** 1.163***
(0.190) (0.191)
Destination shock Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic state tend Yes No
Cubic state trend No Yes
N 6,589 6,589
Kleibergen-Paap Test 54 53.7
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are
clustered at the microregion level. Each regression is weighted
by municipality population. MC fixed effects refers to muni-
cipality fixed effects. Destination shock indicates that the re-
gression includes the local labour demand shock variable at
destination.
Table B.3: 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on
net-migration rates 2005-2010, Second stage res-
ults
Ln(Homicide rate)
Ln(Net-migration rate) 0.170***
(0.027)
Destination shock Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes
Year fixed effects Yes
State-year trend Yes
Observations 4838
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 161
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard
errors are clustered at the microregion level. The re-
gression is weighted by municipality population. Des-
tination shock indicates that the regression includes
the local labour demand shock variable at destina-
tion.
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Table B.4: 2SLS estimation: Homicide rates on
immigration rates with lagged immigration rates
2005-2010, Second stage results
Ln(Homicide rate)
Ln(Immigration rate) 0.219 0.720***
(0.215) (0.224)
L1.Ln(Immigration rate) 0.049* 0.163***
(0.030) (0.053)
L2.Ln(Immigration rate) 0.122**
(0.050)
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
State-year trend Yes Yes
Observations 5254 4039
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 61.4 43.8
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard
errors are clustered at the microregion level. The re-
gression is weighted by municipality population. Des-
tination shock indicates that the regression includes
the local labour demand shock variable at destination.
Table B.5: Migrants’ characteristic in response to local labour
demand shocks at origin, by year
Year Probability to be N
Low-skilled Female Young Young, male,
(16 to 25 years) low-skilled
2009 0.317* 0.327* -0.670*** -0.550*** 33,191
(0.161) (0.164) (0.163) (0.120)
2008 0.313* 0.034 -0.772*** -0.253* 34,237
(0.152) (0.154) (0.152) (0.105)
2007 0.465** -0.034 -0.738*** -0.217* 31,533
(0.163) (0.166) (0.159) (0.106)
2006 0.599** -0.102 -0.813*** -0.369** 27,023
(0.213) (0.218) (0.204) (0.137)
2005 0.368** 0.017 -0.486*** -0.280*** 18,759
(0.130) (0.132) (0.122) (0.081)
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. These are the marginal effects from separate
probit estimations of the probability of a migrant to be either low educated, female
or young/male/unskilled on the local labour demand shock in a migrant’s origin
in t-1 by year of migration. Standard errors are robust. All regressions include
dummies for the state of origin.
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B.2 Additional figures
Figure B.1: Homicide rates in Sa˜o Paulo State 2004 to 2015.
Figure B.2: Manufacturing employment share in destinations and origins 2005-
2010.
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B.3 Misreported homicide data
Working with crime data yields the issue of wrongly reported data. A common
concern is that crime rates are often under-reported, because criminals try to hide
their action. Homicide rates are less prone to this issue due to the severity of
the event, but drug-related homicides or police killings are likely to lead to under-
reporting (Cerqueira, 2012). The process of reporting and categorizing a death in
Brazil is as follows: By law, a doctor has to fill out the declaration of death for any
dead individual and in case of an external and non-natural cause of death, this doctor
has to be from the Legal Medical Institute. She or he has to define whether the death
was due to homicide, suicide or undetermined causes. One copy of the declaration
is then handed to the next-in-kin of the dead person, another to the municipal
Secretariat of Health, where administrators fill in the ICD-10 code (International
Code of Death, World Health Organization). They have to follow up with doctors
from the Legal Medical Institute and/or the police in case the declaration is not
clear enough to define the ICD-10 code (Borges et al., 2012). Thus, it is crucial that
the police passes on information to health institutions properly. This is often done
poorly, so that in 2010 around 37% of deaths reported did not report the location
of death and around 7% of homicides were filed in the category of ’death due to
unknown cause’ but are significantly more likely to have been homicides (Cerqueira,
2014a). These incorrectly reported homicides are thus not included in the data used
for this analysis. Additionally, Brazil has a high number of police killings which are
often not reported or hidden, as only in few states there is actual data available for
these events. In 2010 alone, around 1.6 people in 100,000 were killed by police in the
states where data was available (Murray et al., 2013). Some of these deaths might
show up under the category of ’death due to unknown cause’ but they are less likely
to be reported as homicides and are thus excluded from this analysis.
The analysis so far ignored the fact, that almost one third of the observations
are dropped due to missing values of homicide rates. I can either assume that these
missing values are actually zero homicides which do not appear in the original data
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from the Ministry of Health Death Registry. In the database where homicide data
is stored, municipalities that do not actually experience any homicides, i.e. they
should appear with a zero, are not listed and thus show up as missing values. They
cannot be differentiated from municipalities that report no homicides to the registry
even though they have occurred. It is a major concern that some municipalities
systematically non-report or under-report homicides. There are two reasons that
could give rise to under-reporting of homicides. Firstly, homicides are a crime and
as such mostly occur in a hidden and obscure environment so that not all events
are discovered and reported. Secondly, homicide figures can be seen as political
instrument and there is an incentive for police stations or other public institutions
to under-report in order to appear in a better public light. These issues give rise to
the assumption that the homicide rates are on average under-reported. For the case
of Brazil there is evidence that some states have higher tendency to under-report
homicides (Cerqueira, 2014a).
Systematic misreporting of homicides raises a valid concern of selection bias. The
assumption that the missing values for homicides are actually zeros is motivated by
the fact, that municipalities with missing homicide rates are on average much smaller
than municipalities that report homicide rates. They have a population of around
7,800 people compared to almost 52,000 on average in the municipalities without
missing values (Table B.6). Hence, the number of homicides in the municipalities
with missing values is only between one and two, very close to zero. It is also
important to note that municipalities with missing data report homicide values in
some years, but not in others. This is why I can report a homicide rate for these
municipalities in the first column of table B.6.
However, it is necessary to further check whether the zero assumption is plaus-
ible and how robust the results are if the assumption is challenged. The concern of
non-reporting becomes an issue for the identification strategy of this paper if muni-
cipalities that have missing homicide values are systematically different from those
that do report and if that difference is related to immigration rates. Table B.6 shows
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demographic, economic and social characteristics of all municipalities grouped by
their reporting of homicides in the period from 2005 until 2010. In the last column
are the p-values of the t-test of statistical difference in the means of each variable
between the two groups. The municipalities are statistically different in all charac-
teristics but public security spending at state level. The municipalities with missing
values are very small, less urbanized and more remotely located than those that do
not have missing values. Despite remoteness municipalities with missing homicide
values have higher scores in health indices. They show better institutional qual-
ity with regards to factors that can affect the reporting of homicides, because the
health institutions bear responsibility in the reporting process (Soares, 2004). This
supports the zero homicide assumption.
Table B.6: Characteristics of destination municipalities with and without missing
homicide values
Missing Non-missing Difference P-value
of t-test
Homicide rate 27.7 25.7 2 0.000
Homicides N 1.5 22.2 -20.7 0.000
Immigration rate 642.8 752.1 -109.3 0.000
Population 2010 7,505 76,852 -69,347 0.000
Public security spending 17.81 17.78 0.03 0.452
Health quality index (0 to 1) 0.81 0.79 0.01 0.000
Distance to state capital 257.4 205.9 51.5 0.000
Urbanization rate 0.62 0.75 -0.13 0.000
N 5,396 7,354
One possibility would be to model the selection of municipalities into reporting
of missing and non-missing values. But this is not possible because it is not clear
for which municipalities there is a selection problem in contrast to those that actu-
ally have zero homicides so that an exclusion restriction - even if available - would
not work. Therefore, I conduct a simple matching exercises to estimate bounds for
the main results and present these in the robustness checks in table B.7. I impute
the homicide rates of other municipalities to those which have missing values. In
order not to just randomly impute values, I match municipalities based on charac-
teristics that are likely to affect the quality of reporting: population, distance to
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the state capital, the federal state, local GDP, health institutional quality index1,
and homicide of the previous year. The estimated propensity score is then used to
match municipalities to their nearest five neighbours. Then I will separately use the
highest and lowest homicide values of the five nearest neighbours for each municipal-
ity with missing homicide values to replace these and run the 2SLS regression. The
coefficients should indicate, how much the main result changes if the assumption of
zero homicides is wrong and present a worst case scenario, in which homicides are
actually higher than reported or a less concerning setting in which homicide rates
are not zero, but rather low.
In table B.7, I present the result of the 2SLS regression using the IV as in the
main estimation, but with a different sample. In column 1 missing homicide values
are treated as very small values between zero and one. If I used zeros they would
become missing once I take the logarithm of homicide rates. As shown above, it
is plausible to think that the homicide rates are very small values in years when
only one or two homicides occurred. The effect is naturally smaller as there are
many such small values. The instrument still passes the first stage F-test rule of
thumb. This reduces the concern that there is a selection bias which is related to the
instrument and would thus interfere with the identification strategy. In the other
two columns are the coefficients when missing homicide values are replaced by the
values of homicide rates from matched neighbours. In the second column, the effect
is very close to the main result. In the worst case scenario, that missing homicide
values are actually high values, the effect becomes only slightly larger. Even though
the matching exercise did not impute zeros by construction, it did not systematically
change the result of the analysis. The assumption that missing homicide values are
actually mis-reported zeros or values close to zero seems plausible. The imputed
1This index is compiled by the Federal Industrial Association of the State of Rio de Janeiro
(FIRJAN) from data on the number of pre-natal consultations, number of deaths due to badly
defined causes, number of infant deaths due to evitable causes and whether hospitalization is
sensible to basic care. The index is a value between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest level
of development. The fact, that the index includes the number of deaths due to badly defined
causes makes it an important variable for the matching, because this indicates the quality of the
institutions involved in the reporting of homicides.
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values of the lowest nearest neighbours are on average 9.9, for the highest, 44.9.
The latter is much higher than the average homicide rate in the missing sample for
the years, in which these municipalities do not report missing values (23.2). Even
if I assume that this scenario is unrealistic, it is only 0.1 percentage points higher
than the initial estimate of 1.2% so that I am not concerned with this issue.
Table B.7: Robustness of results to changes in homicide values
Effect of migration on homicide rates, 2SLS estimation
Ln(Homicide rate)
Imputation for missing values: Between Lowest nearest Highest nearest
0 and 1 neighbour neighbour
Ln(Immigration rate) 0.902*** 1.090*** 1.338***
(0.229) (0.206) (0.212)
Destination shock Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
MC fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
State trend Yes Yes Yes
N 11,492 7,927 7,927
Kleibergen-Paap Test 44.9 46.1 46.1
Mean of imputed homicide rate 9.2 44.9
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the microregion
level. Each regression is weighted by municipality population. MC fixed effects refers to
municipality fixed effects. Destination shock indicates that the regression includes the
local labour demand shock variable at destination.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Multiple Correspondence Analysis to construct
asset index
An asset index is a composite measure using information about asset ownership
and/or other welfare indicators in survey data. The researcher is interested in one
continuous measure that captures the welfare of a household. In its simplest format,
we can think of an asset index as the sum of its weighted components as specified
in equation C.1:
Ai = p1a1,i + p2a2,i + . . .+ pkak,i (C.1)
The asset index of household i is the sum of each of the individual asset indicator
dummies, ak weighted by an asset specific weight, pk. Each indicator is equal to 1 if
the household owns this specific asset, 0 otherwise. There are different possibilities
to assign weights. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) apply Principle Component Analysis
(PCA) to retrieve weights for each asset to construct an asset index that reflects
household wealth. PCA uses the cross-sectional covariance of all individual assets to
define the linear combination of these assets with the largest variance. This would
be the first principal component. The linear combination orthogonal to this first
one would be the second principal component and so on. This method thus assumes
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that the variation in assets explained by all components is complete and accurate.
The PCA also imposes the linear constraint of equal distance between categories and
ordered categories (Booysen et al., 2008). It is however arbitrary to judge whether a
cement wall is of better or lower quality than a burnt brick wall, and even if that was
established it is not clear that the difference in quality would be the same between
a burnt brick and a cement wall as between a cement and a mud wall.
In response to the strong assumptions of PCA, Sahn and Stifel (2000) applied the
less restrictive method of Factor Analysis (FA). This method also assumes that the
cross-sectional variance-covariance matrix of individual asset indicators can reveal a
common factor. It can therefore be used to extract the linear combinations of those
individual assets that reflect this factor the best. In contrast to PCA, it allows
individual assets to explain variances and not all indicators have to explain the full
covariance matrix. This approach however requires imposing a linear relationship
and assumes normality for model estimation (Asselin, 2009). This assumption and
the arbitrary choice of rotation methods in the second step of FA seem restrictive
and arbitrary (Booysen et al., 2008).
The third approach, used in chapter 3, is the non-parametric approach to let the
data reveal the individual asset weights without the imposition of any functional
form, that is Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA is also more suitable
to a setting with categorical variables than PCA. Our asset measures are always
expressed in categorical variables. Asselin (2009) explains in detail the advantage
of MCA over FA or PCA to construct multidimensional poverty measures. Booysen
et al. (2008) for example use MCA to construct an asset index to compare poverty
dynamics across time and countries.
The construction of an asset index using MCA can be described in three steps.
First, we construct an indicator matrix I as form of normalization of the data. This
means that we generate a dummy for each of the variable categories that is equal to
one if the household, for example, has wooden walls and zero for all other types of
walls and so on. It is important to note that for each asset variable the categories are
195
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. A household cannot have a one for both, wooden
walls and brick walls; neither can the household have only zeros for the categories
of wall quality. The result of this data manipulation is the indicator matrix I in
which the rows represent a household observation for the year 2013, and the columns
represent an asset category.
In the second step, we apply MCA to this indicator matrix. The columns are
vectors for each sub-category of each asset item, e.g. brick wall, cement wall, mud
wall all comprise one column vector each for the asset item ‘wall material’. The
MCA computes the principal coordinates of each of these categories. These co-
ordinates capture the contribution of each category in the first one-dimensional axis
of best fit, which explains most of the variation in the indicator matrix I and can
therefore be understood as the unobserved underlying factor. In other words, these
coordinates are the average of the normalized scores of each population unit in this
category. These coordinates will serve as the weights for each indicator category in
the construction of the asset index.
Thirdly, we apply these weights to each asset category to compute the asset index
to each household-year observation as in equation C.1. We present the results from
the MCA displaying the principal coordinates and their contribution to the overall
category variance in the appendix figures C.1 and C.2 (page 196 and 197).
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Figure C.1: Explanatory power of each dimension of MCA
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Figure C.2: Summary of first dimension of MCA
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Figure C.3: Summary of first dimension of MCA, continued
The comparison of asset indices for the same household over time yields two
potential problems. The first is that the coordinates used as weights should be con-
sistent over time to make the index comparable between periods. The coordinates
are retrieved from the data and result from the cross-sectional variation of assets
across households. If we now pooled the two survey waves to compute the coordin-
ates, this variation would be different than that of one cross-section and some of the
variation would only reflect variation over time. Therefore, we will rely only on the
data of the base year 2013 to retrieve the coordinates as in Booysen et al. (2008).
Then we use these to compute the index in both years. In the appendix table C.6
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(page 206), we also present the main results using the pooled sample to compute
the asset index. The results barely change.
The second issue is that prices for assets might change over time and in response
to this the demand for assets and the distribution of assets across households might
change.1 There is, though, no reason to think that households with a new mi-
grant would react differently than control households to price changes in their asset
purchase behaviour.
C.2 Attrition
Some households of the baseline survey were not successfully tracked in the follow-up
two years later. These were around 300 households. For the analysis in chapter 3 it
is important to understand, whether some of these households would have been part
of the sample of interest and what implications their attrition has for the analysis.
Of the 300 households that attrited, 167 had a migrant in 2013. They would have
been part of the analysis either as treated or control units. In order to understand
whether these households would have been more or less likely to be in the treatment
group and whether they are substantially different from our sample we compare the
baseline characteristics of households. The comparison is between the 167 attrited
households with migration experience, the control and the treatment households.
Table C.1 shows results of a Logit and of a Multinomial Logit (MNL) estima-
tion of the status of a household on baseline characteristics. The most important
difference between sample and attrited households is their size as we see in the first
row of the regressions. Attrited families are significantly smaller than those that
were successfully re-interviewed. Furthermore, treated households are significantly
larger than both control and attrited observations. There are a few other weakly
significant coefficients. The regional differences are notable. Attrition is highest in
1While there has been high inflation in Ghana between 2013 and 2015 there is no data on the
price changes for each individual asset (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015b,a). Moreover, it is difficult
to measure the market price of a mud wall or a brick wall, as we would need to decide whether to
measure only the material or also the service to build the wall.
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the Volta region, 46 percent of attrited units were located here, 25 percent in Brong
Ahafo, and only 5 percent in the Upper West. In the Logit estimation the base cat-
egory of regions is Brong Ahafo, so that only the coefficient for Upper West appears
significantly. In contrast, treated households are much more likely to be located in
Brong Ahafo than in Volta or Northern region as we observe in the MNL results.
Table C.1: Likelihood for household to attrite, Logit and
Multinomial Logit results
Logit MNL (Base = Control)
Attrited Treated
(N = 167) (N = 170)
Household size -0.129*** -0.084** 0.202***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.038)
Dependency ratio 0.136 0.112 -0.119
(0.165) (0.164) (0.194)
Age of head in years -0.009 -0.011 -0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Number of current migrants in 2013 -0.115 -0.098 0.048
(0.094) (0.095) (0.075)
Female head -0.204 -0.121 0.420
(0.289) (0.294) (0.279)
Highest level of education in household (Base = None)
Primary 0.920 0.833 -0.382
(0.866) (0.874) (0.671)
Middle/Junior 1.254 1.194 -0.280
(0.799) (0.803) (0.603)
Senior Secondary 1.152 1.107 -0.232
(0.807) (0.812) (0.605)
Higher 1.220 1.259 0.078
(0.827) (0.832) (0.605)
Main occupation of head (Base = Inactive/Other)
Employee -0.685 -0.603 0.540
(0.442) (0.451) (0.559)
Self-employed -0.748* -0.685* 0.435
(0.383) (0.390) (0.465)
Unpaid work / unemployed -1.314** -1.247** 0.478
(0.512) (0.523) (0.470)
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued
Logit MNL (Base = Control)
Attrited Treated
(N = 167) (N = 170)
Marital status of head (Base = Single)
Married/living with partner 0.974* 0.998* 0.137
(0.567) (0.577) (0.511)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 0.864 0.904 0.194
(0.613) (0.625) (0.557)
Region (Base = Brong Ahafo)
Northern -0.310 -0.710* -1.984***
(0.369) (0.389) (0.399)
Upper East -0.698 -0.704 -0.014
(0.459) (0.477) (0.370)
Upper West -1.216** -1.347** -0.499
(0.572) (0.579) (0.391)
Volta 0.119 -0.075 -0.847***
(0.275) (0.285) (0.326)
Household has seasonal migrant -0.464* -0.424 0.222
(0.275) (0.278) (0.240)
Household has returnee -0.327 -0.236 0.445
(0.357) (0.365) (0.297)
Main income source(Base = Public sector)
Private sector 0.713 0.866* 0.688
(0.509) (0.525) (0.588)
Own business 0.378 0.421 0.192
(0.436) (0.441) (0.485)
Own farm -0.022 0.161 0.786
(0.480) (0.488) (0.503)
Private transfers 0.478 0.523 0.173
(0.480) (0.487) (0.534)
Others -0.015 0.048 0.317
(0.755) (0.779) (0.738)
Asset purchases in preceding 2 years
Electronic goods 0.239 0.226 0.050
(0.252) (0.257) (0.243)
White goods -0.129 -0.094 0.043
(0.305) (0.314) (0.319)
Livestock -0.180 -0.170 0.048
(0.323) (0.327) (0.274)
Generator -0.750 -0.620 0.514
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued
Logit MNL (Base = Control)
Attrited Treated
(N = 167) (N = 170)
(1.137) (1.160) (0.694)
Car 1.213** 1.633*** 1.384**
(0.507) (0.567) (0.557)
Computer -0.700 -0.784 -0.190
(0.500) (0.522) (0.608)
Electric Appliances 0.094 -0.007 -0.551
(0.293) (0.301) (0.365)
Other Investments 0.263 0.293 0.199
(0.367) (0.376) (0.383)
Agricultural land -0.412 -0.342 0.203
(0.356) (0.364) (0.275)
Agricultural machinery 0.915 0.911 0.107
(0.856) (0.877) (0.733)
Non-agricultural land -0.080 -0.171 -0.442
(0.343) (0.355) (0.351)
New house -0.456 -0.306 0.607**
(0.286) (0.292) (0.255)
Constant -1.227 -1.177 -2.665**
(1.170) (1.177) (1.133)
Observations 699 699 699
log likelihood -296 -573 -573
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 81.64 178.8 178.8
These observations suggest that attrited households were less likely to be among
the treated group. They appear however still different from the control group in
the sample, so that we cannot assume that they are missing at random. To have a
better sense of how their exclusion from the analysis might affect the results of the
impact assessment, we look at the distribution of the asset index. It is important to
note that the index is constructed based on the cross-sectional distribution of assets
in the baseline sample. Thus, the distribution changes once we include the attrited
household in the construction of the index. Figure C.4 plots the kernel density of
the asset index at baseline. We differentiate between the attrited households, the
control and the treated. The latter two groups show two different graphs. One is
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the asset index when we construct it including the attrited households, the other
one (indicated with ‘sample’) when we construct it only for the households included
in the analysis. This is the index used in the analysis of chapter 3.
Figure C.4: Distribution of asset index for attrited, treated and control households
in 2013
The exclusion of the attrited observations from the index construction implies
a change in the distribution of the index. However, the distribution of treatment
and control units are very similar. The attrited households have a lower asset index
distribution. This could result from their smaller size which is associated with assets
of housing quality. For the results of the analysis, we can only conclude, that the
initial asset index distribution would look different for the control group, it would be
lower. However, the application of balancing weights would ensure that the analysis
would be based on a comparable sample. The analysis looks at the impact of having
a new migrant on the change in the asset index between survey years. The data does
not allow to see whether attrited households are on a positive or negative growth
trajectory regarding their asset index. If we assume that they are in the control
group (based on their observables) a positive change in their asset index would bias
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our results upwards, we would possible find a significant negative effect, and vice
versa.
C.3 Additional tables
Table C.2: Migration costs by number of times migrant moved before
New migrant Baseline migrant
in GHS of 2015 N in GHS of 2015 N
First time 160.3 74 331.0 137
Moved at least once before 78.2 41 142.3 132
Table C.3: Results of Chow test; H0 = Coefficients are stable across sub-samples
F( 8, 464) = 1.13
Prob > F = 0.3389
Table C.4: Effect of having a new migrant on asset index dropping local
employment rate from control variables, weighted least squares
Asset index
New Migrant * 2015 -0.016
(0.011)
Household has return migrant (=1) -0.015*
(0.009)
Dependency ratio 0.001
(0.004)
Occupation of household head (base = inactive/others)
Employee 0.015
(0.015)
Self-employed 0.001
(0.015)
Unpaid work / unemployed -0.002
(0.018)
Entropy balancing weights Yes
Observations 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.524
Number of clusters 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E. clustered
at community level.
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Table C.5: Effect of having a new migrant on asset index, weighted
least squares. Entropy balancing weights constructed including the
asset index and its squared term at baseline instead of individual
asset indicators.
Asset index
(1) (2) (3)
New Migrant * 2015 -0.011 -0.018* -0.017*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Household has return migrant (=1) 0.002
(0.005)
Dependency ratio 0.008
(0.014)
Occupation of household head (base = inactive/others)
Employee -0.006
(0.016)
Self-employed -0.004
(0.017)
Unpaid work / unemployed -0.018**
(0.008)
Local employment rate 0.125
(0.094)
Entropy balancing weights No Yes Yes
Observations 960 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.584 0.546 0.552
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects estimator. S.E.
clustered at community level.
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Table C.6: Effect of having a new migrant
on asset index, weighted least squares. As-
set index constructed from data pooling
both survey waves.
Asset index
New Migrant * 2015 -0.016
(0.010)
Entropy balancing weights Yes
Other controls Yes
Observations 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.539
Number of clusters 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed
effects estimator. S.E. clustered at community
level.
Other controls include whether the household
has a returned migrant, occupation of the
household head, dependency ratio and com-
munity employment rate.
Table C.7: Effect of new migrant on household
welfare controlling for sample that did not re-
spond to shock question, weighted least squares
Asset index
New Migrant * 2015 -0.016 -0.024
(0.011) (0.017)
Community not in sample 0.023**
(0.011)
Entropy balancing weights Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 960 960
Adjusted R-squared 0.529 0.532
Number of clusters 93 93
Significance levels * 10% ** 5% *** 1%. Fixed effects
estimator. S.E. clustered at community level.
Other controls include whether the household has a
returned migrant, occupation of the household head,
dependency ratio and community employment rate.
